Mozambique : Can Information and Incentives Increase School Attendance?

Mozambique : Can Information and Incentives Increase School Attendance?

Although more children than ever are starting school in Africa, in many countries dropout rates remain high and few students complete their schooling, especially girls. Results-based financing (RBF) has been used in many developing countries to att...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: World Bank
Format: Brief
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2020
Subjects:
SCHOOL ATTENDENCE
EDUCATION FOR ALL
SECONDARY EDUCATION
PRIMARY EDUCATION
CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS
RESULTS-BASED FINANCING
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/704081531204680698/Mozambique-Can-Information-and-Incentives-Increase-School-Attendance
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/33690
id okr-10986-33690
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-336902021-05-25T10:54:44Z Mozambique : Can Information and Incentives Increase School Attendance? World Bank SCHOOL ATTENDENCE EDUCATION FOR ALL SECONDARY EDUCATION PRIMARY EDUCATION CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS RESULTS-BASED FINANCING SCHOOL ENROLLMENT Although more children than ever are starting school in Africa, in many countries dropout rates remain high and few students complete their schooling, especially girls. Results-based financing (RBF) has been used in many developing countries to attempt to incentivize various stakeholders such as students, parents, and teachers to achieve better results. RBF mechanisms work by linking financial incentives to measurable results, for example school attendance, dropout rates, or student test scores. Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are one such RBF mechanism that has been used in many developing countries to incentivize individuals to take actions that they may not otherwise take, such as attending school or using preventive health services. CCTs work by giving individuals a cash transfer, conditional on verification that they have completed the prescribed behavior. CCTs have been shown to be effective in increasing school attendance in many countries, but their cost and complexity makes them difficult to manage for countries with limited administrative and budgetary capacity. 2020-05-04T20:14:53Z 2020-05-04T20:14:53Z 2018-03 Brief http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/704081531204680698/Mozambique-Can-Information-and-Incentives-Increase-School-Attendance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/33690 English RBF Education; CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Brief Africa Mozambique
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic SCHOOL ATTENDENCE
EDUCATION FOR ALL
SECONDARY EDUCATION
PRIMARY EDUCATION
CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS
RESULTS-BASED FINANCING
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT
spellingShingle SCHOOL ATTENDENCE
EDUCATION FOR ALL
SECONDARY EDUCATION
PRIMARY EDUCATION
CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS
RESULTS-BASED FINANCING
SCHOOL ENROLLMENT
World Bank
Mozambique : Can Information and Incentives Increase School Attendance?
geographic_facet Africa
Mozambique
relation RBF Education;
description Although more children than ever are starting school in Africa, in many countries dropout rates remain high and few students complete their schooling, especially girls. Results-based financing (RBF) has been used in many developing countries to attempt to incentivize various stakeholders such as students, parents, and teachers to achieve better results. RBF mechanisms work by linking financial incentives to measurable results, for example school attendance, dropout rates, or student test scores. Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are one such RBF mechanism that has been used in many developing countries to incentivize individuals to take actions that they may not otherwise take, such as attending school or using preventive health services. CCTs work by giving individuals a cash transfer, conditional on verification that they have completed the prescribed behavior. CCTs have been shown to be effective in increasing school attendance in many countries, but their cost and complexity makes them difficult to manage for countries with limited administrative and budgetary capacity.
format Brief
author World Bank
author_facet World Bank
author_sort World Bank
title Mozambique : Can Information and Incentives Increase School Attendance?
title_short Mozambique : Can Information and Incentives Increase School Attendance?
title_full Mozambique : Can Information and Incentives Increase School Attendance?
title_fullStr Mozambique : Can Information and Incentives Increase School Attendance?
title_full_unstemmed Mozambique : Can Information and Incentives Increase School Attendance?
title_sort mozambique : can information and incentives increase school attendance?
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2020
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/704081531204680698/Mozambique-Can-Information-and-Incentives-Increase-School-Attendance
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/33690
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