Deterring Kickbacks and Encouraging Entry in Public Procurement Markets : Evidence from Firm Surveys in 90 Developing Countries

There is little systematic evidence on the links between procurement systems and outcomes such as competition and corruption levels. This paper adds to the evidence, using data on 34,000 firms from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys, in 90 countries with procurement systems data from Public Ex...

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Main Authors:	Knack, Stephen, Biletska, Nataliya, Kacker, Kanishka
Format:	Journal Article
Published:	Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank 2020
Subjects:	PROCUREMENT BRIBERY CORRUPTION KICKBACKS GOVERNANCE
Online Access:	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34863

id	okr-10986-34863
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-348632021-04-23T14:02:10Z Deterring Kickbacks and Encouraging Entry in Public Procurement Markets : Evidence from Firm Surveys in 90 Developing Countries Knack, Stephen Biletska, Nataliya Kacker, Kanishka PROCUREMENT BRIBERY CORRUPTION KICKBACKS GOVERNANCE There is little systematic evidence on the links between procurement systems and outcomes such as competition and corruption levels. This paper adds to the evidence, using data on 34,000 firms from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys, in 90 countries with procurement systems data from Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessments. We find that in countries with better public access to complete, reliable, and timely procurement information, firms are more likely to participate in public procurement markets. Firms report paying less in kickbacks to officials in countries where exceptions to open competition in tendering must be explicitly justified, and where there are effective and independent complaints mechanisms. These findings—particularly on kickbacks—are robust to the inclusion of numerous controls and to a range of sensitivity tests. However, due to data limitations we are unable to rule out the possibility that these estimates may reflect in part endogeneity bias. 2020-12-03T17:16:18Z 2020-12-03T17:16:18Z 2019-06 Journal Article World Bank Economic Review 1564-698X http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34863 CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank Publications & Research :: Journal Article Publications & Research
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
topic	PROCUREMENT BRIBERY CORRUPTION KICKBACKS GOVERNANCE
spellingShingle	PROCUREMENT BRIBERY CORRUPTION KICKBACKS GOVERNANCE Knack, Stephen Biletska, Nataliya Kacker, Kanishka Deterring Kickbacks and Encouraging Entry in Public Procurement Markets : Evidence from Firm Surveys in 90 Developing Countries
description	There is little systematic evidence on the links between procurement systems and outcomes such as competition and corruption levels. This paper adds to the evidence, using data on 34,000 firms from the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys, in 90 countries with procurement systems data from Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessments. We find that in countries with better public access to complete, reliable, and timely procurement information, firms are more likely to participate in public procurement markets. Firms report paying less in kickbacks to officials in countries where exceptions to open competition in tendering must be explicitly justified, and where there are effective and independent complaints mechanisms. These findings—particularly on kickbacks—are robust to the inclusion of numerous controls and to a range of sensitivity tests. However, due to data limitations we are unable to rule out the possibility that these estimates may reflect in part endogeneity bias.
format	Journal Article
author	Knack, Stephen Biletska, Nataliya Kacker, Kanishka
author_facet	Knack, Stephen Biletska, Nataliya Kacker, Kanishka
author_sort	Knack, Stephen
title	Deterring Kickbacks and Encouraging Entry in Public Procurement Markets : Evidence from Firm Surveys in 90 Developing Countries
title_short	Deterring Kickbacks and Encouraging Entry in Public Procurement Markets : Evidence from Firm Surveys in 90 Developing Countries
title_full	Deterring Kickbacks and Encouraging Entry in Public Procurement Markets : Evidence from Firm Surveys in 90 Developing Countries
title_fullStr	Deterring Kickbacks and Encouraging Entry in Public Procurement Markets : Evidence from Firm Surveys in 90 Developing Countries
title_full_unstemmed	Deterring Kickbacks and Encouraging Entry in Public Procurement Markets : Evidence from Firm Surveys in 90 Developing Countries
title_sort	deterring kickbacks and encouraging entry in public procurement markets : evidence from firm surveys in 90 developing countries
publisher	Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank
publishDate	2020
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34863
_version_	1764481816011472896

Deterring Kickbacks and Encouraging Entry in Public Procurement Markets : Evidence from Firm Surveys in 90 Developing Countries

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