Political Economy of Anglo-French Trade, 1689-1899 : Agricultural Trade Policies, Alcohol Taxes, and War
Britain contrary to received wisdom was not a free trader for most of the 1800s and, despite repeal of the Corn Laws, continued to have higher tariffs than the French until the last quarter of the century. War with Louis fourteenth from 1689 led to...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2017
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/528211468156266734/Political-economy-of-Anglo-French-trade-1689-1899-agricultural-trade-policies-alcohol-taxes-and-war http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28162 |
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okr-10986-281622021-04-23T14:04:45Z Political Economy of Anglo-French Trade, 1689-1899 : Agricultural Trade Policies, Alcohol Taxes, and War Nye, John V. C. AD VALOREM AGRICULTURAL INCENTIVES AGRICULTURAL TRADE AGRICULTURE AVERAGE TARIFF AVERAGE TARIFF LEVELS AVERAGE TARIFFS BENCHMARK BILATERAL AGREEMENT BILATERAL AGREEMENTS COMMERCIAL POLICY COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE CONSUMERS CUSTOMS DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC SUBSTITUTES ECONOMIC HISTORY ECONOMIC WELFARE ECONOMIES OF SCALE EXPORTS FOREIGN COMPETITION FOREIGN PRODUCTS FREE TRADE FREE TRADERS GDP GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM HIGH TARIFFS IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT DUTIES IMPORT MIX IMPORT TARIFF IMPORT TARIFFS IMPORT VALUE IMPORTED PRODUCTS IMPORTS LOW TARIFFS MERCANTILISM MERCHANDISE TRADE MONOPOLY MOST FAVORED NATION NATION CLAUSES NATIONAL INCOME OLIGOPOLY OPEN TRADE OPENNESS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL REASONS PRIMARY GOODS PROPERTY TAXES PROTECTIONISM PROTECTIONIST PROTECTIONIST POLICIES PROTECTIONISTS PROTECTIVE TARIFFS PUBLIC GOOD RATES OF PROTECTION RECIPROCITY RETAIL TRADE TARIFF DISTORTIONS TARIFF LEVELS TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUES TAX REVENUE TAXATION TRADE ARRANGEMENTS TRADE BALANCE TRADE BARRIERS TRADE DEFICIT TRADE DISTORTIONS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE RELATIONS TRADE RESTRICTIONS TRADE TREATY TRADING PARTNER TRANSACTIONS COSTS TREATIES UNILATERAL FREE TRADE WAGES WEALTH WELFARE LOSSES WORLD MARKET WORLD PRICES WORLD TRADE Britain contrary to received wisdom was not a free trader for most of the 1800s and, despite repeal of the Corn Laws, continued to have higher tariffs than the French until the last quarter of the century. War with Louis fourteenth from 1689 led to the end of all trade between Britain and France for a quarter of a century. The creation of powerful protected interests both at home and abroad led to the imposition of prohibitively high tariffs on French imports notably on wine and spirits, when trade with France resumed in 1714. Protection of domestic interests from import competition allowed the state to raise domestic excises which provided increased government revenues despite almost no increases in the taxes on land and income in Britain. The state ensured compliance not simply through the threat of lower tariffs on foreign substitutes but also through the encouragement of a trend towards monopoly production in brewing and restricted retail sales of beer. This history is analyzed in terms of its effects on British fiscal and commercial policy from the early 1700s to the end of the nineteenth century. The result is a fuller, albeit revisionist account of the rise of the modern state that calls into question a variety of theses in economics and political science that draw on the naive view of a liberal Britain unilaterally moving to free trade in the nineteenth century. 2017-09-07T17:01:38Z 2017-09-07T17:01:38Z 2009-05 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/528211468156266734/Political-economy-of-Anglo-French-trade-1689-1899-agricultural-trade-policies-alcohol-taxes-and-war http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28162 English en_US Agricultural Distortions Working Paper;79 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Working Paper Publications & Research |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
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Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
AD VALOREM AGRICULTURAL INCENTIVES AGRICULTURAL TRADE AGRICULTURE AVERAGE TARIFF AVERAGE TARIFF LEVELS AVERAGE TARIFFS BENCHMARK BILATERAL AGREEMENT BILATERAL AGREEMENTS COMMERCIAL POLICY COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE CONSUMERS CUSTOMS DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC SUBSTITUTES ECONOMIC HISTORY ECONOMIC WELFARE ECONOMIES OF SCALE EXPORTS FOREIGN COMPETITION FOREIGN PRODUCTS FREE TRADE FREE TRADERS GDP GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM HIGH TARIFFS IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT DUTIES IMPORT MIX IMPORT TARIFF IMPORT TARIFFS IMPORT VALUE IMPORTED PRODUCTS IMPORTS LOW TARIFFS MERCANTILISM MERCHANDISE TRADE MONOPOLY MOST FAVORED NATION NATION CLAUSES NATIONAL INCOME OLIGOPOLY OPEN TRADE OPENNESS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL REASONS PRIMARY GOODS PROPERTY TAXES PROTECTIONISM PROTECTIONIST PROTECTIONIST POLICIES PROTECTIONISTS PROTECTIVE TARIFFS PUBLIC GOOD RATES OF PROTECTION RECIPROCITY RETAIL TRADE TARIFF DISTORTIONS TARIFF LEVELS TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUES TAX REVENUE TAXATION TRADE ARRANGEMENTS TRADE BALANCE TRADE BARRIERS TRADE DEFICIT TRADE DISTORTIONS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE RELATIONS TRADE RESTRICTIONS TRADE TREATY TRADING PARTNER TRANSACTIONS COSTS TREATIES UNILATERAL FREE TRADE WAGES WEALTH WELFARE LOSSES WORLD MARKET WORLD PRICES WORLD TRADE |
