Do They Do As They Say? : Stated versus Revealed Preferences and Take Up in an Incentives for Conservation Program
Use of conditional cash transfers has become widespread in development policy given their success in boosting health and education outcomes. Recently, conditional cash transfers are being used to promote pro-environmental behavior. While many of th...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2016
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/09/26816716/say-stated-versus-revealed-preferences-take-up-incentives-conservation-program http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25177 |
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okr-10986-251772021-05-25T08:52:09Z Do They Do As They Say? : Stated versus Revealed Preferences and Take Up in an Incentives for Conservation Program De Martino, Samantha Kondylis, Florence Pagiola, Stefano Zwager, Astrid conservation crowding out intrinsic motivations extrinsic incentives self-determination theory Use of conditional cash transfers has become widespread in development policy given their success in boosting health and education outcomes. Recently, conditional cash transfers are being used to promote pro-environmental behavior. While many of these Payments for Environment Services (PES) programs have been successful, it has been hypothesized that those with less favorable outcomes have been subject to low additionality, whereby landholders already conserving their land self-select into the program. Insights from the behavioral economics literature suggest that an external incentive, such as PES, has the potential to crowd in or crowd out individual behavior differentially across the initial distribution of intrinsic motivations (Frey, 1992). Thus, to increase the impact of PES, program administrators might gain from a better understanding of both the pre-existing motivations and existing baseline conservation behavior of potential participants. This paper contributes to the literature by disentangling and measuring intrinsic motivations, specifically: Pro-Environment, Pro-Social, Pro-Government, and Social Norms. Controlling for observable opportunity costs, we use these latent motivations to analyze behavioral determinants of take up for a conservation program in São Paulo, Brazil. The payments are an incentive to comply with the Brazil Forest Code. We find that Pro-Social and Pro-Environment landholders are both more likely to be conserving private land not under legal protection before the program is introduced, whereas only Pro-Social landholders are already conserving land under legal protection. With respect to enrollment in the PES program, we find Pro-Social landholders are less likely to enroll while Pro-Environment landholders are more likely to enroll. Thus we expect some level of additionality from the PES program. We discuss these findings in light of the theoretical framework on Self-Determination Theory (SDT). 2016-10-17T22:05:02Z 2016-10-17T22:05:02Z 2016-06 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/09/26816716/say-stated-versus-revealed-preferences-take-up-incentives-conservation-program http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25177 English en_US CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Working Paper Latin America & Caribbean Brazil |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
conservation crowding out intrinsic motivations extrinsic incentives self-determination theory |
| spellingShingle |
conservation crowding out intrinsic motivations extrinsic incentives self-determination theory De Martino, Samantha Kondylis, Florence Pagiola, Stefano Zwager, Astrid Do They Do As They Say? : Stated versus Revealed Preferences and Take Up in an Incentives for Conservation Program |
| geographic_facet |
Latin America & Caribbean Brazil |
| description |
Use of conditional cash transfers has
become widespread in development policy given their success
in boosting health and education outcomes. Recently,
conditional cash transfers are being used to promote
pro-environmental behavior. While many of these Payments for
Environment Services (PES) programs have been successful, it
has been hypothesized that those with less favorable
outcomes have been subject to low additionality, whereby
landholders already conserving their land self-select into
the program. Insights from the behavioral economics
literature suggest that an external incentive, such as PES,
has the potential to crowd in or crowd out individual
behavior differentially across the initial distribution of
intrinsic motivations (Frey, 1992). Thus, to increase the
impact of PES, program administrators might gain from a
better understanding of both the pre-existing motivations
and existing baseline conservation behavior of potential
participants. This paper contributes to the literature by
disentangling and measuring intrinsic motivations,
specifically: Pro-Environment, Pro-Social, Pro-Government,
and Social Norms. Controlling for observable opportunity
costs, we use these latent motivations to analyze behavioral
determinants of take up for a conservation program in São
Paulo, Brazil. The payments are an incentive to comply with
the Brazil Forest Code. We find that Pro-Social and
Pro-Environment landholders are both more likely to be
conserving private land not under legal protection before
the program is introduced, whereas only Pro-Social
landholders are already conserving land under legal
protection. With respect to enrollment in the PES program,
we find Pro-Social landholders are less likely to enroll
while Pro-Environment landholders are more likely to enroll.
Thus we expect some level of additionality from the PES
program. We discuss these findings in light of the
theoretical framework on Self-Determination Theory (SDT). |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
De Martino, Samantha Kondylis, Florence Pagiola, Stefano Zwager, Astrid |
| author_facet |
De Martino, Samantha Kondylis, Florence Pagiola, Stefano Zwager, Astrid |
| author_sort |
De Martino, Samantha |
| title |
Do They Do As They Say? : Stated versus Revealed Preferences and Take Up in an Incentives for Conservation Program |
| title_short |
Do They Do As They Say? : Stated versus Revealed Preferences and Take Up in an Incentives for Conservation Program |
| title_full |
Do They Do As They Say? : Stated versus Revealed Preferences and Take Up in an Incentives for Conservation Program |
| title_fullStr |
Do They Do As They Say? : Stated versus Revealed Preferences and Take Up in an Incentives for Conservation Program |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Do They Do As They Say? : Stated versus Revealed Preferences and Take Up in an Incentives for Conservation Program |
| title_sort |
do they do as they say? : stated versus revealed preferences and take up in an incentives for conservation program |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2016 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/09/26816716/say-stated-versus-revealed-preferences-take-up-incentives-conservation-program http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25177 |
| _version_ |
1764458578943410176 |