The Consequences of Political Interference in Bureaucratic Decision Making : Evidence from Nigeria

This paper investigates the consequences of granting politicians power over bureaucrats in the implementation of small-scale public infrastructure projects. While potentially bolstering the incentive for the executive to perform, increased legislat...

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Main Author:	Rogger, Daniel
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2018
Subjects:	POLITICIANS BUEAUCRATS PUBLIC GOODS DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL INTERFERENCE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT CORRUPTION
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/655741534339259848/The-consequences-of-political-interference-in-bureaucratic-decision-making-evidence-from-Nigeria http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30244

id	okr-10986-30244
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-302442022-09-18T12:15:36Z The Consequences of Political Interference in Bureaucratic Decision Making : Evidence from Nigeria Rogger, Daniel POLITICIANS BUEAUCRATS PUBLIC GOODS DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL INTERFERENCE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT CORRUPTION This paper investigates the consequences of granting politicians power over bureaucrats in the implementation of small-scale public infrastructure projects. While potentially bolstering the incentive for the executive to perform, increased legislative oversight may lead to distortions in the technocratic process for political gain. By assembling a nationally representative data set from Nigeria that tracks public projects from inception to audit, the paper finds evidence of a clear trade-off between political oversight and bureaucratic autonomy. Using an instrumental variables strategy in which early career choices of politicians are key determinants of legislative committee membership, the analysis finds that legislative influence increases the likelihood that a project is launched by 18 percent, but at the cost of reducing project quality by 15 percent and increasing the reported misuse of funds. The results highlight the fundamental tension between bureaucratic inaction and political corruption. 2018-08-15T20:29:59Z 2018-08-15T20:29:59Z 2018-08 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/655741534339259848/The-consequences-of-political-interference-in-bureaucratic-decision-making-evidence-from-Nigeria http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30244 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8554 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper Africa Nigeria
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English
topic	POLITICIANS BUEAUCRATS PUBLIC GOODS DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL INTERFERENCE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT CORRUPTION
spellingShingle	POLITICIANS BUEAUCRATS PUBLIC GOODS DECENTRALIZATION POLITICAL INTERFERENCE PUBLIC EXPENDITURE PUBLIC INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT CORRUPTION Rogger, Daniel The Consequences of Political Interference in Bureaucratic Decision Making : Evidence from Nigeria
geographic_facet	Africa Nigeria
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8554
description	This paper investigates the consequences of granting politicians power over bureaucrats in the implementation of small-scale public infrastructure projects. While potentially bolstering the incentive for the executive to perform, increased legislative oversight may lead to distortions in the technocratic process for political gain. By assembling a nationally representative data set from Nigeria that tracks public projects from inception to audit, the paper finds evidence of a clear trade-off between political oversight and bureaucratic autonomy. Using an instrumental variables strategy in which early career choices of politicians are key determinants of legislative committee membership, the analysis finds that legislative influence increases the likelihood that a project is launched by 18 percent, but at the cost of reducing project quality by 15 percent and increasing the reported misuse of funds. The results highlight the fundamental tension between bureaucratic inaction and political corruption.
format	Working Paper
author	Rogger, Daniel
author_facet	Rogger, Daniel
author_sort	Rogger, Daniel
title	The Consequences of Political Interference in Bureaucratic Decision Making : Evidence from Nigeria
title_short	The Consequences of Political Interference in Bureaucratic Decision Making : Evidence from Nigeria
title_full	The Consequences of Political Interference in Bureaucratic Decision Making : Evidence from Nigeria
title_fullStr	The Consequences of Political Interference in Bureaucratic Decision Making : Evidence from Nigeria
title_full_unstemmed	The Consequences of Political Interference in Bureaucratic Decision Making : Evidence from Nigeria
title_sort	consequences of political interference in bureaucratic decision making : evidence from nigeria
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2018
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/655741534339259848/The-consequences-of-political-interference-in-bureaucratic-decision-making-evidence-from-Nigeria http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30244
_version_	1764471512582062080

The Consequences of Political Interference in Bureaucratic Decision Making : Evidence from Nigeria

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