The Logic of the CAP : Politics or Economics?

This paper derives an applied general political economy model incorporating a model of political decision making into a computable general economic equilibrium model. Political decision making among a set of legislators is modeled via a mean voter...

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Main Authors:	Henning, Christian H.C.A., Struve, Carsten, Brockmeier, Martina
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2017
Subjects:	AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION BARGAINING BARGAINING POWER CETERIS PARIBUS CONSUMERS CULTURAL CHANGE DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DEMOCRACY DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT POLICY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM ECONOMIC FACTORS ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC SYSTEM ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION EXPECTED UTILITY EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS FORECASTS FUTURE RESEARCH GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS GLOBAL POLICY HUMAN BEINGS IDEOLOGY IMPERFECT INFORMATION IMPORT QUOTAS INCENTIVE PROBLEMS INCOME INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS INTEREST GROUP INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LEGISLATORS LOGROLLING MACROECONOMIC POLICIES MOTIVATION NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATIONAL COUNCIL NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY PARTY PLATFORM POLICY CONCERN POLICY DECISIONS POLICY DEVELOPMENTS POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESPONSE POLITICAL DECISION POLITICAL ECONOMICS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY STUDIES POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SUPPORT POLITICAL SYSTEMS POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION PREFERENCE FUNCTIONS PRICE POLICIES PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAMS PROGRESS PROTECTIONISM RESOURCE ALLOCATION RISK AVERSE RURAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL POLICIES TRADE POLICIES TRADE-OFF TREATY URBAN POPULATION UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS UTILITY MAXIMIZATION VOTERS WAGE RATES WTO
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/355811468339615195/The-logic-of-the-CAP-politics-or-economics http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28181

id	okr-10986-28181
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-281812021-04-23T14:04:46Z The Logic of the CAP : Politics or Economics? Henning, Christian H.C.A. Struve, Carsten Brockmeier, Martina AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION BARGAINING BARGAINING POWER CETERIS PARIBUS CONSUMERS CULTURAL CHANGE DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DEMOCRACY DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT POLICY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM ECONOMIC FACTORS ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC SYSTEM ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION EXPECTED UTILITY EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS FORECASTS FUTURE RESEARCH GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS GLOBAL POLICY HUMAN BEINGS IDEOLOGY IMPERFECT INFORMATION IMPORT QUOTAS INCENTIVE PROBLEMS INCOME INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS INTEREST GROUP INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LEGISLATORS LOGROLLING MACROECONOMIC POLICIES MOTIVATION NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATIONAL COUNCIL NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY PARTY PLATFORM POLICY CONCERN POLICY DECISIONS POLICY DEVELOPMENTS POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESPONSE POLITICAL DECISION POLITICAL ECONOMICS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY STUDIES POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SUPPORT POLITICAL SYSTEMS POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION PREFERENCE FUNCTIONS PRICE POLICIES PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAMS PROGRESS PROTECTIONISM RESOURCE ALLOCATION RISK AVERSE RURAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL POLICIES TRADE POLICIES TRADE-OFF TREATY URBAN POPULATION UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS UTILITY MAXIMIZATION VOTERS WAGE RATES WTO This paper derives an applied general political economy model incorporating a model of political decision making into a computable general economic equilibrium model. Political decision making among a set of legislators is modeled via a mean voter decision rule derived from a modified non cooperative legislative bargaining game of a Baron Ferejohn type. The model allows a simultaneous analysis of political and economic factors determining policy outcome and is applied to simulate future Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) under various political and economic scenarios. 2017-09-07T18:15:16Z 2017-09-07T18:15:16Z 2008-11-02 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/355811468339615195/The-logic-of-the-CAP-politics-or-economics http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28181 English en_US Agricultural Distortions Working Paper;77 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Working Paper Publications & Research European Union
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION BARGAINING BARGAINING POWER CETERIS PARIBUS CONSUMERS CULTURAL CHANGE DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DEMOCRACY DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT POLICY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM ECONOMIC FACTORS ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC SYSTEM ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION EXPECTED UTILITY EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS FORECASTS FUTURE RESEARCH GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS GLOBAL POLICY HUMAN BEINGS IDEOLOGY IMPERFECT INFORMATION IMPORT QUOTAS INCENTIVE PROBLEMS INCOME INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS INTEREST GROUP INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LEGISLATORS LOGROLLING MACROECONOMIC POLICIES MOTIVATION NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATIONAL COUNCIL NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY PARTY PLATFORM POLICY CONCERN POLICY DECISIONS POLICY DEVELOPMENTS POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESPONSE POLITICAL DECISION POLITICAL ECONOMICS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY STUDIES POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SUPPORT POLITICAL SYSTEMS POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION PREFERENCE FUNCTIONS PRICE POLICIES PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAMS PROGRESS PROTECTIONISM RESOURCE ALLOCATION RISK AVERSE RURAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL POLICIES TRADE POLICIES TRADE-OFF TREATY URBAN POPULATION UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS UTILITY MAXIMIZATION VOTERS WAGE RATES WTO
spellingShingle	AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION BARGAINING BARGAINING POWER CETERIS PARIBUS CONSUMERS CULTURAL CHANGE DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DEMOCRACY DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT POLICY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM ECONOMIC FACTORS ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC SYSTEM ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION EXPECTED UTILITY EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS FORECASTS FUTURE RESEARCH GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS GLOBAL POLICY HUMAN BEINGS IDEOLOGY IMPERFECT INFORMATION IMPORT QUOTAS INCENTIVE PROBLEMS INCOME INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS INTEREST GROUP INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LEGISLATORS LOGROLLING MACROECONOMIC POLICIES MOTIVATION NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATIONAL COUNCIL NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY PARTY PLATFORM POLICY CONCERN POLICY DECISIONS POLICY DEVELOPMENTS POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESPONSE POLITICAL DECISION POLITICAL ECONOMICS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY STUDIES POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SUPPORT POLITICAL SYSTEMS POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION PREFERENCE FUNCTIONS PRICE POLICIES PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAMS PROGRESS PROTECTIONISM RESOURCE ALLOCATION RISK AVERSE RURAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL POLICIES TRADE POLICIES TRADE-OFF TREATY URBAN POPULATION UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS UTILITY MAXIMIZATION VOTERS WAGE RATES WTO Henning, Christian H.C.A. Struve, Carsten Brockmeier, Martina The Logic of the CAP : Politics or Economics?
geographic_facet	European Union
relation	Agricultural Distortions Working Paper;77
description	This paper derives an applied general political economy model incorporating a model of political decision making into a computable general economic equilibrium model. Political decision making among a set of legislators is modeled via a mean voter decision rule derived from a modified non cooperative legislative bargaining game of a Baron Ferejohn type. The model allows a simultaneous analysis of political and economic factors determining policy outcome and is applied to simulate future Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) under various political and economic scenarios.
format	Working Paper
author	Henning, Christian H.C.A. Struve, Carsten Brockmeier, Martina
author_facet	Henning, Christian H.C.A. Struve, Carsten Brockmeier, Martina
author_sort	Henning, Christian H.C.A.
title	The Logic of the CAP : Politics or Economics?
title_short	The Logic of the CAP : Politics or Economics?
title_full	The Logic of the CAP : Politics or Economics?
title_fullStr	The Logic of the CAP : Politics or Economics?
title_full_unstemmed	The Logic of the CAP : Politics or Economics?
title_sort	logic of the cap : politics or economics?
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2017
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/355811468339615195/The-logic-of-the-CAP-politics-or-economics http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28181
_version_	1764466039186259968

The Logic of the CAP : Politics or Economics?

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