Encouraging Service Delivery to the Poor : Does Money Talk When Health Workers Are Pro-Poor?
Do service providers respond to pecuniary incentives to serve the poor? Service delivery to the poor is complicated by the extra effort required to deliver services to them and the intrinsic incentives of service providers to exert this effort. Inc...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2018
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/126181544125231736/Encouraging-Service-Delivery-to-the-Poor-Does-Money-Talk-When-Health-Workers-Are-Pro-Poor http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30988 |
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okr-10986-309882021-06-08T14:42:45Z Encouraging Service Delivery to the Poor : Does Money Talk When Health Workers Are Pro-Poor? Banuri, Sheheryar de Walque, Damien Keeper, Philip Robyn, Paul Jacob SERVICE DELIVERY HEALTH SERVICES PUBLIC HEALTH ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE SERVICE HEALTH WORKERS INEQUALITY Do service providers respond to pecuniary incentives to serve the poor? Service delivery to the poor is complicated by the extra effort required to deliver services to them and the intrinsic incentives of service providers to exert this effort. Incentive schemes typically fail to account for these complications. A lab-in-the-field experiment with nearly 400 health workers in rural Burkina Faso provides strong evidence that the interaction of effort costs, ability, and intrinsic and extrinsic incentives significantly influences service delivery to the poor. Health workers reviewed video vignettes of medical cases involving poor and nonpoor patients under a variety of bonus schemes. Bonuses to serve the poor have less impact on effort than bonuses to serve the nonpoor; health workers who receive equal bonuses to serve poor and nonpoor patients see fewer poor patients than workers who receive only a flat salary; and bonuses operate largely through their influence on the behavior of pro-poor workers. The paper also presents novel evidence on the selection effects of contract type: pro-poor workers prefer the flat salary contract to the variable salary contract. 2018-12-11T18:48:43Z 2018-12-11T18:48:43Z 2018-12 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/126181544125231736/Encouraging-Service-Delivery-to-the-Poor-Does-Money-Talk-When-Health-Workers-Are-Pro-Poor http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30988 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8666 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Publications & Research Africa Burkina Faso |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
SERVICE DELIVERY HEALTH SERVICES PUBLIC HEALTH ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE SERVICE HEALTH WORKERS INEQUALITY |
| spellingShingle |
SERVICE DELIVERY HEALTH SERVICES PUBLIC HEALTH ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE SERVICE HEALTH WORKERS INEQUALITY Banuri, Sheheryar de Walque, Damien Keeper, Philip Robyn, Paul Jacob Encouraging Service Delivery to the Poor : Does Money Talk When Health Workers Are Pro-Poor? |
| geographic_facet |
Africa Burkina Faso |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8666 |
| description |
Do service providers respond to
pecuniary incentives to serve the poor? Service delivery to
the poor is complicated by the extra effort required to
deliver services to them and the intrinsic incentives of
service providers to exert this effort. Incentive schemes
typically fail to account for these complications. A
lab-in-the-field experiment with nearly 400 health workers
in rural Burkina Faso provides strong evidence that the
interaction of effort costs, ability, and intrinsic and
extrinsic incentives significantly influences service
delivery to the poor. Health workers reviewed video
vignettes of medical cases involving poor and nonpoor
patients under a variety of bonus schemes. Bonuses to serve
the poor have less impact on effort than bonuses to serve
the nonpoor; health workers who receive equal bonuses to
serve poor and nonpoor patients see fewer poor patients than
workers who receive only a flat salary; and bonuses operate
largely through their influence on the behavior of pro-poor
workers. The paper also presents novel evidence on the
selection effects of contract type: pro-poor workers prefer
the flat salary contract to the variable salary contract. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Banuri, Sheheryar de Walque, Damien Keeper, Philip Robyn, Paul Jacob |
| author_facet |
Banuri, Sheheryar de Walque, Damien Keeper, Philip Robyn, Paul Jacob |
| author_sort |
Banuri, Sheheryar |
| title |
Encouraging Service Delivery to the Poor : Does Money Talk When Health Workers Are Pro-Poor? |
| title_short |
Encouraging Service Delivery to the Poor : Does Money Talk When Health Workers Are Pro-Poor? |
| title_full |
Encouraging Service Delivery to the Poor : Does Money Talk When Health Workers Are Pro-Poor? |
| title_fullStr |
Encouraging Service Delivery to the Poor : Does Money Talk When Health Workers Are Pro-Poor? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Encouraging Service Delivery to the Poor : Does Money Talk When Health Workers Are Pro-Poor? |
| title_sort |
encouraging service delivery to the poor : does money talk when health workers are pro-poor? |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2018 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/126181544125231736/Encouraging-Service-Delivery-to-the-Poor-Does-Money-Talk-When-Health-Workers-Are-Pro-Poor http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30988 |
| _version_ |
1764473336158486528 |