Appraising the Thailand Village Fund
The Thailand Village Fund is the second-largest microcredit scheme in the world. Nearly 80,000 elected local Village Fund committees administer loans that reach 30 percent of all households. The value of Village Fund loans has remained steady since...
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| Format: | Policy Research Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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2012
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| Online Access: | http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20120314093820 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3286 |
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okr-10986-32862021-04-23T14:02:08Z Appraising the Thailand Village Fund R. Boonperm, Jirawan Haughton, Jonathan Khandker, Shahidur Rukumnuaykit, Pungpond ACCESS TO CREDIT ACCOUNTING ADMINISTRATIVE COST ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES AGRICULTURE ASSET CLASS AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT BALANCE SHEET BANK BORROWERS BANK LENDING BANK LOANS BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKRUPTCY CONSTRAINT BOOK VALUE BORROWER BORROWING BORROWING COST BORROWING COSTS BORROWING RATE CAPITAL COSTS CAPITAL INFLOW CLAIM COMMERCIAL BANK CONSUMER CREDIT CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS CREDIT RATING CREDIT RATINGS CREDIT STANDING CREDITWORTHINESS DEBT DEMAND FOR CREDIT DEPENDENT DEPOSIT DEPOSITS DEVELOPMENT BANK DEVELOPMENT BANKS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DIVIDEND DIVIDEND PAYMENTS DIVIDENDS DUMMY VARIABLES ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMIC SURVEYS EMERGENCY FUND EMERGENCY LOANS ENTREPRENEURSHIP EQUIPMENT EXCHANGE RATE EXPENDITURE EXPLICIT INTEREST FINANCIAL ASSET FINANCIAL ASSETS FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL INSTITUTION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY FINANCIAL POSITION GOVERNMENT SAVINGS HOLDING INCOME INCOME GROUPS INDEBTED INSTRUMENT INSUFFICIENT FUNDS INTEREST COSTS INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATE POLICIES INTEREST RATES INTERNATIONAL BANK JUDGE LATE PAYMENTS LENDER LENDERS LIABILITY LOAN LOAN AMOUNT LOAN AMOUNTS LOAN APPLICATION LOAN APPLICATIONS LOAN APPRAISAL LOAN BALANCE LOAN CONTRACT LOAN DEMAND LOAN GUARANTEES LOAN PORTFOLIO LOAN PRICE LOAN RECOVERY LOAN REPAYMENT LOAN SIZE LOAN SIZES LOAN TERMS LOANABLE FUNDS LOANS FROM BANKS LOANS TO INDIVIDUALS LOW INTEREST RATES MARGINAL PRODUCT MARGINAL UTILITY MARKET INTEREST RATE MICROCREDIT MICROFINANCE MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS MONOPOLY NET PROFIT NON-PERFORMING LOANS OFFERINGS ONLENDING OPPORTUNITY COST OUTSTANDING DEBT OVERDUE LOANS PAYOFF PERSONAL LIABILITY POOR BORROWER POOR BORROWERS PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT MAXIMIZATION PROFIT RATE PUBLIC FUNDS RECOVERY RATE RECOVERY RATES REGRESSION ANALYSIS REPAYMENT REPAYMENT OF PRINCIPAL REPAYMENT PERIOD REPAYMENT RATE REPAYMENT RATES REPAYMENTS RETURN REVOLVING FUND RISKY BORROWERS ROTATING CREDIT SAVINGS BANK SAVINGS DEPOSITS SHAREHOLDERS SMALL LOAN SMALL LOANS SOURCE OF CREDIT SUPPLY OF CREDIT WAGES WORKING CAPITAL The Thailand Village Fund is the second-largest microcredit scheme in the world. Nearly 80,000 elected local Village Fund committees administer loans that reach 30 percent of all households. The value of Village Fund loans has remained steady since 2006, even without new infusions of government funds, and loans go disproportionately to the poor. Based mainly on a custom-built survey of more than 3,000 Village Funds conducted in 2010, this paper evaluates the performance of Village Funds, which it argues are best modeled as altruistic, and do not appear to be subject to elite capture. As expected, profit rates are difficult to model, but the regression analysis shows that loan recovery rates, total lending, credit ratings, and the proportion of loans going to the poor are all higher when a Village Fund borrows additional funds from a formal bank and on-lends to households, as was done by one in five Village Funds. An economic analysis suggests that Village Fund benefits exceed the costs. Most Village Funds are social rather than financial intermediaries; they have little incentive to take risks or to innovate, which explains why Village Fund lending has not kept pace with the growth of the Thai economy. 