Regulating Water and Sanitation Network Services Accounting for Institutional and Informational Constraints

The main purpose of this paper is to argue that the optimal design of regulation of water and sanitation monopolies should be the outcome of a detailed diagnostic of the institutional constraints impacting the ability of the operator -- whether pub...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Camos, Daniel, Estache, Antonio
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2017
Subjects:
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/194881500387672328/Regulating-water-and-sanitation-network-services-accounting-for-institutional-and-informational-constraints
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/27957
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Summary:The main purpose of this paper is to argue that the optimal design of regulation of water and sanitation monopolies should be the outcome of a detailed diagnostic of the institutional constraints impacting the ability of the operator -- whether public or private -- to deliver the services. Tailoring the regulatory processes and instruments to account for institutional and informational weaknesses stands a better chance of improving the performance of the sector than the adoption of imported standardized or pre-packaged regulatory tools.