Public Sector Human Resource Practices to Drive Performance
Many Governments wrestle with the issue of designing an appropriate set of human resource practices to motivate public servants to perform. Identifying the right set of practices for the public sector is a source of some controversy, and passions r...
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| Format: | Brief |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2016
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/930881467998212918/Public-sector-human-resource-practices-to-drive-performance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25489 |
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okr-10986-25489 |
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oai_dc |
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Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
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Digital Repositories |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
SKILLS EMPLOYMENT RISKS PROFESSIONAL STAFF MOTIVATION EQUIPMENT PERSONALITY PRODUCTION POLITICS RETIREMENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INCOME PSYCHOLOGY TAXONOMY COMMUNITY HEALTH INFORMATION MONITORING HEALTH CARE POLITICAL ECONOMY GOVERNMENT NETWORKS MENU CERVICAL CANCER HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT EFFECTS INCENTIVES HEALTH LABOR ECONOMICS SERVANTS TIME PERIOD HYPERTENSION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS PILOT PROJECT REGISTRY PUBLIC HEALTH KNOWLEDGE INSTITUTIONS HUMAN RESOURCE DIABETES LABOR MARKET MATHEMATICS TRAINING IMMUNIZATION MORAL HAZARD PATIENT PATIENTS ADJUSTMENT SMOKING INTERVENTION OUTPUTS RELATIONSHIPS LABOR UNIONS TARGETS ABILITY PRODUCTIVITY PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS NEEDS ORGANIZATIONS HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT LINKS LEARNING STANDARDS LABOR WORK ENVIRONMENT ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT GENERAL PRACTICE CAPABILITIES EFFICIENCY MANAGERIAL DISCRETION TECHNOLOGY INCENTIVE PROBLEMS BELIEFS RECOGNITION WORKERS INSPECTION WAGES POLICIES SCIENCE PATIENT SATISFACTION TIME FRAME RESULTS VALUE HEALTH POLICY EMPLOYMENT SECURITY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES NETWORKS EFFORT INTRINSIC MOTIVATION LABOR RELATIONS PRIVATE SECTOR CAREERS NUTRITION ECONOMICS MANAGEMENT ADMINISTRATION INSURANCE RESULT PHYSICIANS INTERESTS THEORY SECURITY DISMISSAL LICENSES CREATIVITY BUSINESS NETWORK RISK HUMAN RESOURCES ISOLATION CONTRACTING PERFORMANCE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION FLEXIBLE WORKING HOURS INSPECTIONS RETENTION EXTRINSIC INCENTIVES EXPERIENCE ATTENTION INNOVATION INSTITUTION WORKING HOURS TURNOVER RATES SMOKING CESSATION FAMILIES PROFITS HOSPITALS OUTCOMES SAFETY IMPLEMENTATION HEALTH SERVICES TARGET ADVERSE SELECTION |
| spellingShingle |
SKILLS EMPLOYMENT RISKS PROFESSIONAL STAFF MOTIVATION EQUIPMENT PERSONALITY PRODUCTION POLITICS RETIREMENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INCOME PSYCHOLOGY TAXONOMY COMMUNITY HEALTH INFORMATION MONITORING HEALTH CARE POLITICAL ECONOMY GOVERNMENT NETWORKS MENU CERVICAL CANCER HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT EFFECTS INCENTIVES HEALTH LABOR ECONOMICS SERVANTS TIME PERIOD HYPERTENSION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS PILOT PROJECT REGISTRY PUBLIC HEALTH KNOWLEDGE INSTITUTIONS HUMAN RESOURCE DIABETES LABOR MARKET MATHEMATICS TRAINING IMMUNIZATION MORAL HAZARD PATIENT PATIENTS ADJUSTMENT SMOKING INTERVENTION OUTPUTS RELATIONSHIPS LABOR UNIONS TARGETS ABILITY PRODUCTIVITY PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS NEEDS ORGANIZATIONS HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT LINKS LEARNING STANDARDS LABOR WORK ENVIRONMENT ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT GENERAL PRACTICE CAPABILITIES EFFICIENCY MANAGERIAL DISCRETION TECHNOLOGY INCENTIVE PROBLEMS BELIEFS RECOGNITION WORKERS INSPECTION WAGES POLICIES SCIENCE PATIENT SATISFACTION TIME FRAME RESULTS VALUE HEALTH POLICY EMPLOYMENT SECURITY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES