Sharing Oil Rents and Political Violence
This paper investigates how the devolution of oil windfalls affects the likelihood of political violence. It shows that transferring large shares of oil wealth can prevent conflict, while transferring small shares can trigger it. Among the differen...
Main Authors: | Cordella, Tito, Onder, Harun |
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Format: | Working Paper |
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2016
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/10/26875985/sharing-oil-rents-political-violence http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25314 |
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