Group Incentives for the Public Good : A Field Experiment on Improving the Urban Environment

How to maintain communal spaces is an important concern in many developing countries, particularly in urban environments. But what strategies can communities use to overcome the public goods problems involved in maintaining their local environment?...

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Main Authors: Newman, Carol, Mitchell, Tara, Holmlund, Marcus, Fernandez, Chloe
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2019
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/217571576600422423/Group-Incentives-for-the-Public-Good-A-Field-Experiment-on-Improving-the-Urban-Environment
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/33056
id okr-10986-33056
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-330562022-09-20T00:15:07Z Group Incentives for the Public Good : A Field Experiment on Improving the Urban Environment Newman, Carol Mitchell, Tara Holmlund, Marcus Fernandez, Chloe PUBLIC GOODS INFRASTRUCTURE URBAN ENVIRONMENT COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATIONS CIVIL SOCIETY FLOODS DRAINAGE INFRASTRUCTURE How to maintain communal spaces is an important concern in many developing countries, particularly in urban environments. But what strategies can communities use to overcome the public goods problems involved in maintaining their local environment? This paper investigates whether changing the incentives for a subset of the community to contribute to the public good can lead to a shift to a more efficient equilibrium for the community as a whole. The analysis uses a randomized controlled trial to test the effectiveness of a program called "Operation Clean Neighborhood," which targets established community-based organizations and encourages them, through social recognition and low-value, in-kind incentives, to work toward keeping their neighborhoods clean, with the ultimate goal of reducing flooding in these areas. The findings show that, after one year, the intervention was effective in engaging communities and improving the cleanliness of the neighborhood. There is also evidence that this leads to reduced levels of flooding. The analysis uncovers important differences in the effectiveness of the program between areas that have had increased investment in drainage infrastructure and those that have not. It also addresses the issue of spillovers, an important consideration in densely populated urban centers. 2019-12-19T17:21:32Z 2019-12-19T17:21:32Z 2019-12 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/217571576600422423/Group-Incentives-for-the-Public-Good-A-Field-Experiment-on-Improving-the-Urban-Environment http://hdl.handle.net/10986/33056 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9087 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Africa Senegal
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic PUBLIC GOODS
INFRASTRUCTURE
URBAN ENVIRONMENT
COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT
COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATIONS
CIVIL SOCIETY
FLOODS
DRAINAGE INFRASTRUCTURE
spellingShingle PUBLIC GOODS
INFRASTRUCTURE
URBAN ENVIRONMENT
COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT
COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATIONS
CIVIL SOCIETY
FLOODS
DRAINAGE INFRASTRUCTURE
Newman, Carol
Mitchell, Tara
Holmlund, Marcus
Fernandez, Chloe
Group Incentives for the Public Good : A Field Experiment on Improving the Urban Environment
geographic_facet Africa
Senegal
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9087
description How to maintain communal spaces is an important concern in many developing countries, particularly in urban environments. But what strategies can communities use to overcome the public goods problems involved in maintaining their local environment? This paper investigates whether changing the incentives for a subset of the community to contribute to the public good can lead to a shift to a more efficient equilibrium for the community as a whole. The analysis uses a randomized controlled trial to test the effectiveness of a program called "Operation Clean Neighborhood," which targets established community-based organizations and encourages them, through social recognition and low-value, in-kind incentives, to work toward keeping their neighborhoods clean, with the ultimate goal of reducing flooding in these areas. The findings show that, after one year, the intervention was effective in engaging communities and improving the cleanliness of the neighborhood. There is also evidence that this leads to reduced levels of flooding. The analysis uncovers important differences in the effectiveness of the program between areas that have had increased investment in drainage infrastructure and those that have not. It also addresses the issue of spillovers, an important consideration in densely populated urban centers.
format Working Paper
author Newman, Carol
Mitchell, Tara
Holmlund, Marcus
Fernandez, Chloe
author_facet Newman, Carol
Mitchell, Tara
Holmlund, Marcus
Fernandez, Chloe
author_sort Newman, Carol
title Group Incentives for the Public Good : A Field Experiment on Improving the Urban Environment
title_short Group Incentives for the Public Good : A Field Experiment on Improving the Urban Environment
title_full Group Incentives for the Public Good : A Field Experiment on Improving the Urban Environment
title_fullStr Group Incentives for the Public Good : A Field Experiment on Improving the Urban Environment
title_full_unstemmed Group Incentives for the Public Good : A Field Experiment on Improving the Urban Environment
title_sort group incentives for the public good : a field experiment on improving the urban environment
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2019
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/217571576600422423/Group-Incentives-for-the-Public-Good-A-Field-Experiment-on-Improving-the-Urban-Environment
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/33056
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