Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools
This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a 'pay-for-percentile'...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2020
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/440111599837928395/Recruitment-Effort-and-Retention-Effects-of-Performance-Contracts-for-Civil-Servants-Experimental-Evidence-from-Rwandan-Primary-Schools http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34481 |