Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions
Education conditional cash transfer programs may increase school attendance in part due to the information they transmit to parents about their child's attendance. This paper presents experimental evidence that the information content of an ed...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2018
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/720071529003623702/Incentivizing-school-attendance-in-the-presence-of-parent-child-information-frictions http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29905 |
| id |
okr-10986-29905 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| spelling |
okr-10986-299052021-06-08T14:42:46Z Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions de Walque, Damien Valente, Christine CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS ABSENTEEISM SCHOOL ATTENDANCE MORAL HAZARD DROPOUT RATE PRIMARY EDUCATION CASH INCENTIVES EDUCATION POLICY TEST SCORE Education conditional cash transfer programs may increase school attendance in part due to the information they transmit to parents about their child's attendance. This paper presents experimental evidence that the information content of an education conditional cash transfer program, when given to parents independently of any transfer, can have a substantial effect on school attendance. The effect is as large as 75 percent of the effect of a conditional cash transfer incentivizing parents, and not significantly different from it. In contrast, a conditional transfer program incentivizing children instead of parents is nearly twice as effective as an "information only" treatment providing the same information to parents about their child's attendance. Taken together, these results suggest that children have substantial agency in their schooling decisions. The paper replicates the findings from most evaluations of conditional cash transfers that gains in attendance achieved by incentivizing parents financially do not translate into gains in test scores. But it finds that both the information only treatment and the alternative intervention incentivizing children substantially improve math test scores. 2018-06-19T16:11:51Z 2018-06-19T16:11:51Z 2018-06 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/720071529003623702/Incentivizing-school-attendance-in-the-presence-of-parent-child-information-frictions http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29905 English Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8476 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English |
| topic |
CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS ABSENTEEISM SCHOOL ATTENDANCE MORAL HAZARD DROPOUT RATE PRIMARY EDUCATION CASH INCENTIVES EDUCATION POLICY TEST SCORE |
| spellingShingle |
CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS ABSENTEEISM SCHOOL ATTENDANCE MORAL HAZARD DROPOUT RATE PRIMARY EDUCATION CASH INCENTIVES EDUCATION POLICY TEST SCORE de Walque, Damien Valente, Christine Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8476 |
| description |
Education conditional cash transfer
programs may increase school attendance in part due to the
information they transmit to parents about their
child's attendance. This paper presents experimental
evidence that the information content of an education
conditional cash transfer program, when given to parents
independently of any transfer, can have a substantial effect
on school attendance. The effect is as large as 75 percent
of the effect of a conditional cash transfer incentivizing
parents, and not significantly different from it. In
contrast, a conditional transfer program incentivizing
children instead of parents is nearly twice as effective as
an "information only" treatment providing the same
information to parents about their child's attendance.
Taken together, these results suggest that children have
substantial agency in their schooling decisions. The paper
replicates the findings from most evaluations of conditional
cash transfers that gains in attendance achieved by
incentivizing parents financially do not translate into
gains in test scores. But it finds that both the information
only treatment and the alternative intervention
incentivizing children substantially improve math test scores. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
de Walque, Damien Valente, Christine |
| author_facet |
de Walque, Damien Valente, Christine |
| author_sort |
de Walque, Damien |
| title |
Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions |
| title_short |
Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions |
| title_full |
Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions |
| title_fullStr |
Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Incentivizing School Attendance in the Presence of Parent-Child Information Frictions |
| title_sort |
incentivizing school attendance in the presence of parent-child information frictions |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2018 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/720071529003623702/Incentivizing-school-attendance-in-the-presence-of-parent-child-information-frictions http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29905 |
| _version_ |
1764470683911323648 |