On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia

This paper studies the effects of enforcement on illegal behavior in the context of a large aerial spraying program designed to curb coca cultivation in Colombia. In 2006, the Colombian government pledged not to spray a 10 km band around the frontier with Ecuador due to diplomatic frictions arising...

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Main Authors:	Mejía, Daniel, Restrepo, Pascual, Rozo, Sandra V.
Format:	Journal Article
Published:	Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank 2018
Subjects:	COCA CULTIVATION AERIAL SPRAYING LAW ENFORCEMENT ILLEGAL MARKETS INCENTIVES PENALTIES CRIME ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES ILLICIT DRUGS WAR ON DRUGS
Online Access:	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30965

id	okr-10986-30965
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-309652021-05-25T10:54:35Z On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia Mejía, Daniel Restrepo, Pascual Rozo, Sandra V. COCA CULTIVATION AERIAL SPRAYING LAW ENFORCEMENT ILLEGAL MARKETS INCENTIVES PENALTIES CRIME ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES ILLICIT DRUGS WAR ON DRUGS This paper studies the effects of enforcement on illegal behavior in the context of a large aerial spraying program designed to curb coca cultivation in Colombia. In 2006, the Colombian government pledged not to spray a 10 km band around the frontier with Ecuador due to diplomatic frictions arising from the possibly negative collateral effects of this policy on the Ecuadorian side of the border. We exploit this variation to estimate the effect of spraying on coca cultivation by regression discontinuity around the 10 km threshold and by conditional differences in differences. Our results suggest that spraying one additional hectare reduces coca cultivation by 0.022 to 0.03 hectares; these effects are too small to make aerial spraying a cost-effective policy for reducing cocaine production in Colombia. 2018-12-06T22:03:18Z 2018-12-06T22:03:18Z 2017-06-01 Journal Article World Bank Economic Review 1564-698X http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30965 CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank Publications & Research :: Journal Article Publications & Research Latin America & Caribbean Colombia
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
topic	COCA CULTIVATION AERIAL SPRAYING LAW ENFORCEMENT ILLEGAL MARKETS INCENTIVES PENALTIES CRIME ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES ILLICIT DRUGS WAR ON DRUGS
spellingShingle	COCA CULTIVATION AERIAL SPRAYING LAW ENFORCEMENT ILLEGAL MARKETS INCENTIVES PENALTIES CRIME ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES ILLICIT DRUGS WAR ON DRUGS Mejía, Daniel Restrepo, Pascual Rozo, Sandra V. On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia
geographic_facet	Latin America & Caribbean Colombia
description	This paper studies the effects of enforcement on illegal behavior in the context of a large aerial spraying program designed to curb coca cultivation in Colombia. In 2006, the Colombian government pledged not to spray a 10 km band around the frontier with Ecuador due to diplomatic frictions arising from the possibly negative collateral effects of this policy on the Ecuadorian side of the border. We exploit this variation to estimate the effect of spraying on coca cultivation by regression discontinuity around the 10 km threshold and by conditional differences in differences. Our results suggest that spraying one additional hectare reduces coca cultivation by 0.022 to 0.03 hectares; these effects are too small to make aerial spraying a cost-effective policy for reducing cocaine production in Colombia.
format	Journal Article
author	Mejía, Daniel Restrepo, Pascual Rozo, Sandra V.
author_facet	Mejía, Daniel Restrepo, Pascual Rozo, Sandra V.
author_sort	Mejía, Daniel
title	On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia
title_short	On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia
title_full	On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia
title_fullStr	On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia
title_full_unstemmed	On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia
title_sort	on the effects of enforcement on illegal markets : evidence from a quasi-experiment in colombia
publisher	Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the World Bank
publishDate	2018
url	http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30965
_version_	1764473286135119872

On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia

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