Are Politically Connected Firms More Likely to Evade Taxes? : Evidence from Tunisia

Are Politically Connected Firms More Likely to Evade Taxes? : Evidence from Tunisia

Are politically connected firms more likely to evade taxes? Using tax, social security, and customs records from Tunisia in which firms owned by former president Ben Ali and his family are identified, this paper demonstrates that connected firms we...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Rijkers, Bob, Arouri, Hassen, Baghdadi, Leila
Format: Journal Article
Language:English
Published: Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank 2019
Subjects:
TAX EVASION
POLITICAL CONNECTIONS
TAX ADMINISTRATION
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
CORRUPTION
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/281521565589273511/Are-Politically-Connected-Firms-More-Likely-to-Evade-Taxes-Evidence-from-Tunisia
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/32242
id okr-10986-32242
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-322422021-05-25T10:54:42Z Are Politically Connected Firms More Likely to Evade Taxes? : Evidence from Tunisia Rijkers, Bob Arouri, Hassen Baghdadi, Leila TAX EVASION POLITICAL CONNECTIONS TAX ADMINISTRATION CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CORRUPTION Are politically connected firms more likely to evade taxes? Using tax, social security, and customs records from Tunisia in which firms owned by former president Ben Ali and his family are identified, this paper demonstrates that connected firms were more likely to evade taxes. Ceteris paribus, connected firms are 4.6 percent more likely not to submit a tax declaration in spite of registering workers and/or customs transactions and 8.4 percent more likely to report anomalously low sales when submitting a tax declaration. 2019-08-13T19:30:17Z 2019-08-13T19:30:17Z 2016-06-09 Journal Article http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/281521565589273511/Are-Politically-Connected-Firms-More-Likely-to-Evade-Taxes-Evidence-from-Tunisia World Bank Economic Review http://hdl.handle.net/10986/32242 English CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank Publications & Research :: Journal Article Publications & Research Middle East and North Africa Tunisia
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic TAX EVASION
POLITICAL CONNECTIONS
TAX ADMINISTRATION
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
CORRUPTION
spellingShingle TAX EVASION
POLITICAL CONNECTIONS
TAX ADMINISTRATION
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
CORRUPTION
Rijkers, Bob
Arouri, Hassen
Baghdadi, Leila
Are Politically Connected Firms More Likely to Evade Taxes? : Evidence from Tunisia
geographic_facet Middle East and North Africa
Tunisia
description Are politically connected firms more likely to evade taxes? Using tax, social security, and customs records from Tunisia in which firms owned by former president Ben Ali and his family are identified, this paper demonstrates that connected firms were more likely to evade taxes. Ceteris paribus, connected firms are 4.6 percent more likely not to submit a tax declaration in spite of registering workers and/or customs transactions and 8.4 percent more likely to report anomalously low sales when submitting a tax declaration.
format Journal Article
author Rijkers, Bob
Arouri, Hassen
Baghdadi, Leila
author_facet Rijkers, Bob
Arouri, Hassen
Baghdadi, Leila
author_sort Rijkers, Bob
title Are Politically Connected Firms More Likely to Evade Taxes? : Evidence from Tunisia
title_short Are Politically Connected Firms More Likely to Evade Taxes? : Evidence from Tunisia
title_full Are Politically Connected Firms More Likely to Evade Taxes? : Evidence from Tunisia
title_fullStr Are Politically Connected Firms More Likely to Evade Taxes? : Evidence from Tunisia
title_full_unstemmed Are Politically Connected Firms More Likely to Evade Taxes? : Evidence from Tunisia
title_sort are politically connected firms more likely to evade taxes? : evidence from tunisia
publisher Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank
publishDate 2019
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/281521565589273511/Are-Politically-Connected-Firms-More-Likely-to-Evade-Taxes-Evidence-from-Tunisia
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/32242
_version_ 1764476111786344448

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