NETWORKS EFFORT INTRINSIC MOTIVATION LABOR RELATIONS PRIVATE SECTOR CAREERS NUTRITION ECONOMICS MANAGEMENT ADMINISTRATION INSURANCE RESULT PHYSICIANS INTERESTS THEORY SECURITY DISMISSAL LICENSES CREATIVITY BUSINESS NETWORK RISK HUMAN RESOURCES ISOLATION CONTRACTING PERFORMANCE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION FLEXIBLE WORKING HOURS INSPECTIONS RETENTION EXTRINSIC INCENTIVES EXPERIENCE ATTENTION INNOVATION INSTITUTION WORKING HOURS TURNOVER RATES SMOKING CESSATION FAMILIES PROFITS HOSPITALS OUTCOMES SAFETY IMPLEMENTATION HEALTH SERVICES TARGET ADVERSE SELECTION Manning, Nick Hasnain, Zahid Pierskalla, Jan Henryk Public Sector Human Resource Practices to Drive Performance |
| relation |
GET Note; |
| description |
Many Governments wrestle with the issue
of designing an appropriate set of human resource practices
to motivate public servants to perform. Identifying the
right set of practices for the public sector is a source of
some controversy, and passions run high particularly in
relation to the use of monetary incentives, often referred
to as performance-related pay or performance based pay. This
GET note reviews recent research on a range of practices
Governments utilize to drive employee performance, which
rest on the assumptions that public servants are motivated
in two ways: (i) ‘intrinsically’ (i.e. internal factors
motivated by ‘the right thing to do’), and (ii)
‘extrinsically’ (i.e., external validation from rewards
offered by others). Generally, a Human Resource Management
(HRM) system designed to motivate employee performance will
utilize practices in two broad categories related to: (i)
‘external incentives’ (e.g., financial incentives), and (ii)
‘opportunities to perform’ focusing on ‘intrinsic’ factors
(i.e. self-directed work). Within ‘external incentives,’ a
financial incentive may either act over the long term (e.g.,
deferred compensation) or in the short term (e.g.,
performance-related pay). This note applies this conceptual
framework to more clearly understand the range of practices
Governments are using to improve staff performance, as well
as the pre-conditions for their success. Given the recent
attention on performance-related pay, we take a deeper look
at the evidence underlying the shorter term
performance-related pay, reviewing evidence from both OECD
and middle income countries. Annex one provides a brief
overview on the theories of motivation for those interested
in the theoretical underpinnings of the work, and annex two
presents’ experiences of performance pay in practice. This
Note draws heavily from performance-related pay in the
public sector: A review of theory and evidence (Hasnain and
others 2012), a recent review of the literature in fields
including political science, public administration, business
management, and psychology. |
| format |
Brief |
| author |
Manning, Nick Hasnain, Zahid Pierskalla, Jan Henryk |
| author_facet |
Manning, Nick Hasnain, Zahid Pierskalla, Jan Henryk |
| author_sort |
Manning, Nick |
| title |
Public Sector Human Resource Practices to Drive Performance |
| title_short |
Public Sector Human Resource Practices to Drive Performance |
| title_full |
Public Sector Human Resource Practices to Drive Performance |
| title_fullStr |
Public Sector Human Resource Practices to Drive Performance |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Public Sector Human Resource Practices to Drive Performance |
| title_sort |
public sector human resource practices to drive performance |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2016 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/930881467998212918/Public-sector-human-resource-practices-to-drive-performance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25489 |
| _version_ |