2012-03-19T17:29:45Z 2012-03-19T17:29:45Z 2012-03-01 http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20120314093820 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3286 English Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5998 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper East Asia and Pacific East Asia and Pacific Southeast Asia Asia Thailand |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
ACCESS TO CREDIT ACCOUNTING ADMINISTRATIVE COST ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES AGRICULTURE ASSET CLASS AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT BALANCE SHEET BANK BORROWERS BANK LENDING BANK LOANS BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKRUPTCY CONSTRAINT BOOK VALUE BORROWER BORROWING BORROWING COST BORROWING COSTS BORROWING RATE CAPITAL COSTS CAPITAL INFLOW CLAIM COMMERCIAL BANK CONSUMER CREDIT CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS CREDIT RATING CREDIT RATINGS CREDIT STANDING CREDITWORTHINESS DEBT DEMAND FOR CREDIT DEPENDENT DEPOSIT DEPOSITS DEVELOPMENT BANK DEVELOPMENT BANKS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DIVIDEND DIVIDEND PAYMENTS DIVIDENDS DUMMY VARIABLES ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMIC SURVEYS EMERGENCY FUND EMERGENCY LOANS ENTREPRENEURSHIP EQUIPMENT EXCHANGE RATE EXPENDITURE EXPLICIT INTEREST FINANCIAL ASSET FINANCIAL ASSETS FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL INSTITUTION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY FINANCIAL POSITION GOVERNMENT SAVINGS HOLDING INCOME INCOME GROUPS INDEBTED INSTRUMENT INSUFFICIENT FUNDS INTEREST COSTS INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATE POLICIES INTEREST RATES INTERNATIONAL BANK JUDGE LATE PAYMENTS LENDER LENDERS LIABILITY LOAN LOAN AMOUNT LOAN AMOUNTS LOAN APPLICATION LOAN APPLICATIONS LOAN APPRAISAL LOAN BALANCE LOAN CONTRACT LOAN DEMAND LOAN GUARANTEES LOAN PORTFOLIO LOAN PRICE LOAN RECOVERY LOAN REPAYMENT LOAN SIZE LOAN SIZES LOAN TERMS LOANABLE FUNDS LOANS FROM BANKS LOANS TO INDIVIDUALS LOW INTEREST RATES MARGINAL PRODUCT MARGINAL UTILITY MARKET INTEREST RATE MICROCREDIT MICROFINANCE MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS MONOPOLY NET PROFIT NON-PERFORMING LOANS OFFERINGS ONLENDING OPPORTUNITY COST OUTSTANDING DEBT OVERDUE LOANS PAYOFF PERSONAL LIABILITY POOR BORROWER POOR BORROWERS PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT MAXIMIZATION PROFIT RATE PUBLIC FUNDS RECOVERY RATE RECOVERY RATES REGRESSION ANALYSIS REPAYMENT REPAYMENT OF PRINCIPAL REPAYMENT PERIOD REPAYMENT RATE REPAYMENT RATES REPAYMENTS RETURN REVOLVING FUND RISKY BORROWERS ROTATING CREDIT SAVINGS BANK SAVINGS DEPOSITS SHAREHOLDERS SMALL LOAN SMALL LOANS SOURCE OF CREDIT SUPPLY OF CREDIT WAGES WORKING CAPITAL |
| spellingShingle |
ACCESS TO CREDIT ACCOUNTING ADMINISTRATIVE COST ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES AFFILIATED ORGANIZATIONS AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES AGRICULTURE ASSET CLASS AVAILABILITY OF CREDIT BALANCE SHEET BANK BORROWERS BANK LENDING BANK LOANS BANKING SYSTEM BANKRUPTCY BANKRUPTCY CONSTRAINT BOOK VALUE BORROWER BORROWING BORROWING COST BORROWING COSTS BORROWING RATE CAPITAL COSTS CAPITAL INFLOW CLAIM COMMERCIAL BANK CONSUMER CREDIT CREDIT ASSOCIATIONS CREDIT RATING CREDIT RATINGS CREDIT STANDING CREDITWORTHINESS DEBT DEMAND FOR CREDIT DEPENDENT DEPOSIT DEPOSITS DEVELOPMENT BANK DEVELOPMENT BANKS DEVELOPMENT POLICY DIVIDEND DIVIDEND PAYMENTS DIVIDENDS DUMMY