Selective Control : The Political Economy of Censorship

In recent years, alongside democratic backsliding and security threats, censorship is increasingly used by governments and other societal actors to control the media. Who is likely to be affected by censorship and why? Does censorship as a form of...

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Main Authors: Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina, Hamilton, Alexander
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2018
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/329391534428575999/Selective-control-the-political-economy-of-censorship
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30283
id okr-10986-30283
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-302832021-06-08T14:42:47Z Selective Control : The Political Economy of Censorship Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina Hamilton, Alexander CENSORSHIP MEDIA ANTI-CORRUPTION CORRUPTION PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE In recent years, alongside democratic backsliding and security threats, censorship is increasingly used by governments and other societal actors to control the media. Who is likely to be affected by censorship and why? Does censorship as a form of punishment coexist with or act as a substitute for reward-based forms of media capture such as market concentration or bribes? First, this argues that censors employ censorship only toward certain targets that provide information to politically consequential audiences, while allowing media that caters to elite audiences to report freely. Second, the paper hypothesizes that coercion and inducements are substitutes, with censorship being employed primarily when bribes and ownership fail to control information. To test these hypotheses, a new data set was built of 9,000 salient censorship events and their characteristics across 196 countries between 2001 and 2015. The study finds strong empirical support for the theory of media market segmentation. 2018-08-23T15:41:14Z 2018-08-23T15:41:14Z 2018-08 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/329391534428575999/Selective-control-the-political-economy-of-censorship http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30283 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8556 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
topic CENSORSHIP
MEDIA
ANTI-CORRUPTION
CORRUPTION
PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE
PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE
spellingShingle CENSORSHIP
MEDIA
ANTI-CORRUPTION
CORRUPTION
PUBLIC SECTOR GOVERNANCE
PUBLIC SECTOR PERFORMANCE
Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina
Hamilton, Alexander
Selective Control : The Political Economy of Censorship
relation Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8556
description In recent years, alongside democratic backsliding and security threats, censorship is increasingly used by governments and other societal actors to control the media. Who is likely to be affected by censorship and why? Does censorship as a form of punishment coexist with or act as a substitute for reward-based forms of media capture such as market concentration or bribes? First, this argues that censors employ censorship only toward certain targets that provide information to politically consequential audiences, while allowing media that caters to elite audiences to report freely. Second, the paper hypothesizes that coercion and inducements are substitutes, with censorship being employed primarily when bribes and ownership fail to control information. To test these hypotheses, a new data set was built of 9,000 salient censorship events and their characteristics across 196 countries between 2001 and 2015. The study finds strong empirical support for the theory of media market segmentation.
format Working Paper
author Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina
Hamilton, Alexander
author_facet Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina
Hamilton, Alexander
author_sort Corduneanu-Huci, Cristina
title Selective Control : The Political Economy of Censorship
title_short Selective Control : The Political Economy of Censorship
title_full Selective Control : The Political Economy of Censorship
title_fullStr Selective Control : The Political Economy of Censorship
title_full_unstemmed Selective Control : The Political Economy of Censorship
title_sort selective control : the political economy of censorship
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2018
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/329391534428575999/Selective-control-the-political-economy-of-censorship
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30283
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