Auction Length and Prices : Evidence from Random Auction Closing in Brazil
Electronic reverse auctions are the most used competitive method for procurement of goods and non-consulting services by the Federal Government of Brazil. These auctions are closed randomly, which perfectly satisfies fairness considerations but may...
| Main Authors: | Borges de Oliveira, Alexandre, Fabregas, Abdoulaye, Fazekas, Mihaly |
|---|---|
| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2019
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/663441555954348673/Auction-Length-and-Prices-Evidence-from-Random-Auction-Closing-in-Brazil http://hdl.handle.net/10986/31583 |
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