Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills

This paper presents field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers' skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers' skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them to...

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Main Authors:	Carranza, Eliana, Garlick, Robert, Orkin, Kate, Rankin, Neil
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2020
Subjects:	AFRICA GENDER POLICY GENDER INNOVATION LAB LABOR MARKET LABOR SKILLS LIMITED INFORMATION EMPLOYMENT WAGES SEARCH STRATEGY ACTIVE LABOR MARKET PROGRAM GENDER WOMEN AND YOUTH EMPLOYMENT
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/797911596131488697/Job-Search-and-Hiring-with-Two-Sided-Limited-Information-about-Workseekers-Skills http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34276

id	okr-10986-34276
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-342762022-09-20T00:10:56Z Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills Carranza, Eliana Garlick, Robert Orkin, Kate Rankin, Neil AFRICA GENDER POLICY GENDER INNOVATION LAB LABOR MARKET LABOR SKILLS LIMITED INFORMATION EMPLOYMENT WAGES SEARCH STRATEGY ACTIVE LABOR MARKET PROGRAM GENDER WOMEN AND YOUTH EMPLOYMENT This paper presents field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers' skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers' skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them to credibly share the results with firms increases workseekers' employment and earnings. It also aligns their beliefs and search strategies more closely with their skills. Giving assessment results only to workseekers has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms increases callbacks. These patterns are consistent with two-sided information frictions, a new finding that can inform the design of information-provision mechanisms. 2020-08-06T13:28:01Z 2020-08-06T13:28:01Z 2020-07 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/797911596131488697/Job-Search-and-Hiring-with-Two-Sided-Limited-Information-about-Workseekers-Skills http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34276 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9345 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Africa Sub-Saharan Africa South Africa
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	AFRICA GENDER POLICY GENDER INNOVATION LAB LABOR MARKET LABOR SKILLS LIMITED INFORMATION EMPLOYMENT WAGES SEARCH STRATEGY ACTIVE LABOR MARKET PROGRAM GENDER WOMEN AND YOUTH EMPLOYMENT
spellingShingle	AFRICA GENDER POLICY GENDER INNOVATION LAB LABOR MARKET LABOR SKILLS LIMITED INFORMATION EMPLOYMENT WAGES SEARCH STRATEGY ACTIVE LABOR MARKET PROGRAM GENDER WOMEN AND YOUTH EMPLOYMENT Carranza, Eliana Garlick, Robert Orkin, Kate Rankin, Neil Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills
geographic_facet	Africa Sub-Saharan Africa South Africa
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9345
description	This paper presents field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers' skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers' skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them to credibly share the results with firms increases workseekers' employment and earnings. It also aligns their beliefs and search strategies more closely with their skills. Giving assessment results only to workseekers has similar effects on beliefs and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings. Giving assessment results only to firms increases callbacks. These patterns are consistent with two-sided information frictions, a new finding that can inform the design of information-provision mechanisms.
format	Working Paper
author	Carranza, Eliana Garlick, Robert Orkin, Kate Rankin, Neil
author_facet	Carranza, Eliana Garlick, Robert Orkin, Kate Rankin, Neil
author_sort	Carranza, Eliana
title	Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills
title_short	Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills
title_full	Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills
title_fullStr	Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills
title_full_unstemmed	Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills
title_sort	job search and hiring with two-sided limited information about workseekers' skills
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2020
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/797911596131488697/Job-Search-and-Hiring-with-Two-Sided-Limited-Information-about-Workseekers-Skills http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34276
_version_	1764480557130973184

Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills

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