Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools
This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a 'pay-for-percentile'...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2020
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/440111599837928395/Recruitment-Effort-and-Retention-Effects-of-Performance-Contracts-for-Civil-Servants-Experimental-Evidence-from-Rwandan-Primary-Schools http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34481 |
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okr-10986-344812022-09-20T00:11:49Z Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools Leaver, Clare Ozier, Owen Serneels, Pieter Zeitlin, Andrew PERFORMANCE PAY CIVIL SERVICE REFORM TEACHER RECRUITMENT TEACHER RETENTION INCENTIVES FIELD EXPERIMENT PRIMARY EDUCATION PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE LABOR MARKET This paper reports on a two-tiered experiment designed to separately identify the selection and effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly assigned to a 'pay-for-percentile' or fixed-wage contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected, incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was performed, so that some teachers who applied for a fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard deviations after allowing for selection. 2020-09-17T21:22:15Z 2020-09-17T21:22:15Z 2020-09 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/440111599837928395/Recruitment-Effort-and-Retention-Effects-of-Performance-Contracts-for-Civil-Servants-Experimental-Evidence-from-Rwandan-Primary-Schools http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34481 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9395 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Africa Rwanda |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
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Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
PERFORMANCE PAY CIVIL SERVICE REFORM TEACHER RECRUITMENT TEACHER RETENTION INCENTIVES FIELD EXPERIMENT PRIMARY EDUCATION PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE LABOR MARKET |
| spellingShingle |
PERFORMANCE PAY CIVIL SERVICE REFORM TEACHER RECRUITMENT TEACHER RETENTION INCENTIVES FIELD EXPERIMENT PRIMARY EDUCATION PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE LABOR MARKET Leaver, Clare Ozier, Owen Serneels, Pieter Zeitlin, Andrew Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools |
| geographic_facet |
Africa Rwanda |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9395 |
| description |
This paper reports on a two-tiered
experiment designed to separately identify the selection and
effort margins of pay-for-performance (P4P). At the
recruitment stage, teacher labor markets were randomly
assigned to a 'pay-for-percentile' or fixed-wage
contract. Once recruits were placed, an unexpected,
incentive-compatible, school-level re-randomization was
performed, so that some teachers who applied for a
fixed-wage contract ended up being paid by P4P, and vice
versa. By the second year of the study, the within-year
effort effect of P4P was 0.16 standard deviations of pupil
learning, with the total effect rising to 0.20 standard
deviations after allowing for selection. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Leaver, Clare Ozier, Owen Serneels, Pieter Zeitlin, Andrew |
| author_facet |
Leaver, Clare Ozier, Owen Serneels, Pieter Zeitlin, Andrew |
| author_sort |
Leaver, Clare |
| title |
Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools |
| title_short |
Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools |
| title_full |
Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools |
| title_fullStr |
Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Recruitment, Effort, and Retention Effects of Performance Contracts for Civil Servants : Experimental Evidence from Rwandan Primary Schools |
| title_sort |
recruitment, effort, and retention effects of performance contracts for civil servants : experimental evidence from rwandan primary schools |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2020 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/440111599837928395/Recruitment-Effort-and-Retention-Effects-of-Performance-Contracts-for-Civil-Servants-Experimental-Evidence-from-Rwandan-Primary-Schools http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34481 |
| _version_ |
1764480990269407232 |