The Politics of Power : The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking in Electric Utilities in the Philippines
This paper takes advantage of unique intra-country variation in the Philippines power sector to examine under what conditions politicians have an incentive to "capture" an electric utility and use it for the purposes of rent-seeking. The...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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2012
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| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110623180935 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3472 |
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okr-10986-34722021-04-23T14:02:10Z The Politics of Power : The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking in Electric Utilities in the Philippines Hasnain, Zahid Matsuda, Yasuhiko ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ACTIVISM ALLOCATION ANARCHY AUTONOMY BIDDING BUREAUCRACY BUSINESSMEN CAPABILITIES CAPITALISM CETERIS PARIBUS CHECKS AND BALANCES CIVIL SOCIETY COLLECTIVE ACTION COLLUSION COMPETITIVENESS COMPLAINT COMPLAINTS CONFIDENCE CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CONSUMER GROUPS CONSUMERS CORPORATION CORRUPTION CRIME DEMOCRACY DEVELOPMENT POLICY DICTATORSHIP DISCRETION DYNASTIES ECONOMIC RENTS ECONOMICS ECONOMIES OF SCALE ELECTIONS ETHIC FACTION FACTIONS FRAUD FREEDOM GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES INITIATIVE INVESTIGATION LEADERSHIP LEGAL FRAMEWORK LIABILITY MARGINAL VALUE MAYORS MEDIA MERGERS MONOPOLY MORAL HAZARD NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS PATRONAGE PEACE PENALTIES PERSONAL GAIN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES POLITICAL BENEFITS POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS POLITICAL CONDITIONS POLITICAL CULTURE POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM POLITICAL FACTORS POLITICAL GROUPS POLITICAL INFLUENCE POLITICAL INTEREST POLITICAL INTERESTS POLITICAL INTERFERENCE POLITICAL MACHINE POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICIAN POLITICIANS POLITICIZATION PREFERENTIAL PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENTS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC SERVICES RENT SEEKING SAVINGS SERVICE DELIVERY SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE SOCIAL STRUCTURE STATE POLICIES TAKEOVER THEFT TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSPARENCY VIOLENCE VOTERS VOTING WEALTH This paper takes advantage of unique intra-country variation in the Philippines power sector to examine under what conditions politicians have an incentive to "capture" an electric utility and use it for the purposes of rent-seeking. The authors hypothesize that the level of capture is determined by the incentives of, and the interactions between, local and national politicians, where the concepts of "local" and "national" are context specific. A local politician is defined as one whose electoral jurisdiction lies within the utility s catchment area; by contrast, a national politician is defined as one whose electoral jurisdiction includes two or more utility catchment areas. These jurisdictional differences imply different motivations for local and national politicians: because of "spillover" effects, local politicians have a greater incentive to use the utility for rent-seeking than a national politician as they capture only a portion of the political gains from utility performance improvements as some of the benefits of improved service will go to other electoral jurisdictions within the utility s catchment area. The authors posit that three variables impact the magnitude of these incentives of local and national politicians: (i) the local economic context, specifically the scale of rents that can be extracted from an electricity cooperative (ii) the degree of competitiveness of local politics; and (iii) the political salience of an electricity cooperative s catchment area for national politicians. The authors illustrate this framework through case studies of specific power utilities, and suggest some policy implications. 2012-03-19T18:03:04Z 2012-03-19T18:03:04Z 2011-06-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110623180935 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3472 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5704 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper East Asia and Pacific East Asia and Pacific Southeast Asia Asia Philippines |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ACTIVISM ALLOCATION ANARCHY AUTONOMY BIDDING BUREAUCRACY BUSINESSMEN CAPABILITIES CAPITALISM CETERIS PARIBUS CHECKS AND BALANCES CIVIL SOCIETY COLLECTIVE ACTION COLLUSION COMPETITIVENESS COMPLAINT COMPLAINTS CONFIDENCE CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CONSUMER GROUPS CONSUMERS CORPORATION CORRUPTION CRIME DEMOCRACY DEVELOPMENT POLICY DICTATORSHIP DISCRETION DYNASTIES ECONOMIC RENTS ECONOMICS ECONOMIES OF SCALE ELECTIONS ETHIC FACTION FACTIONS FRAUD FREEDOM GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES INITIATIVE INVESTIGATION LEADERSHIP LEGAL FRAMEWORK LIABILITY MARGINAL VALUE MAYORS MEDIA MERGERS MONOPOLY MORAL HAZARD NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS PATRONAGE PEACE PENALTIES PERSONAL GAIN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES POLITICAL BENEFITS POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS POLITICAL CONDITIONS POLITICAL CULTURE POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM POLITICAL FACTORS POLITICAL GROUPS POLITICAL INFLUENCE POLITICAL INTEREST POLITICAL INTERESTS POLITICAL INTERFERENCE POLITICAL MACHINE POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICIAN POLITICIANS POLITICIZATION PREFERENTIAL PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENTS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC SERVICES RENT SEEKING SAVINGS SERVICE DELIVERY SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE SOCIAL STRUCTURE STATE POLICIES TAKEOVER THEFT TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSPARENCY VIOLENCE VOTERS VOTING WEALTH |
