Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools

Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools

This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a 'pay-for-percentile'...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Leaver, Clare, Ozier, Owen, Serneels, Pieter, Zeitlin, Andrew
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2020
Subjects:
PERFORMANCE PAY
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM
TEACHER RECRUITMENT
TEACHER RETENTION
INCENTIVES
FIELD EXPERIMENT
PRIMARY EDUCATION
PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE
LABOR MARKET
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/440111599837928395/Recruitment-Effort-and-Retention-Effects-of-Performance-Contracts-for-Civil-Servants-Experimental-Evidence-from-Rwandan-Primary-Schools
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34481

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/440111599837928395/Recruitment-Effort-and-Retention-Effects-of-Performance-Contracts-for-Civil-Servants-Experimental-Evidence-from-Rwandan-Primary-Schools
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34481

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