The Consequences of Political Interference in Bureaucratic Decision Making : Evidence from Nigeria
This paper investigates the consequences of granting politicians power over bureaucrats in the implementation of small-scale public infrastructure projects. While potentially bolstering the incentive for the executive to perform, increased legislat...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2018
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/655741534339259848/The-consequences-of-political-interference-in-bureaucratic-decision-making-evidence-from-Nigeria http://hdl.handle.net/10986/30244 |
| Summary: | This paper investigates the consequences
of granting politicians power over bureaucrats in the
implementation of small-scale public infrastructure
projects. While potentially bolstering the incentive for the
executive to perform, increased legislative oversight may
lead to distortions in the technocratic process for
political gain. By assembling a nationally representative
data set from Nigeria that tracks public projects from
inception to audit, the paper finds evidence of a clear
trade-off between political oversight and bureaucratic
autonomy. Using an instrumental variables strategy in which
early career choices of politicians are key determinants of
legislative committee membership, the analysis finds that
legislative influence increases the likelihood that a
project is launched by 18 percent, but at the cost of
reducing project quality by 15 percent and increasing the
reported misuse of funds. The results highlight the
fundamental tension between bureaucratic inaction and
political corruption. |
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