The Governance Game

In this paper, the authors use the lab to test a series of policy proposals designed to constrain rent-seeking behaviour in a policymaking context. The baseline governance game is conducted in the following way: subjects are randomly assigned to gr...

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Main Authors:	Banuri, Sheheryar, Bulman, David, Lopez-Calva, Luis F., Molina, Ezequiel, Safir, Abla, Sharma, Siddharth
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2017
Subjects:	GOVERNANCE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE GROWTH POLICY GAME THEORY VOTING RENT-SEEKING citizen engagement
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/245631487331766677/The-governance-game http://hdl.handle.net/10986/26085

id	okr-10986-26085
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-260852021-05-25T08:57:39Z The Governance Game Banuri, Sheheryar Bulman, David Lopez-Calva, Luis F. Molina, Ezequiel Safir, Abla Sharma, Siddharth GOVERNANCE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE GROWTH POLICY GAME THEORY VOTING RENT-SEEKING citizen engagement In this paper, the authors use the lab to test a series of policy proposals designed to constrain rent-seeking behaviour in a policymaking context. The baseline governance game is conducted in the following way: subjects are randomly assigned to groups of four, with one subject randomly selected to be the “policymaker", while the other three are the “citizens”. Citizens are informed that they can use their endowments to contribute to a group account. Any amount contributed to the group account are doubled. Once citizens have made their contribution decisions, the policymaker observes the contribution decisions of each citizen, and the total amount in the group account. The policymaker formulates a distribution “policy” to distribute the tokens among all four group members. The game is repeated for 20 rounds. With this basic framework, the authors implement and test the effect of three institutions designed to constrain policymaker rent-seeking behaviour: voting, policy commitment, and punishment. The results show that voting and enforced commitment are the most effective policy mechanisms to constrain rent-seeking, and improve citizen welfare. The authors find policymaker punishment regimes to be largely ineffective, both in reducing rent-seeking and improving welfare of citizens. 2017-02-17T20:26:16Z 2017-02-17T20:26:16Z 2017-01 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/245631487331766677/The-governance-game http://hdl.handle.net/10986/26085 English en_US CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Working Paper
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	GOVERNANCE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE GROWTH POLICY GAME THEORY VOTING RENT-SEEKING citizen engagement
spellingShingle	GOVERNANCE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE GROWTH POLICY GAME THEORY VOTING RENT-SEEKING citizen engagement Banuri, Sheheryar Bulman, David Lopez-Calva, Luis F. Molina, Ezequiel Safir, Abla Sharma, Siddharth The Governance Game
description	In this paper, the authors use the lab to test a series of policy proposals designed to constrain rent-seeking behaviour in a policymaking context. The baseline governance game is conducted in the following way: subjects are randomly assigned to groups of four, with one subject randomly selected to be the “policymaker", while the other three are the “citizens”. Citizens are informed that they can use their endowments to contribute to a group account. Any amount contributed to the group account are doubled. Once citizens have made their contribution decisions, the policymaker observes the contribution decisions of each citizen, and the total amount in the group account. The policymaker formulates a distribution “policy” to distribute the tokens among all four group members. The game is repeated for 20 rounds. With this basic framework, the authors implement and test the effect of three institutions designed to constrain policymaker rent-seeking behaviour: voting, policy commitment, and punishment. The results show that voting and enforced commitment are the most effective policy mechanisms to constrain rent-seeking, and improve citizen welfare. The authors find policymaker punishment regimes to be largely ineffective, both in reducing rent-seeking and improving welfare of citizens.
format	Working Paper
author	Banuri, Sheheryar Bulman, David Lopez-Calva, Luis F. Molina, Ezequiel Safir, Abla Sharma, Siddharth
author_facet	Banuri, Sheheryar Bulman, David Lopez-Calva, Luis F. Molina, Ezequiel Safir, Abla Sharma, Siddharth
author_sort	Banuri, Sheheryar
title	The Governance Game
title_short	The Governance Game
title_full	The Governance Game
title_fullStr	The Governance Game
title_full_unstemmed	The Governance Game
title_sort	governance game
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2017
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/245631487331766677/The-governance-game http://hdl.handle.net/10986/26085
_version_	1764460937173008384

The Governance Game

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