If Politics Is the Problem, How Can External Actors Be Part of the Solution?
Despite a large body of research and evidence on the policies and institutions needed to generate growth and reduce poverty, many governments fail to adopt these policies or establish the institutions. Research advances since the 1990s have explain...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
| Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2016
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/07/26596689/politics-problem-can-external-actors-part-solution http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24842 |
| id |
okr-10986-24842 |
|---|---|
| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| spelling |
okr-10986-248422021-04-23T14:04:27Z If Politics Is the Problem, How Can External Actors Be Part of the Solution? Devarajan, Shantayanan Khemani, Stuti government failure political institutions development aid development Despite a large body of research and evidence on the policies and institutions needed to generate growth and reduce poverty, many governments fail to adopt these policies or establish the institutions. Research advances since the 1990s have explained this syndrome, which this paper generically calls "government failure," in terms of the incentives facing politicians, and the underlying political institutions that lead to those incentives. Meanwhile, development assistance, which is intended to generate growth and reduce poverty, has hardly changed since the 1950s, when it was thought that the problem was one of market failure. Most assistance is still delivered to governments, in the form of finance and knowledge that are bundled together as a "project." Drawing on recent research on the politics of government failure, the paper shows how traditional development assistance can contribute to the persistence of government failures. It proposes a new model of development assistance that can help societies transition to better institutions. Specifically, the paper suggests that knowledge be provided to citizens to build their capacity to select and sanction leaders who have the political will and legitimacy to deliver the public goods needed for development. As for the financial transfer, which for various reasons has to be delivered to governments, the paper proposes that this be provided in a lump sum manner (that is, not linked to individual projects), conditional on the government following broadly favorable policies and making information available to citizens. 2016-08-09T19:49:11Z 2016-08-09T19:49:11Z 2016-07 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/07/26596689/politics-problem-can-external-actors-part-solution http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24842 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7761 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
government failure political institutions development aid development |
| spellingShingle |
government failure political institutions development aid development Devarajan, Shantayanan Khemani, Stuti If Politics Is the Problem, How Can External Actors Be Part of the Solution? |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7761 |
| description |
Despite a large body of research and
evidence on the policies and institutions needed to generate
growth and reduce poverty, many governments fail to adopt
these policies or establish the institutions. Research
advances since the 1990s have explained this syndrome, which
this paper generically calls "government failure,"
in terms of the incentives facing politicians, and the
underlying political institutions that lead to those
incentives. Meanwhile, development assistance, which is
intended to generate growth and reduce poverty, has hardly
changed since the 1950s, when it was thought that the
problem was one of market failure. Most assistance is still
delivered to governments, in the form of finance and
knowledge that are bundled together as a
"project." Drawing on recent research on the
politics of government failure, the paper shows how
traditional development assistance can contribute to the
persistence of government failures. It proposes a new model
of development assistance that can help societies transition
to better institutions. Specifically, the paper suggests
that knowledge be provided to citizens to build their
capacity to select and sanction leaders who have the
political will and legitimacy to deliver the public goods
needed for development. As for the financial transfer, which
for various reasons has to be delivered to governments, the
paper proposes that this be provided in a lump sum manner
(that is, not linked to individual projects), conditional on
the government following broadly favorable policies and
making information available to citizens. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Devarajan, Shantayanan Khemani, Stuti |
| author_facet |
Devarajan, Shantayanan Khemani, Stuti |
| author_sort |
Devarajan, Shantayanan |
| title |
If Politics Is the Problem, How Can External Actors Be Part of the Solution? |
| title_short |
If Politics Is the Problem, How Can External Actors Be Part of the Solution? |
| title_full |
If Politics Is the Problem, How Can External Actors Be Part of the Solution? |
| title_fullStr |
If Politics Is the Problem, How Can External Actors Be Part of the Solution? |
| title_full_unstemmed |
If Politics Is the Problem, How Can External Actors Be Part of the Solution? |
| title_sort |
if politics is the problem, how can external actors be part of the solution? |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2016 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/07/26596689/politics-problem-can-external-actors-part-solution http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24842 |
| _version_ |
1764457797796233216 |