Politics, Public Works and Poverty : Evidence from the Bangladesh Employment Generation Programme for the Poorest
Public works programs can be effective safety nets if they help allocate resources toward poor households. By setting wages lower than market rates public works programs identify poor households reasonably well. When these programs are oversubscrib...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2017
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/150921504018082396/Politics-public-works-and-poverty-evidence-from-the-Bangladesh-employment-generation-programme-for-the-poorest http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28355 |
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okr-10986-283552021-06-08T14:42:48Z Politics, Public Works and Poverty : Evidence from the Bangladesh Employment Generation Programme for the Poorest Sharif, Iffath Ruthbah, Ummul EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM POVERTY REDUCTION PUBLIC WORKS JOB CREATION POLITICS POLITICAL ACCESS SAFETY NET SEASONAL WORK Public works programs can be effective safety nets if they help allocate resources toward poor households. By setting wages lower than market rates public works programs identify poor households reasonably well. When these programs are oversubscribed and lack beneficiary selection rules however, discretion by local politicians can influence their distribution and their effectiveness as safety nets. This paper tests this hypothesis using household survey data on a seasonal public works program in Bangladesh. The results show access to local politicians is a significant determinant of participation, and can increase the relative probability of participation by 110 percent. Participation has a positive impact on food and nonfood consumption of poorer participants. The same is not true for less poor participants. The results suggest rather than relying on local politicians, public works aiming to maximize their impact on poverty should rely on an objective and transparent targeting system that ensures participation of larger numbers of poorer households. 2017-09-21T16:39:21Z 2017-09-21T16:39:21Z 2017-08 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/150921504018082396/Politics-public-works-and-poverty-evidence-from-the-Bangladesh-employment-generation-programme-for-the-poorest http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28355 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8178 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper South Asia Bangladesh |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM POVERTY REDUCTION PUBLIC WORKS JOB CREATION POLITICS POLITICAL ACCESS SAFETY NET SEASONAL WORK |
| spellingShingle |
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM POVERTY REDUCTION PUBLIC WORKS JOB CREATION POLITICS POLITICAL ACCESS SAFETY NET SEASONAL WORK Sharif, Iffath Ruthbah, Ummul Politics, Public Works and Poverty : Evidence from the Bangladesh Employment Generation Programme for the Poorest |
| geographic_facet |
South Asia Bangladesh |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 8178 |
| description |
Public works programs can be effective
safety nets if they help allocate resources toward poor
households. By setting wages lower than market rates public
works programs identify poor households reasonably well.
When these programs are oversubscribed and lack beneficiary
selection rules however, discretion by local politicians can
influence their distribution and their effectiveness as
safety nets. This paper tests this hypothesis using
household survey data on a seasonal public works program in
Bangladesh. The results show access to local politicians is
a significant determinant of participation, and can increase
the relative probability of participation by 110 percent.
Participation has a positive impact on food and nonfood
consumption of poorer participants. The same is not true for
less poor participants. The results suggest rather than
relying on local politicians, public works aiming to
maximize their impact on poverty should rely on an objective
and transparent targeting system that ensures participation
of larger numbers of poorer households. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Sharif, Iffath Ruthbah, Ummul |
| author_facet |
Sharif, Iffath Ruthbah, Ummul |
| author_sort |
Sharif, Iffath |
| title |
Politics, Public Works and Poverty : Evidence from the Bangladesh Employment Generation Programme for the Poorest |
| title_short |
Politics, Public Works and Poverty : Evidence from the Bangladesh Employment Generation Programme for the Poorest |
| title_full |
Politics, Public Works and Poverty : Evidence from the Bangladesh Employment Generation Programme for the Poorest |
| title_fullStr |
Politics, Public Works and Poverty : Evidence from the Bangladesh Employment Generation Programme for the Poorest |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Politics, Public Works and Poverty : Evidence from the Bangladesh Employment Generation Programme for the Poorest |
| title_sort |
politics, public works and poverty : evidence from the bangladesh employment generation programme for the poorest |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2017 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/150921504018082396/Politics-public-works-and-poverty-evidence-from-the-Bangladesh-employment-generation-programme-for-the-poorest http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28355 |
| _version_ |
1764466693058330624 |