id okr-10986-27359
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-273592021-04-23T14:04:41Z The Economics of Pollution Trading and Pricing under Regulatory Uncertainty Knudsen, Odin K. Scandizzo, Pasquale L. ACCOUNTING ADMINISTERED PRICE ASSET VALUE BID CALL OPTION CARBON EMISSION CARBON TRADING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE CONTINGENT LIABILITY DERIVATIVE EMISSIONS TRADING ENERGY PRICES ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFIT EQUILIBRIUM PRICE EXPECTED PRESENT VALUE EXPENDITURE HOLDING INDUSTRIAL SECTOR INSTRUMENT INTEREST RATE JUDICIAL SYSTEM LAW ENFORCEMENT MARGINAL COSTS MARKET BEHAVIOR MARKET DEMAND MARKET EQUILIBRIUM MARKET INSTRUMENTS MARKET PRICE MARKET SHARE NATURAL RESOURCE OPPORTUNITY COSTS OUTPUT POLLUTER POLLUTION POTENTIAL DEMAND POWER UTILITIES PROFIT MAXIMIZING PUBLIC POLICY REGULATOR REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT REGULATORY REGIME SINGLE MARKET SPREAD TAX TAX RATE TRADING SYSTEM TRANSACTION TRANSACTION COSTS UNDERLYING ASSET VOLATILITY In this paper, authors explore the effects of uncertainty on pricing of pollution permits, through the use of a dynamic model of pollution markets. Authors consider two major sources of uncertainty - that arising from the volatility of demand for the underlying resource and that coming from the regulatory environment. Both sources of uncertainty are common in pollution permit trading as not only does the market respond to the volatility of fundamentals but also to the vagaries of the institutional structure, created by public policy and enforced through regulation. The paper shows that even in the presence of strategic behavior on the part of the agents involved, the trading of permits effectively reduces emissions, and pricing does reflect opportunity costs and environmental objectives. Furthermore, and somewhat paradoxically, the higher uncertainty, the greater the impact of regulation. 2017-06-27T18:13:31Z 2017-06-27T18:13:31Z 2011 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/234491468061732523/The-economics-of-pollution-trading-and-pricing-under-regulatory-uncertainty http://hdl.handle.net/10986/27359 English en_US CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research :: Working Paper Publications & Research Middle East and North Africa Morocco
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language English
en_US
topic ACCOUNTING
ADMINISTERED PRICE
ASSET VALUE
BID
CALL OPTION
CARBON EMISSION
CARBON TRADING
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
CONTINGENT LIABILITY
DERIVATIVE
EMISSIONS TRADING
ENERGY PRICES
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFIT
EQUILIBRIUM PRICE
EXPECTED PRESENT VALUE
EXPENDITURE
HOLDING
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
INSTRUMENT
INTEREST RATE
JUDICIAL SYSTEM
LAW ENFORCEMENT
MARGINAL COSTS
MARKET BEHAVIOR
MARKET DEMAND
MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
MARKET INSTRUMENTS
MARKET PRICE
MARKET SHARE
NATURAL RESOURCE
OPPORTUNITY COSTS
OUTPUT
POLLUTER
POLLUTION
POTENTIAL DEMAND
POWER UTILITIES
PROFIT MAXIMIZING
PUBLIC POLICY
REGULATOR
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
REGULATORY REGIME
SINGLE MARKET
SPREAD
TAX
TAX RATE
TRADING SYSTEM
TRANSACTION
TRANSACTION COSTS
UNDERLYING ASSET
VOLATILITY
spellingShingle ACCOUNTING
ADMINISTERED PRICE
ASSET VALUE
BID
CALL OPTION
CARBON EMISSION
CARBON TRADING
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
CONTINGENT LIABILITY
DERIVATIVE
EMISSIONS TRADING
ENERGY PRICES
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFIT
EQUILIBRIUM PRICE
EXPECTED PRESENT VALUE
EXPENDITURE
HOLDING
INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
INSTRUMENT
INTEREST RATE
JUDICIAL SYSTEM
LAW ENFORCEMENT
MARGINAL COSTS
MARKET BEHAVIOR
MARKET DEMAND
MARKET EQUILIBRIUM
MARKET INSTRUMENTS
MARKET PRICE
MARKET SHARE
NATURAL RESOURCE
OPPORTUNITY COSTS
OUTPUT
POLLUTER
POLLUTION
POTENTIAL DEMAND
POWER UTILITIES
PROFIT MAXIMIZING
PUBLIC POLICY
REGULATOR
REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT
REGULATORY REGIME
SINGLE MARKET
SPREAD
TAX
TAX RATE
TRADING SYSTEM
TRANSACTION
TRANSACTION COSTS
UNDERLYING ASSET
VOLATILITY
Knudsen, Odin K.
Scandizzo, Pasquale L.
The Economics of Pollution Trading and Pricing under Regulatory Uncertainty
geographic_facet Middle East and North Africa
Morocco
description In this paper, authors explore the effects of uncertainty on pricing of pollution permits, through the use of a dynamic model of pollution markets. Authors consider two major sources of uncertainty - that arising from the volatility of demand for the underlying resource and that coming from the regulatory environment. Both sources of uncertainty are common in pollution permit trading as not only does the market respond to the volatility of fundamentals but also to the vagaries of the institutional structure, created by public policy and enforced through regulation. The paper shows that even in the presence of strategic behavior on the part of the agents involved, the trading of permits effectively reduces emissions, and pricing does reflect opportunity costs and environmental objectives. Furthermore, and somewhat paradoxically, the higher uncertainty, the greater the impact of regulation.
format Working Paper
author Knudsen, Odin K.
Scandizzo, Pasquale L.
author_facet Knudsen, Odin K.
Scandizzo, Pasquale L.
author_sort Knudsen, Odin K.
title The Economics of Pollution Trading and Pricing under Regulatory Uncertainty
title_short The Economics of Pollution Trading and Pricing under Regulatory Uncertainty
title_full The Economics of Pollution Trading and Pricing under Regulatory Uncertainty
title_fullStr The Economics of Pollution Trading and Pricing under Regulatory Uncertainty
title_full_unstemmed The Economics of Pollution Trading and Pricing under Regulatory Uncertainty
title_sort economics of pollution trading and pricing under regulatory uncertainty
publisher World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate 2017
url http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/234491468061732523/The-economics-of-pollution-trading-and-pricing-under-regulatory-uncertainty
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/27359
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