Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns : The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance

In this paper, the authors examine the political economy drivers of the variation in agricultural protection, both across countries and within countries over time. The paper starts by listing the key insights provided by both the theoretical and em...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors:	Dutt, Pushan, Mitra, Devashish
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2017
Subjects:	ABSOLUTE VALUE AGRICULTURAL TRADE AGRICULTURE ASSET DISTRIBUTION ASSET INEQUALITY AUCTIONS BARRIER BARRIERS ON IMPORTS CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS CAPITAL GAINS CAPITAL-ABUNDANT COUNTRIES CHECKS AND BALANCES COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY CONSTANT RETURNS CONSTANT RETURNS TO SCALE CONSUMER SURPLUS CONSUMERS COUNTRY SIZE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC EFFECTS CROSS-COUNTRY DATA DATA SET DECREASING FUNCTION DEMOCRACIES DEMOCRACY DEPENDENT VARIABLE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS DICTATORSHIP DOMESTIC PRICE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY ECONOMIC FACTORS ECONOMIC GROWTH ECONOMIC MODELS ECONOMIC REVIEW ECONOMICS ECONOMY LITERATURE ELASTICITY EMPIRICAL APPLICATION EMPIRICAL APPROACHES EMPIRICAL LITERATURE EMPIRICAL RESULTS EMPIRICAL SUPPORT EMPIRICAL WORK EQUILIBRIUM EQUILIBRIUM TARIFF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES EXPORT SUBSIDY EXPORT SUPPLY EXPORTS FREE TRADE FUTURE RESEARCH GDP GDP PER CAPITA GINI COEFFICIENT GLOBALIZATION IDEOLOGY IMPORT COMPETITION IMPORT PROTECTION INCOME INCOME INEQUALITY INCOME LEVELS INCOME TAXES INCREASING FUNCTION INCUMBENT INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES INEQUALITY INEQUALITY MEASURE INEQUALITY WILL INCREASE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION INTERNATIONAL TRADE LABOR FORCE LAND INEQUALITY LEGAL SYSTEM LOBBYING LONG-RUN POLICY MARKET ACCESS MARKET CONDITIONS MEASURING INCOME INEQUALITY MEDIAN VOTER NEGATIVE SIGN NOMINAL RATE NON-TARIFF BARRIERS OLD ISSUES OPEN ECONOMIES OUTPUT PER CAPITA INCOME PER CAPITA INCOMES POLICY CHANGES POLITICAL ACTIVITY POLITICAL CONFLICT POLITICAL ECONOMY POLITICAL ECONOMY MODELS POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICY POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS POLITICAL REGIME POLITICAL SCIENCE POOR COUNTRIES PRODUCTIVITY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION PROTECTIONISM PROTECTIONIST PUBLIC FINANCE REAL WAGES REGULATION OF TRADE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT TARIFF BARRIERS TARIFF FORMATION TARIFF RATES TARIFF STRUCTURE TAX TAX REVENUE TAX REVENUES TAXATION TERMS OF TRADE TRADE BARRIERS TRADE ISSUES TRADE LEGISLATION TRADE LIBERALIZATION TRADE MODELS TRADE POLICIES TRADE POLICY TRADE POLICY FORMULATION TRADE PROTECTION TRADE REFORMS TRADE RESTRICTIONS TRANSPARENCY UNEMPLOYMENT UNEMPLOYMENT RATE UNSKILLED LABOR WAGES WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS WORLD TRADE
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/704051468336324311/Explaining-agricultural-distortion-patterns-the-roles-of-ideology-inequality-lobbying-and-public-finance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/28159

Description
Summary:	In this paper, the authors examine the political economy drivers of the variation in agricultural protection, both across countries and within countries over time. The paper starts by listing the key insights provided by both the theoretical and empirical literature on the political economy of trade policy formulation. The authors then set out a basic framework that allows us to put forth various testable hypotheses on the variation and evolution of agricultural protection. The authors find that both the political ideology of the government and the degree of income inequality are important determinants of agricultural protection. Thus, both the political-support-function approach as well as the median-voter approach can be used in explaining the variation in agricultural protection across countries and within countries over time. The results are consistent with the predictions of a model that assumes that labor is specialized and sector-specific in nature. Some aspects of protection also seem to be consistent with predictions of a lobbying model in that agricultural protection is negatively related to agricultural employment and positively related to agricultural productivity. Public finance aspects of protection also seem to be empirically important.

Explaining Agricultural Distortion Patterns : The Roles of Ideology, Inequality, Lobbying and Public Finance

Similar Items