The Logic of the CAP : Politics or Economics?

This paper derives an applied general political economy model incorporating a model of political decision making into a computable general economic equilibrium model. Political decision making among a set of legislators is modeled via a mean voter...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Henning, Christian H.C.A., Struve, Carsten, Brockmeier, Martina
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2017
Subjects:	AGRICULTURAL POLICIES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION BARGAINING BARGAINING POWER CETERIS PARIBUS CONSUMERS CULTURAL CHANGE DECISION MAKING DECISION-MAKING DEMOCRACY DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPMENT POLICY ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM ECONOMIC FACTORS ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ECONOMIC SYSTEM ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION EXPECTED UTILITY EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS FORECASTS FUTURE RESEARCH GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS GLOBAL POLICY HUMAN BEINGS IDEOLOGY IMPERFECT INFORMATION IMPORT QUOTAS INCENTIVE PROBLEMS INCOME INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS INTEREST GROUP INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LEGISLATORS LOGROLLING MACROECONOMIC POLICIES MOTIVATION NASH EQUILIBRIUM NATIONAL COUNCIL NEW POLITICAL ECONOMY PARTY PLATFORM POLICY CONCERN POLICY DECISIONS POLICY DEVELOPMENTS POLICY IMPLICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH POLICY RESPONSE POLITICAL DECISION POLITICAL ECONOMICS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY STUDIES POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL PARTICIPATION POLITICAL POWER POLITICAL SCIENCE POLITICAL SUPPORT POLITICAL SYSTEMS POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION PREFERENCE FUNCTIONS PRICE POLICIES PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS PRODUCTIVITY PROGRAMS PROGRESS PROTECTIONISM RESOURCE ALLOCATION RISK AVERSE RURAL DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL POLICIES TRADE POLICIES TRADE-OFF TREATY URBAN POPULATION UTILITY FUNCTION UTILITY FUNCTIONS UTILITY MAXIMIZATION VOTERS WAGE RATES WTO
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/355811468339615195/The-logic-of-the-CAP-politics-or-economics http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28181

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Summary:	This paper derives an applied general political economy model incorporating a model of political decision making into a computable general economic equilibrium model. Political decision making among a set of legislators is modeled via a mean voter decision rule derived from a modified non cooperative legislative bargaining game of a Baron Ferejohn type. The model allows a simultaneous analysis of political and economic factors determining policy outcome and is applied to simulate future Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) under various political and economic scenarios.

The Logic of the CAP : Politics or Economics?

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