Job Search and Hiring with Two-Sided Limited Information about Workseekers' Skills
This paper presents field experimental evidence that limited information about workseekers' skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing workseekers' skills, giving workseekers their assessment results, and helping them to...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2020
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/797911596131488697/Job-Search-and-Hiring-with-Two-Sided-Limited-Information-about-Workseekers-Skills http://hdl.handle.net/10986/34276 |
| Summary: | This paper presents field experimental
evidence that limited information about workseekers'
skills distorts both firm and workseeker behavior. Assessing
workseekers' skills, giving workseekers their
assessment results, and helping them to credibly share the
results with firms increases workseekers' employment
and earnings. It also aligns their beliefs and search
strategies more closely with their skills. Giving assessment
results only to workseekers has similar effects on beliefs
and search, but smaller effects on employment and earnings.
Giving assessment results only to firms increases callbacks.
These patterns are consistent with two-sided information
frictions, a new finding that can inform the design of
information-provision mechanisms. |
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