Sharing Oil Rents and Political Violence

This paper investigates how the devolution of oil windfalls affects the likelihood of political violence. It shows that transferring large shares of oil wealth can prevent conflict, while transferring small shares can trigger it. Among the differen...

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Main Authors:	Cordella, Tito, Onder, Harun
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2016
Subjects:	natural resources conflict redistribution aggregative games oil windfalls political violence subsidies reform subnational governance
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/10/26875985/sharing-oil-rents-political-violence http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25314

id	okr-10986-25314
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-253142021-04-23T14:04:29Z Sharing Oil Rents and Political Violence Cordella, Tito Onder, Harun natural resources conflict redistribution aggregative games oil windfalls political violence subsidies reform subnational governance This paper investigates how the devolution of oil windfalls affects the likelihood of political violence. It shows that transferring large shares of oil wealth can prevent conflict, while transferring small shares can trigger it. Among the different transfer schemes, fiscal transfers (to subnational governments) yield the highest levels of consumption, but direct transfers (to people) are the most effective in preventing conflict. By averting conflict, transfers can improve ex ante welfare; however, only a subset of the ex ante welfare optimal transfers is optimal ex post and thus self-enforcing. Among them, those that avert conflict by reinforcing repressive regimes are of particular policy interest. 2016-11-01T19:10:45Z 2016-11-01T19:10:45Z 2016-10 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/10/26875985/sharing-oil-rents-political-violence http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25314 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7869 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	natural resources conflict redistribution aggregative games oil windfalls political violence subsidies reform subnational governance
spellingShingle	natural resources conflict redistribution aggregative games oil windfalls political violence subsidies reform subnational governance Cordella, Tito Onder, Harun Sharing Oil Rents and Political Violence
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7869
description	This paper investigates how the devolution of oil windfalls affects the likelihood of political violence. It shows that transferring large shares of oil wealth can prevent conflict, while transferring small shares can trigger it. Among the different transfer schemes, fiscal transfers (to subnational governments) yield the highest levels of consumption, but direct transfers (to people) are the most effective in preventing conflict. By averting conflict, transfers can improve ex ante welfare; however, only a subset of the ex ante welfare optimal transfers is optimal ex post and thus self-enforcing. Among them, those that avert conflict by reinforcing repressive regimes are of particular policy interest.
format	Working Paper
author	Cordella, Tito Onder, Harun
author_facet	Cordella, Tito Onder, Harun
author_sort	Cordella, Tito
title	Sharing Oil Rents and Political Violence
title_short	Sharing Oil Rents and Political Violence
title_full	Sharing Oil Rents and Political Violence
title_fullStr	Sharing Oil Rents and Political Violence
title_full_unstemmed	Sharing Oil Rents and Political Violence
title_sort	sharing oil rents and political violence
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2016
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/10/26875985/sharing-oil-rents-political-violence http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25314
_version_	1764458938793721856

Sharing Oil Rents and Political Violence

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