Should Developing Countries Introduce Antidumping?
In Global Economic Prospects 1995 it was explained that antidumping is ordinary protection with a good public relations program. In fact, antidumping is often more costly to importing countries than ordinary protection through tariffs. The reason a...
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2017
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/903741484052470932/Should-developing-countries-introduce-antidumping http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25941 |
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okr-10986-259412021-04-23T14:04:32Z Should Developing Countries Introduce Antidumping? Finger, Michael J. antidumping trade policy WTO In Global Economic Prospects 1995 it was explained that antidumping is ordinary protection with a good public relations program. In fact, antidumping is often more costly to importing countries than ordinary protection through tariffs. The reason antidumping is such a costly form of protection is that the threat of antidumping action provides leverage to the importing country to force exporters into settled agreements which raise export prices. Exporters are frequently faced with the choice of having a tariff applied against their export sales or agreeing to raise prices (a “price undertaking”) or limit sales (a “voluntary export restraint” or VER). Since exporters can typically increase their profits with a price undertaking or a voluntary export restraint, they frequently prefer a settled agreement to the imposition of an antidumping duty. Sometimes simply the threat of an antidumping action will induce a settlement because the uncertainty of the antidumping process itself will cause a loss of customers. These settled agreements, however, impose large costs on consumers and importing industries since they do not provide any tariff revenue to the government. The effect on the importing country is similar to the OPEC cartel: the exporting countries charge higher prices to the importing countries through an agreed limitation on sales or minimum prices. The difference between OPEC and antidumping is that with antidumping it is importing country policy that forces up the prices of imports to its consumers and industries. 2017-01-25T21:29:42Z 2017-01-25T21:29:42Z 2000 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/903741484052470932/Should-developing-countries-introduce-antidumping http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25941 English en_US CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Working Paper |
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Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
antidumping trade policy WTO |
| spellingShingle |
antidumping trade policy WTO Finger, Michael J. Should Developing Countries Introduce Antidumping? |
| description |
In Global Economic Prospects 1995 it was
explained that antidumping is ordinary protection with a
good public relations program. In fact, antidumping is often
more costly to importing countries than ordinary protection
through tariffs. The reason antidumping is such a costly
form of protection is that the threat of antidumping action
provides leverage to the importing country to force
exporters into settled agreements which raise export prices.
Exporters are frequently faced with the choice of having a
tariff applied against their export sales or agreeing to
raise prices (a “price undertaking”) or limit sales (a
“voluntary export restraint” or VER). Since exporters can
typically increase their profits with a price undertaking or
a voluntary export restraint, they frequently prefer a
settled agreement to the imposition of an antidumping duty.
Sometimes simply the threat of an antidumping action will
induce a settlement because the uncertainty of the
antidumping process itself will cause a loss of customers.
These settled agreements, however, impose large costs on
consumers and importing industries since they do not provide
any tariff revenue to the government. The effect on the
importing country is similar to the OPEC cartel: the
exporting countries charge higher prices to the importing
countries through an agreed limitation on sales or minimum
prices. The difference between OPEC and antidumping is that
with antidumping it is importing country policy that forces
up the prices of imports to its consumers and industries. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Finger, Michael J. |
| author_facet |
Finger, Michael J. |
| author_sort |
Finger, Michael J. |
| title |
Should Developing Countries Introduce Antidumping? |
| title_short |
Should Developing Countries Introduce Antidumping? |
| title_full |
Should Developing Countries Introduce Antidumping? |
| title_fullStr |
Should Developing Countries Introduce Antidumping? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Should Developing Countries Introduce Antidumping? |
| title_sort |
should developing countries introduce antidumping? |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2017 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/903741484052470932/Should-developing-countries-introduce-antidumping http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25941 |
| _version_ |
1764460495847292928 |