All in the Family : State Capture in Tunisia

We examine the relationship between entry regulation and the business interests of former President Ben Ali’s family using firm-level data from Tunisia. Connected firms account for a disproportionate share of aggregate employment, output and profits, especially in sectors subject to authorization an...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Rijkers, Bob, Freund, Caroline, Nucifora, Antonio
Format: Journal Article
Language:en_US
Published: Elsevier 2016
Subjects:
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25014
id okr-10986-25014
recordtype oai_dc
spelling okr-10986-250142021-05-25T10:54:42Z All in the Family : State Capture in Tunisia Rijkers, Bob Freund, Caroline Nucifora, Antonio regulation cronyism corruption rent-seeking firms We examine the relationship between entry regulation and the business interests of former President Ben Ali’s family using firm-level data from Tunisia. Connected firms account for a disproportionate share of aggregate employment, output and profits, especially in sectors subject to authorization and restrictions on FDI. Quantile regressions show that profit and market share premia from being connected increase along the firm-size distribution, especially in highly regulated sectors. These patterns are partly explained by Ben Ali’s relatives sorting into the most profitable sectors. The market shares of connected firms are positively correlated with exit and concentration rates in highly regulated sectors. Although causality is difficult to establish, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the Ben Ali clan abused entry regulation for private gain at the expense of reduced competition. 2016-09-07T19:06:54Z 2016-09-07T19:06:54Z 2017-01 Journal Article Journal of Development Economics http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25014 en_US CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/ World Bank Elsevier Publications & Research :: Journal Article Publications & Research Middle East and North Africa Tunisia
repository_type Digital Repository
institution_category Foreign Institution
institution Digital Repositories
building World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection World Bank
language en_US
topic regulation
cronyism
corruption
rent-seeking
firms
spellingShingle regulation
cronyism
corruption
rent-seeking
firms
Rijkers, Bob
Freund, Caroline
Nucifora, Antonio
All in the Family : State Capture in Tunisia
geographic_facet Middle East and North Africa
Tunisia
description We examine the relationship between entry regulation and the business interests of former President Ben Ali’s family using firm-level data from Tunisia. Connected firms account for a disproportionate share of aggregate employment, output and profits, especially in sectors subject to authorization and restrictions on FDI. Quantile regressions show that profit and market share premia from being connected increase along the firm-size distribution, especially in highly regulated sectors. These patterns are partly explained by Ben Ali’s relatives sorting into the most profitable sectors. The market shares of connected firms are positively correlated with exit and concentration rates in highly regulated sectors. Although causality is difficult to establish, the results are consistent with the hypothesis that the Ben Ali clan abused entry regulation for private gain at the expense of reduced competition.
format Journal Article
author Rijkers, Bob
Freund, Caroline
Nucifora, Antonio
author_facet Rijkers, Bob
Freund, Caroline
Nucifora, Antonio
author_sort Rijkers, Bob
title All in the Family : State Capture in Tunisia
title_short All in the Family : State Capture in Tunisia
title_full All in the Family : State Capture in Tunisia
title_fullStr All in the Family : State Capture in Tunisia
title_full_unstemmed All in the Family : State Capture in Tunisia
title_sort all in the family : state capture in tunisia
publisher Elsevier
publishDate 2016
url http://hdl.handle.net/10986/25014
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