Bank Runs and Moral Hazard : A Review of Deposit Insurance

Deposit insurance is a widely adopted policy to promote financial stability in the banking sector. Deposit insurance helps ensure depositors' confidence in the financial system and prevents contagious bank runs, but it also comes with an unint...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Anginer, Deniz, Demirguc-Kunt, Asli
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2018
Subjects:	DEPOSIT INSURANCE BANKING RISK BANKING SYSTEM BANKING CRISIS MORAL HAZARD CONTAGION FINANCIAL CRISIS
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/548031537377082747/Bank-Runs-and-Moral-Hazard-A-Review-of-Deposit-Insurance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30444

id	okr-10986-30444
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-304442022-09-18T12:15:42Z Bank Runs and Moral Hazard : A Review of Deposit Insurance Anginer, Deniz Demirguc-Kunt, Asli DEPOSIT INSURANCE BANKING RISK BANKING SYSTEM BANKING CRISIS MORAL HAZARD CONTAGION FINANCIAL CRISIS Deposit insurance is a widely adopted policy to promote financial stability in the banking sector. Deposit insurance helps ensure depositors' confidence in the financial system and prevents contagious bank runs, but it also comes with an unintended consequence of encouraging banks to take on excessive risk. This paper reviews the economic costs and benefits of deposit insurance and highlights the importance of institutions and specific design features for how well deposit insurance schemes work in practice. 2018-09-25T20:22:38Z 2018-09-25T20:22:38Z 2018-09 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/548031537377082747/Bank-Runs-and-Moral-Hazard-A-Review-of-Deposit-Insurance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30444 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8589 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	DEPOSIT INSURANCE BANKING RISK BANKING SYSTEM BANKING CRISIS MORAL HAZARD CONTAGION FINANCIAL CRISIS
spellingShingle	DEPOSIT INSURANCE BANKING RISK BANKING SYSTEM BANKING CRISIS MORAL HAZARD CONTAGION FINANCIAL CRISIS Anginer, Deniz Demirguc-Kunt, Asli Bank Runs and Moral Hazard : A Review of Deposit Insurance
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8589
description	Deposit insurance is a widely adopted policy to promote financial stability in the banking sector. Deposit insurance helps ensure depositors' confidence in the financial system and prevents contagious bank runs, but it also comes with an unintended consequence of encouraging banks to take on excessive risk. This paper reviews the economic costs and benefits of deposit insurance and highlights the importance of institutions and specific design features for how well deposit insurance schemes work in practice.
format	Working Paper
author	Anginer, Deniz Demirguc-Kunt, Asli
author_facet	Anginer, Deniz Demirguc-Kunt, Asli
author_sort	Anginer, Deniz
title	Bank Runs and Moral Hazard : A Review of Deposit Insurance
title_short	Bank Runs and Moral Hazard : A Review of Deposit Insurance
title_full	Bank Runs and Moral Hazard : A Review of Deposit Insurance
title_fullStr	Bank Runs and Moral Hazard : A Review of Deposit Insurance
title_full_unstemmed	Bank Runs and Moral Hazard : A Review of Deposit Insurance
title_sort	bank runs and moral hazard : a review of deposit insurance
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2018
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/548031537377082747/Bank-Runs-and-Moral-Hazard-A-Review-of-Deposit-Insurance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30444
_version_	1764472015597600768

Bank Runs and Moral Hazard : A Review of Deposit Insurance

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