Highway Politics in a Divided Government : Evidence from Mexico

This paper combines local election results and geo-referenced road construction data over 1993-2012 to investigate political bias in road infrastructure investment in a democratic setting, focusing on the case of Mexico. Using a regression disconti...

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Main Authors:	Selod, Harris, Soumahoro, Souleymane
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2019
Subjects:	GOVERNANCE POLITICAL FAVORITISM PUBLIC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE ROAD CONSTRUCTION FEDERAL HIGHWAYS LEGISLATIVE RACES
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/493691547756360057/Highway-Politics-in-a-Divided-Government-Evidence-from-Mexico http://hdl.handle.net/10986/31178

id	okr-10986-31178
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-311782021-06-08T14:42:45Z Highway Politics in a Divided Government : Evidence from Mexico Selod, Harris Soumahoro, Souleymane GOVERNANCE POLITICAL FAVORITISM PUBLIC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE ROAD CONSTRUCTION FEDERAL HIGHWAYS LEGISLATIVE RACES This paper combines local election results and geo-referenced road construction data over 1993-2012 to investigate political bias in road infrastructure investment in a democratic setting, focusing on the case of Mexico. Using a regression discontinuity design, the paper finds strong evidence of partisan allocation of federally-funded highways to municipalities that voted for the president's party in legislative races, nearly doubling the stock of highways compared to opposition municipalities. The extent of political favoritism in highway provision is stronger under divided government when the president has no majority in the legislature, suggesting political efforts to control the Congress. 2019-01-31T21:18:07Z 2019-01-31T21:18:07Z 2019-01 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/493691547756360057/Highway-Politics-in-a-Divided-Government-Evidence-from-Mexico http://hdl.handle.net/10986/31178 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8710 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Latin America & Caribbean Mexico
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	GOVERNANCE POLITICAL FAVORITISM PUBLIC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE ROAD CONSTRUCTION FEDERAL HIGHWAYS LEGISLATIVE RACES
spellingShingle	GOVERNANCE POLITICAL FAVORITISM PUBLIC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE ROAD CONSTRUCTION FEDERAL HIGHWAYS LEGISLATIVE RACES Selod, Harris Soumahoro, Souleymane Highway Politics in a Divided Government : Evidence from Mexico
geographic_facet	Latin America & Caribbean Mexico
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8710
description	This paper combines local election results and geo-referenced road construction data over 1993-2012 to investigate political bias in road infrastructure investment in a democratic setting, focusing on the case of Mexico. Using a regression discontinuity design, the paper finds strong evidence of partisan allocation of federally-funded highways to municipalities that voted for the president's party in legislative races, nearly doubling the stock of highways compared to opposition municipalities. The extent of political favoritism in highway provision is stronger under divided government when the president has no majority in the legislature, suggesting political efforts to control the Congress.
format	Working Paper
author	Selod, Harris Soumahoro, Souleymane
author_facet	Selod, Harris Soumahoro, Souleymane
author_sort	Selod, Harris
title	Highway Politics in a Divided Government : Evidence from Mexico
title_short	Highway Politics in a Divided Government : Evidence from Mexico
title_full	Highway Politics in a Divided Government : Evidence from Mexico
title_fullStr	Highway Politics in a Divided Government : Evidence from Mexico
title_full_unstemmed	Highway Politics in a Divided Government : Evidence from Mexico
title_sort	highway politics in a divided government : evidence from mexico
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2019
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/493691547756360057/Highway-Politics-in-a-Divided-Government-Evidence-from-Mexico http://hdl.handle.net/10986/31178
_version_	1764473722213761024

Highway Politics in a Divided Government : Evidence from Mexico

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