Group Incentives for the Public Good : A Field Experiment on Improving the Urban Environment
How to maintain communal spaces is an important concern in many developing countries, particularly in urban environments. But what strategies can communities use to overcome the public goods problems involved in maintaining their local environment?...
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2019
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/217571576600422423/Group-Incentives-for-the-Public-Good-A-Field-Experiment-on-Improving-the-Urban-Environment http://hdl.handle.net/10986/33056 |
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okr-10986-330562022-09-20T00:15:07Z Group Incentives for the Public Good : A Field Experiment on Improving the Urban Environment Newman, Carol Mitchell, Tara Holmlund, Marcus Fernandez, Chloe PUBLIC GOODS INFRASTRUCTURE URBAN ENVIRONMENT COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATIONS CIVIL SOCIETY FLOODS DRAINAGE INFRASTRUCTURE How to maintain communal spaces is an important concern in many developing countries, particularly in urban environments. But what strategies can communities use to overcome the public goods problems involved in maintaining their local environment? This paper investigates whether changing the incentives for a subset of the community to contribute to the public good can lead to a shift to a more efficient equilibrium for the community as a whole. The analysis uses a randomized controlled trial to test the effectiveness of a program called "Operation Clean Neighborhood," which targets established community-based organizations and encourages them, through social recognition and low-value, in-kind incentives, to work toward keeping their neighborhoods clean, with the ultimate goal of reducing flooding in these areas. The findings show that, after one year, the intervention was effective in engaging communities and improving the cleanliness of the neighborhood. There is also evidence that this leads to reduced levels of flooding. The analysis uncovers important differences in the effectiveness of the program between areas that have had increased investment in drainage infrastructure and those that have not. It also addresses the issue of spillovers, an important consideration in densely populated urban centers. 2019-12-19T17:21:32Z 2019-12-19T17:21:32Z 2019-12 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/217571576600422423/Group-Incentives-for-the-Public-Good-A-Field-Experiment-on-Improving-the-Urban-Environment http://hdl.handle.net/10986/33056 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9087 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Africa Senegal |
repository_type |
Digital Repository |
institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
institution |
Digital Repositories |
building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
collection |
World Bank |
language |
English |
topic |
PUBLIC GOODS INFRASTRUCTURE URBAN ENVIRONMENT COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATIONS CIVIL SOCIETY FLOODS DRAINAGE INFRASTRUCTURE |
spellingShingle |
PUBLIC GOODS INFRASTRUCTURE URBAN ENVIRONMENT COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATIONS CIVIL SOCIETY FLOODS DRAINAGE INFRASTRUCTURE Newman, Carol Mitchell, Tara Holmlund, Marcus Fernandez, Chloe Group Incentives for the Public Good : A Field Experiment on Improving the Urban Environment |
geographic_facet |
Africa Senegal |
relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 9087 |
description |
How to maintain communal spaces is an
important concern in many developing countries, particularly
in urban environments. But what strategies can communities
use to overcome the public goods problems involved in
maintaining their local environment? This paper investigates
whether changing the incentives for a subset of the
community to contribute to the public good can lead to a
shift to a more efficient equilibrium for the community as a
whole. The analysis uses a randomized controlled trial to
test the effectiveness of a program called "Operation
Clean Neighborhood," which targets established
community-based organizations and encourages them, through
social recognition and low-value, in-kind incentives, to
work toward keeping their neighborhoods clean, with the
ultimate goal of reducing flooding in these areas. The
findings show that, after one year, the intervention was
effective in engaging communities and improving the
cleanliness of the neighborhood. There is also evidence that
this leads to reduced levels of flooding. The analysis
uncovers important differences in the effectiveness of the
program between areas that have had increased investment in
drainage infrastructure and those that have not. It also
addresses the issue of spillovers, an important
consideration in densely populated urban centers. |
format |
Working Paper |
author |
Newman, Carol Mitchell, Tara Holmlund, Marcus Fernandez, Chloe |
author_facet |
Newman, Carol Mitchell, Tara Holmlund, Marcus Fernandez, Chloe |
author_sort |
Newman, Carol |
title |
Group Incentives for the Public Good : A Field Experiment on Improving the Urban Environment |
title_short |
Group Incentives for the Public Good : A Field Experiment on Improving the Urban Environment |
title_full |
Group Incentives for the Public Good : A Field Experiment on Improving the Urban Environment |
title_fullStr |
Group Incentives for the Public Good : A Field Experiment on Improving the Urban Environment |
title_full_unstemmed |
Group Incentives for the Public Good : A Field Experiment on Improving the Urban Environment |
title_sort |
group incentives for the public good : a field experiment on improving the urban environment |
publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
publishDate |
2019 |
url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/217571576600422423/Group-Incentives-for-the-Public-Good-A-Field-Experiment-on-Improving-the-Urban-Environment http://hdl.handle.net/10986/33056 |
_version_ |
1764477900658049024 |