Sharing Oil Rents and Political Violence
This paper investigates how the devolution of oil windfalls affects the likelihood of political violence. It shows that transferring large shares of oil wealth can prevent conflict, while transferring small shares can trigger it. Among the differen...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2016
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/10/26875985/sharing-oil-rents-political-violence http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25314 |
| Summary: | This paper investigates how the
devolution of oil windfalls affects the likelihood of
political violence. It shows that transferring large shares
of oil wealth can prevent conflict, while transferring small
shares can trigger it. Among the different transfer schemes,
fiscal transfers (to subnational governments) yield the
highest levels of consumption, but direct transfers (to
people) are the most effective in preventing conflict. By
averting conflict, transfers can improve ex ante welfare;
however, only a subset of the ex ante welfare optimal
transfers is optimal ex post and thus self-enforcing. Among
them, those that avert conflict by reinforcing repressive
regimes are of particular policy interest. |
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