1764459833256312832 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-254892021-04-23T14:04:31Z Public Sector Human Resource Practices to Drive Performance Manning, Nick Hasnain, Zahid Pierskalla, Jan Henryk SKILLS EMPLOYMENT RISKS PROFESSIONAL STAFF MOTIVATION EQUIPMENT PERSONALITY PRODUCTION POLITICS RETIREMENT INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INCOME PSYCHOLOGY TAXONOMY COMMUNITY HEALTH INFORMATION MONITORING HEALTH CARE POLITICAL ECONOMY GOVERNMENT NETWORKS MENU CERVICAL CANCER HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT EFFECTS INCENTIVES HEALTH LABOR ECONOMICS SERVANTS TIME PERIOD HYPERTENSION MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS PILOT PROJECT REGISTRY PUBLIC HEALTH KNOWLEDGE INSTITUTIONS HUMAN RESOURCE DIABETES LABOR MARKET MATHEMATICS TRAINING IMMUNIZATION MORAL HAZARD PATIENT PATIENTS ADJUSTMENT SMOKING INTERVENTION OUTPUTS RELATIONSHIPS LABOR UNIONS TARGETS ABILITY PRODUCTIVITY PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS NEEDS ORGANIZATIONS HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT LINKS LEARNING STANDARDS LABOR WORK ENVIRONMENT ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT GENERAL PRACTICE CAPABILITIES EFFICIENCY MANAGERIAL DISCRETION TECHNOLOGY INCENTIVE PROBLEMS BELIEFS RECOGNITION WORKERS INSPECTION WAGES POLICIES SCIENCE PATIENT SATISFACTION TIME FRAME RESULTS VALUE HEALTH POLICY EMPLOYMENT SECURITY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES NETWORKS EFFORT INTRINSIC MOTIVATION LABOR RELATIONS PRIVATE SECTOR CAREERS NUTRITION ECONOMICS MANAGEMENT ADMINISTRATION INSURANCE RESULT PHYSICIANS INTERESTS THEORY SECURITY DISMISSAL LICENSES CREATIVITY BUSINESS NETWORK RISK HUMAN RESOURCES ISOLATION CONTRACTING PERFORMANCE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION FLEXIBLE WORKING HOURS INSPECTIONS RETENTION EXTRINSIC INCENTIVES EXPERIENCE ATTENTION INNOVATION INSTITUTION WORKING HOURS TURNOVER RATES SMOKING CESSATION FAMILIES PROFITS HOSPITALS OUTCOMES SAFETY IMPLEMENTATION HEALTH SERVICES TARGET ADVERSE SELECTION Many Governments wrestle with the issue of designing an appropriate set of human resource practices to motivate public servants to perform. Identifying the right set of practices for the public sector is a source of some controversy, and passions run high particularly in relation to the use of monetary incentives, often referred to as performance-related pay or performance based pay. This GET note reviews recent research on a range of practices Governments utilize to drive employee performance, which rest on the assumptions that public servants are motivated in two ways: (i) ‘intrinsically’ (i.e. internal factors motivated by ‘the right thing to do’), and (ii) ‘extrinsically’ (i.e., external validation from rewards offered by others). Generally, a Human Resource Management (HRM) system designed to motivate employee performance will utilize practices in two broad categories related to: (i) ‘external incentives’ (e.g., financial incentives), and (ii) ‘opportunities to perform’ focusing on ‘intrinsic’ factors (i.e. self-directed work). Within ‘external incentives,’ a financial incentive may either act over the long term (e.g., deferred compensation) or in the short term (e.g., performance-related pay). This note applies this conceptual framework to more clearly understand the range of practices Governments are using to improve staff performance, as well as the pre-conditions for their success. Given the recent attention on performance-related pay, we take a deeper look at the evidence underlying the shorter term performance-related pay, reviewing evidence from both OECD and middle income countries. Annex one provides a brief overview on the theories of motivation for those interested in the theoretical underpinnings of the work, and annex two presents’ experiences of performance pay in practice. This Note draws heavily from performance-related pay in the public sector: A review of theory and evidence (Hasnain and others 2012), a recent review of the literature in fields including political science, public administration, business management, and psychology. 2016-11-29T22:43:29Z 2016-11-29T22:43:29Z 2012-10 Brief http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/930881467998212918/Public-sector-human-resource-practices-to-drive-performance http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25489 English en_US GET Note; CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Brief |