Elections and Embezzlement : Experimental Evidence from Burkina Faso

Elections and Embezzlement : Experimental Evidence from Burkina Faso

Can democratic elections reduce rent extraction by public decision makers? Existing research suggests that reelection incentives can reduce the embezzlement of public funds. This paper examines three additional mechanisms through which democratic e...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Lierl, Malte
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2017
Subjects:
CORRUPTION
ELECTIONS
POLITICS
CIVIL SOCIETY
CITIZENS
DEMOCRACY
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/188921495025751605/Elections-and-embezzlement-experimental-evidence-from-Burkina-Faso
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/26759

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/188921495025751605/Elections-and-embezzlement-experimental-evidence-from-Burkina-Faso
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/26759

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