Organizational Performance with In-group and Out-group Leaders : An Experiment

In this paper, we compare the performance of a homogeneous organization in which group members and the leader belong to the same group, with a heterogeneous organization in which the leader is an outsider. Using a modified public goods game in which leaders’ performance in a real effort task determi...

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Main Authors: Ibanez, Marcela, Schaffland, Elke
Format: Journal Article
Published: Elsevier 2018
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29366
id okr-10986-29366
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-293662021-05-25T10:54:44Z Organizational Performance with In-group and Out-group Leaders : An Experiment Ibanez, Marcela Schaffland, Elke PUBLIC GOODS GAME GROUP MEMBERSHIP LEADERSHIP EXPERIMENT ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE COOPERATION In this paper, we compare the performance of a homogeneous organization in which group members and the leader belong to the same group, with a heterogeneous organization in which the leader is an outsider. Using a modified public goods game in which leaders’ performance in a real effort task determines the marginal return to the public good we focus on the effect of shared group membership on: i) the effort of the leader in the real effort task, ii) cooperation of group members and iii) group members’ payoffs. When the leaders are selected randomly, we find that homogeneous groups tend to out-perform heterogeneous groups. This is due to lower performance of the out-group leader and not to differences in cooperation. This effect disappears when high-performance leaders are selected. High performance out-group leaders tend to over perform relative to in-group leaders, yet, there are no differences in cooperation once we control for the marginal incentives to invest in the public good. The results of our study have important implications for how organizations can deal with the arrival of out-group leaders. 2018-02-16T20:17:45Z 2018-02-16T20:17:45Z 2017-12-02 Journal Article Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 2214-8043 http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29366 CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo World Bank Elsevier Publications & Research :: Journal Article Publications & Research
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
topic PUBLIC GOODS GAME
GROUP MEMBERSHIP
LEADERSHIP
EXPERIMENT
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
COOPERATION
spellingShingle PUBLIC GOODS GAME
GROUP MEMBERSHIP
LEADERSHIP
EXPERIMENT
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE
COOPERATION
Ibanez, Marcela
Schaffland, Elke
Organizational Performance with In-group and Out-group Leaders : An Experiment
description In this paper, we compare the performance of a homogeneous organization in which group members and the leader belong to the same group, with a heterogeneous organization in which the leader is an outsider. Using a modified public goods game in which leaders’ performance in a real effort task determines the marginal return to the public good we focus on the effect of shared group membership on: i) the effort of the leader in the real effort task, ii) cooperation of group members and iii) group members’ payoffs. When the leaders are selected randomly, we find that homogeneous groups tend to out-perform heterogeneous groups. This is due to lower performance of the out-group leader and not to differences in cooperation. This effect disappears when high-performance leaders are selected. High performance out-group leaders tend to over perform relative to in-group leaders, yet, there are no differences in cooperation once we control for the marginal incentives to invest in the public good. The results of our study have important implications for how organizations can deal with the arrival of out-group leaders.
format Journal Article
author Ibanez, Marcela
Schaffland, Elke
author_facet Ibanez, Marcela
Schaffland, Elke
author_sort Ibanez, Marcela
title Organizational Performance with In-group and Out-group Leaders : An Experiment
title_short Organizational Performance with In-group and Out-group Leaders : An Experiment
title_full Organizational Performance with In-group and Out-group Leaders : An Experiment
title_fullStr Organizational Performance with In-group and Out-group Leaders : An Experiment
title_full_unstemmed Organizational Performance with In-group and Out-group Leaders : An Experiment
title_sort organizational performance with in-group and out-group leaders : an experiment
publisher Elsevier
publishDate 2018
url http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29366
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