Russian Federation Financial Sector Assessment Program : Insurance Core Principles Assessment
With about RUB 988bn (USD 26bn) in gross premium written, in 2014, the Russian insurance industry ranked 27th in the world. Non-life insurance premium accounted for 89 percent of GPW while life insurance for only 11 percent. In 2015, the industry a...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Report |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2016
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/08/26739000/moldova-financial-sector-assessment-program-insurance-core-principles-detailed-assessment-report http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25064 |
| Summary: | With about RUB 988bn (USD 26bn) in gross
premium written, in 2014, the Russian insurance industry
ranked 27th in the world. Non-life insurance premium
accounted for 89 percent of GPW while life insurance for
only 11 percent. In 2015, the industry also faced with the
consequences of the Western economic sanctions which
effectively closed access to the high quality Western
reinsurance capacity for the Russian insurers that provide
coverage for 1500 large Russian companies which were put on
the sanctions list. In the past, the Western reinsurers
provided over 80 percent of reinsurance capacity for such
risks. In the case of Russia, the main objective of
insurance supervision is to ensure that insurers fully
comply with core regulatory norms fixed by the law in the
following four areas of insurance operations: (a) solvency
(capital adequacy); (b) insurance reserves; (c) assets
covering own funds; and (d) assets covering reserves. The
objective of off-site and onsite supervision is restricted
to ensuring compliance of insurers with these four
regulatory norms. In this context, the resources of the
insurance supervisor are by and large dedicated towards
meeting this objective. While the dispersion of insurance
supervisory functions among numerous CBR departments with
various reporting lines carries certain advantages (such as
a reduced potential for the conflict of interest), it also
has a potential for major drawbacks. These include the
potential for (a) insufficient coordination among different
departments, (b) shortage of necessary insurance expertise
within departments universally dealing with a wide range of
financial services, and (c) impaired ability of the
regulator as a whole to systematically detect problems with
compliance in such a technically complex industry as
insurance at an early stage. |
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