Learning from Power Sector Reform Experiences : The Case of Uganda
Uganda's power sector structure is among the most sophisticated in Sub-Saharan Africa, and Uganda is one of only a handful of countries in the region where tariffs are close to being cost reflective. While reforms were swift and comprehensive,...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2019
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/964971555504602614/Learning-from-Power-Sector-Reform-Experiences-The-Case-of-Uganda http://hdl.handle.net/10986/31562 |
| Summary: | Uganda's power sector structure is
among the most sophisticated in Sub-Saharan Africa, and
Uganda is one of only a handful of countries in the region
where tariffs are close to being cost reflective. While
reforms were swift and comprehensive, following the 1999
Electricity Act, significant difficulties were encountered
along the way that prevented the benefits of reform from
materializing until much later. The failed first attempt
with the Bujagali Hydropower independent power producer left
the country heavily exposed to the 2005/06 and 2010/12
droughts, which in turn created difficulties for the new
private distribution utility, Umeme, and led to a relaxation
of the regulatory performance targets for the concession.
This situation led to a buildup of frustration with the new
operator and the launch of two public enquiries, which
recommended termination of the concession. In 2012, with the
easing of drought conditions and the completion of the
Bujagali Hydropower Project following a second independent
power producer arrangement, there was improvement in the
availability of power. This made it possible to set more
demanding performance targets for the concessionaire, Umeme,
which fed through into substantial improvements in
operational efficiency and accelerating service coverage.
Although the reform model was eventually able to deliver
results, the associated cost was comparatively high.
Furthermore, the extension of the private concession model
to financially unviable rural areas did not prove to be
successful. Access rates began to pick up only following the
adoption of a revised approach in 2012, built around
government-led and donor-funded expansion of rural networks. |
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