VARIABLES ECONOMETRIC MODELS ECONOMIC SURVEYS EMERGENCY FUND EMERGENCY LOANS ENTREPRENEURSHIP EQUIPMENT EXCHANGE RATE EXPENDITURE EXPLICIT INTEREST FINANCIAL ASSET FINANCIAL ASSETS FINANCIAL INFORMATION FINANCIAL INSTITUTION FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY FINANCIAL POSITION GOVERNMENT SAVINGS HOLDING INCOME INCOME GROUPS INDEBTED INSTRUMENT INSUFFICIENT FUNDS INTEREST COSTS INTEREST RATE INTEREST RATE POLICIES INTEREST RATES INTERNATIONAL BANK JUDGE LATE PAYMENTS LENDER LENDERS LIABILITY LOAN LOAN AMOUNT LOAN AMOUNTS LOAN APPLICATION LOAN APPLICATIONS LOAN APPRAISAL LOAN BALANCE LOAN CONTRACT LOAN DEMAND LOAN GUARANTEES LOAN PORTFOLIO LOAN PRICE LOAN RECOVERY LOAN REPAYMENT LOAN SIZE LOAN SIZES LOAN TERMS LOANABLE FUNDS LOANS FROM BANKS LOANS TO INDIVIDUALS LOW INTEREST RATES MARGINAL PRODUCT MARGINAL UTILITY MARKET INTEREST RATE MICROCREDIT MICROFINANCE MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS MONOPOLY NET PROFIT NON-PERFORMING LOANS OFFERINGS ONLENDING OPPORTUNITY COST OUTSTANDING DEBT OVERDUE LOANS PAYOFF PERSONAL LIABILITY POOR BORROWER POOR BORROWERS PRODUCTIVITY PROFIT MAXIMIZATION PROFIT RATE PUBLIC FUNDS RECOVERY RATE RECOVERY RATES REGRESSION ANALYSIS REPAYMENT REPAYMENT OF PRINCIPAL REPAYMENT PERIOD REPAYMENT RATE REPAYMENT RATES REPAYMENTS RETURN REVOLVING FUND RISKY BORROWERS ROTATING CREDIT SAVINGS BANK SAVINGS DEPOSITS SHAREHOLDERS SMALL LOAN SMALL LOANS SOURCE OF CREDIT SUPPLY OF CREDIT WAGES WORKING CAPITAL R. Boonperm, Jirawan Haughton, Jonathan Khandker, Shahidur Rukumnuaykit, Pungpond Appraising the Thailand Village Fund |
| geographic_facet |
East Asia and Pacific East Asia and Pacific Southeast Asia Asia Thailand |
| relation |
Policy Research working paper ; no. WPS 5998 |
| description |
The Thailand Village Fund is the
second-largest microcredit scheme in the world. Nearly
80,000 elected local Village Fund committees administer
loans that reach 30 percent of all households. The value of
Village Fund loans has remained steady since 2006, even
without new infusions of government funds, and loans go
disproportionately to the poor. Based mainly on a
custom-built survey of more than 3,000 Village Funds
conducted in 2010, this paper evaluates the performance of
Village Funds, which it argues are best modeled as
altruistic, and do not appear to be subject to elite
capture. As expected, profit rates are difficult to model,
but the regression analysis shows that loan recovery rates,
total lending, credit ratings, and the proportion of loans
going to the poor are all higher when a Village Fund borrows
additional funds from a formal bank and on-lends to
households, as was done by one in five Village Funds. An
economic analysis suggests that Village Fund benefits exceed
the costs. Most Village Funds are social rather than
financial intermediaries; they have little incentive to take
risks or to innovate, which explains why Village Fund
lending has not kept pace with the growth of the Thai economy. |
| format |
Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| author |
R. Boonperm, Jirawan Haughton, Jonathan Khandker, Shahidur Rukumnuaykit, Pungpond |
| author_facet |
R. Boonperm, Jirawan Haughton, Jonathan Khandker, Shahidur Rukumnuaykit, Pungpond |
| author_sort |
R. Boonperm, Jirawan |
| title |
Appraising the Thailand Village Fund |
| title_short |
Appraising the Thailand Village Fund |
| title_full |
Appraising the Thailand Village Fund |
| title_fullStr |
Appraising the Thailand Village Fund |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Appraising the Thailand Village Fund |
| title_sort |
appraising the thailand village fund |
| publishDate |
2012 |
| url |
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/main?menuPK=64187510&pagePK=64193027&piPK=64187937&theSitePK=523679&menuPK=64187510&searchMenuPK=64187283&siteName=WDS&entityID=000158349_20120314093820 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/3286 |
| _version_ |
1764386734954512384 |