Clientelism in the Public Sector : Why Public Service Reforms Fail and What to Do about It
In many developing countries (and beyond), public sector workers are not just simply implementers of policies designed by the politicians in charge of supervising them -- so called agents and principals, respectively. Public sector workers can have...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2018
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/557331526302017028/Clientelism-in-the-public-sector-why-public-service-reforms-fail-and-what-to-do-about-it http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29845 |
| Summary: | In many developing countries (and
beyond), public sector workers are not just simply
implementers of policies designed by the politicians in
charge of supervising them -- so called agents and
principals, respectively. Public sector workers can have the
power to influence whether politicians are elected, thereby
influencing whether policies to improve service delivery are
adopted and how they are implemented, if at all. This has
implications for the quality of public services: if the main
purpose of the relationship between politicians and public
servants is not to deliver quality public services, but
rather to share rents accruing from public office, then
service delivery outcomes are likely to be poor. This paper
reviews the consequences of such clientelism for improving
service delivery, and examines efforts to break from this
"bad" equilibrium, at the local and national levels. |
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