| spellingShingle |
AD VALOREM AGRICULTURAL INCENTIVES AGRICULTURAL TRADE AGRICULTURE AVERAGE TARIFF AVERAGE TARIFF LEVELS AVERAGE TARIFFS BENCHMARK BILATERAL AGREEMENT BILATERAL AGREEMENTS COMMERCIAL POLICY COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE CONSUMERS CUSTOMS DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION DOMESTIC INDUSTRY DOMESTIC SUBSTITUTES ECONOMIC HISTORY ECONOMIC WELFARE ECONOMIES OF SCALE EXPORTS FOREIGN COMPETITION FOREIGN PRODUCTS FREE TRADE FREE TRADERS GDP GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM HIGH TARIFFS IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT DUTIES IMPORT MIX IMPORT TARIFF IMPORT TARIFFS IMPORT VALUE IMPORTED PRODUCTS IMPORTS LOW TARIFFS MERCANTILISM MERCHANDISE TRADE MONOPOLY MOST FAVORED NATION NATION CLAUSES NATIONAL INCOME OLIGOPOLY OPEN TRADE OPENNESS POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL REASONS PRIMARY GOODS PROPERTY TAXES PROTECTIONISM PROTECTIONIST PROTECTIONIST POLICIES PROTECTIONISTS PROTECTIVE TARIFFS PUBLIC GOOD RATES OF PROTECTION RECIPROCITY RETAIL TRADE TARIFF DISTORTIONS TARIFF LEVELS TARIFF PROTECTION TARIFF RATE TARIFF RATES TARIFF REVENUES TAX REVENUE TAXATION TRADE ARRANGEMENTS TRADE BALANCE TRADE BARRIERS TRADE DEFICIT TRADE DISTORTIONS TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE RELATIONS TRADE RESTRICTIONS TRADE TREATY TRADING PARTNER TRANSACTIONS COSTS TREATIES UNILATERAL FREE TRADE WAGES WEALTH WELFARE LOSSES WORLD MARKET WORLD PRICES WORLD TRADE Nye, John V. C. Political Economy of Anglo-French Trade, 1689-1899 : Agricultural Trade Policies, Alcohol Taxes, and War |
| relation |
Agricultural Distortions Working Paper;79 |
| description |
Britain contrary to received wisdom was
not a free trader for most of the 1800s and, despite repeal
of the Corn Laws, continued to have higher tariffs than the
French until the last quarter of the century. War with Louis
fourteenth from 1689 led to the end of all trade between
Britain and France for a quarter of a century. The creation
of powerful protected interests both at home and abroad led
to the imposition of prohibitively high tariffs on French
imports notably on wine and spirits, when trade with France
resumed in 1714. Protection of domestic interests from
import competition allowed the state to raise domestic
excises which provided increased government revenues despite
almost no increases in the taxes on land and income in
Britain. The state ensured compliance not simply through the
threat of lower tariffs on foreign substitutes but also
through the encouragement of a trend towards monopoly
production in brewing and restricted retail sales of beer.
This history is analyzed in terms of its effects on British
fiscal and commercial policy from the early 1700s to the end
of the nineteenth century. The result is a fuller, albeit
revisionist account of the rise of the modern state that
calls into question a variety of theses in economics and
political science that draw on the naive view of a liberal
Britain unilaterally moving to free trade in the nineteenth century. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Nye, John V. C. |
| author_facet |
Nye, John V. C. |
| author_sort |
Nye, John V. C. |
| title |
Political Economy of Anglo-French Trade, 1689-1899 : Agricultural Trade Policies, Alcohol Taxes, and War |
| title_short |
Political Economy of Anglo-French Trade, 1689-1899 : Agricultural Trade Policies, Alcohol Taxes, and War |
| title_full |
Political Economy of Anglo-French Trade, 1689-1899 : Agricultural Trade Policies, Alcohol Taxes, and War |
| title_fullStr |
Political Economy of Anglo-French Trade, 1689-1899 : Agricultural Trade Policies, Alcohol Taxes, and War |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Political Economy of Anglo-French Trade, 1689-1899 : Agricultural Trade Policies, Alcohol Taxes, and War |
| title_sort |
political economy of anglo-french trade, 1689-1899 : agricultural trade policies, alcohol taxes, and war |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2017 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/528211468156266734/Political-economy-of-Anglo-French-trade-1689-1899-agricultural-trade-policies-alcohol-taxes-and-war http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28162 |
| _version_ |
1764465420074483712 |