| spellingShingle |
ACCOUNTABILITY ACCOUNTING ACTIVISM ALLOCATION ANARCHY AUTONOMY BIDDING BUREAUCRACY BUSINESSMEN CAPABILITIES CAPITALISM CETERIS PARIBUS CHECKS AND BALANCES CIVIL SOCIETY COLLECTIVE ACTION COLLUSION COMPETITIVENESS COMPLAINT COMPLAINTS CONFIDENCE CONSTITUENCY CONSTITUENTS CONSUMER GROUPS CONSUMERS CORPORATION CORRUPTION CRIME DEMOCRACY DEVELOPMENT POLICY DICTATORSHIP DISCRETION DYNASTIES ECONOMIC RENTS ECONOMICS ECONOMIES OF SCALE ELECTIONS ETHIC FACTION FACTIONS FRAUD FREEDOM GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES INITIATIVE INVESTIGATION LEADERSHIP LEGAL FRAMEWORK LIABILITY MARGINAL VALUE MAYORS MEDIA MERGERS MONOPOLY MORAL HAZARD NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS PATRONAGE PEACE PENALTIES PERSONAL GAIN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES POLITICAL BENEFITS POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS POLITICAL CONDITIONS POLITICAL CULTURE POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REFORM POLITICAL FACTORS POLITICAL GROUPS POLITICAL INFLUENCE POLITICAL INTEREST POLITICAL INTERESTS POLITICAL INTERFERENCE POLITICAL MACHINE POLITICAL PARTIES POLITICAL PARTY POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICIAN POLITICIANS POLITICIZATION PREFERENTIAL PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATIZATION PROCUREMENT PROCUREMENTS PROPERTY RIGHTS PUBLIC GOOD PUBLIC GOODS PUBLIC SERVICES RENT SEEKING SAVINGS SERVICE DELIVERY SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE SOCIAL STRUCTURE STATE POLICIES TAKEOVER THEFT TRANSACTION COSTS TRANSPARENCY VIOLENCE VOTERS VOTING WEALTH Hasnain, Zahid Matsuda, Yasuhiko The Politics of Power : The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking in Electric Utilities in the Philippines |
| geographic_facet |
East Asia and Pacific East Asia and Pacific Southeast Asia Asia Philippines |
| relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5704 |
| description |
This paper takes advantage of unique
intra-country variation in the Philippines power sector to
examine under what conditions politicians have an incentive
to "capture" an electric utility and use it for
the purposes of rent-seeking. The authors hypothesize that
the level of capture is determined by the incentives of, and
the interactions between, local and national politicians,
where the concepts of "local" and
"national" are context specific. A local
politician is defined as one whose electoral jurisdiction
lies within the utility s catchment area; by contrast, a
national politician is defined as one whose electoral
jurisdiction includes two or more utility catchment areas.
These jurisdictional differences imply different motivations
for local and national politicians: because of
"spillover" effects, local politicians have a
greater incentive to use the utility for rent-seeking than a
national politician as they capture only a portion of the
political gains from utility performance improvements as
some of the benefits of improved service will go to other
electoral jurisdictions within the utility s catchment area.
The authors posit that three variables impact the magnitude
of these incentives of local and national politicians: (i)
the local economic context, specifically the scale of rents
that can be extracted from an electricity cooperative (ii)
the degree of competitiveness of local politics; and (iii)
the political salience of an electricity cooperative s
catchment area for national politicians. The authors
illustrate this framework through case studies of specific
power utilities, and suggest some policy implications. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
Hasnain, Zahid Matsuda, Yasuhiko |
| author_facet |
Hasnain, Zahid Matsuda, Yasuhiko |
| author_sort |
Hasnain, Zahid |
| title |
The Politics of Power : The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking in Electric Utilities in the Philippines |
| title_short |
The Politics of Power : The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking in Electric Utilities in the Philippines |
| title_full |
The Politics of Power : The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking in Electric Utilities in the Philippines |
| title_fullStr |
The Politics of Power : The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking in Electric Utilities in the Philippines |
| title_full_unstemmed |
The Politics of Power : The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking in Electric Utilities in the Philippines |
| title_sort |
politics of power : the political economy of rent-seeking in electric utilities in the philippines |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20110623180935 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3472 |
| _version_ |
1764387055480078336 |