Why Governments Tax or Subsidize Trade : Evidence from Agriculture
This paper empirically explores the political-economic determinants of why governments choose to tax or subsidize trade in agriculture. The authors use a new data set on nominal rates of assistance (NRA) across a number of commodities spanning the...
Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | Working Paper |
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2017
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/393041468152708786/Why-governments-tax-or-subsidize-trade-evidence-from-agriculture http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28182 |
Summary: | This paper empirically explores the
political-economic determinants of why governments choose to
tax or subsidize trade in agriculture. The authors use a new
data set on nominal rates of assistance (NRA) across a
number of commodities spanning the last five decades for 64
countries. NRAs measure the effect on domestic (relative to
world) price of the quantitative and price-based instruments
used to regulate agricultural markets. The data set admits
consideration of both taxes and subsidies on exports and
imports. The authors find that both economic and political
variables play important roles in determining the
within-variation in the NRA data. Based on results the
authors offer a number of data-driven exploratory hypotheses
that can inform future theoretical and empirical research on
why governments choose to tax or subsidize agricultural
products an important policy question that is also one of
the least understood by scholars. |
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