Poverty and Policy Selectivity of World Bank Trust Funds
Over the past decade, donors of foreign aid quadrupled their annual contributions to trust funds at the World Bank. This earmarking of contributions to donors' preferred recipient countries and issues has raised concerns about the alignment of...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2016
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/06/26532670/poverty-policy-selectivity-world-bank-trust-funds http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24648 |
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okr-10986-24648 |
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| recordtype |
oai_dc |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
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World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
ALLIANCE LIMITED MODALITIES CAPITAL MARKETS FINANCIAL SERVICES BILATERAL AID MULTILATERAL AID BOARD MEMBERS FISCAL YEAR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE CHECKS ACCOUNTING CORPORATION INTERNATIONAL POLITICS PRINCIPAL POST‐CONFLICT” COUNTRIES INTEREST TRUST FUNDS DUMMY VARIABLES AID INSTITUTIONS NATIONS ALLOCATION DECISIONS AID FINANCING INTERNATIONAL POLITICS EXCHANGE POLITICAL ECONOMIES FINANCIAL SUPPORT SERVICES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES PUBLIC SERVICES POLITICAL ECONOMY POSITIVE COEFFICIENT PORTFOLIO COMPANIES RECIPIENT COUNTRIES CREDITWORTHINESS PROJECTS COLLECTIVE INTEREST BORROWERS MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS MULTILATERAL AGENCIES BILATERAL” AID GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS DUMMY VARIABLE CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL BANK CREDITOR BUDGET INTERNATIONAL FINANCE ARMED CONFLICT PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION STATES MULTILATERAL AID TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PARTNERSHIPS DISBURSEMENT FOREIGN AID UNION PROXY ECONOMIC COOPERATION TRADING MONETARY FUND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING NATURAL DISASTERS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CRITERIA MARKETS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AID FINANCING WORLD DEVELOPMENT TRUST ORGANIZATIONS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POST‐CONFLICT” COUNTRIES NEGOTIATIONS INCOME LEVELS ECONOMIC POLICIES LOANS HEALTH AID GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT TRUST FUNDS COLLECTIVE INTEREST ARMED CONFLICT FINANCE BANK POLICY DIRECTORS ALLOCATION DECISIONS INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE BANKS FOREIGN AID EQUITY GRANT DONOR COUNTRIES MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS IMF ACCOUNTABILITY MEMBER STATES TRANCHE ACCESS TO CAPITAL FUTURE VALUE MEMBER STATES INTERNATIONAL STUDIES DEVELOPMENT BANKS INVESTIGATION BANK BUDGETS AID INSTITUTIONS ASSOCIATION COLLECTIVE DISBURSEMENTS ECONOMY REFUGEE DEVELOPING‐COUNTRY FISCAL YEAR DEVELOPMENT AID INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY SHARES MARKET UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL BILATERAL” AID INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IFC GOVERNANCE SHAREHOLDERS RECIPIENT COUNTRIES INTERESTS PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION STATE GOODS SECURITY TRUSTEE DEVELOPMENT AID WAR HEALTH AID IBRD SHARE ORGANIZATION EQUALITY TRUST‐FUNDS POVERTY CRISES BILATERAL AID MULTILATERAL AGENCIES BOARD MEMBERS DEVELOPMENT FINANCE UNIVERSITY FINANCIAL SUPPORT RECIPIENT COUNTRY LENDING TRUST FUND INTERNATIONAL BANK AID FLOWS DONOR COUNTRIES FINANCIAL SERVICES STATISTICAL ANALYSIS POST‐CONFLICT COUNTRIES FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING PRIVATE COMPANIES EXCHANGE RATE INSTRUMENT RATES OF INTEREST GOVERNMENTS ARREARS AID FLOWS RECIPIENT COUNTRY WORLD DEVELOPMENT RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIES HUMAN DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES |
| spellingShingle |
ALLIANCE LIMITED MODALITIES CAPITAL MARKETS FINANCIAL SERVICES BILATERAL AID MULTILATERAL AID BOARD MEMBERS FISCAL YEAR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE CHECKS ACCOUNTING CORPORATION INTERNATIONAL POLITICS PRINCIPAL POST‐CONFLICT” COUNTRIES INTEREST TRUST FUNDS DUMMY VARIABLES AID INSTITUTIONS NATIONS ALLOCATION DECISIONS AID FINANCING INTERNATIONAL POLITICS EXCHANGE POLITICAL ECONOMIES FINANCIAL SUPPORT SERVICES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES PUBLIC SERVICES POLITICAL ECONOMY POSITIVE COEFFICIENT PORTFOLIO COMPANIES RECIPIENT COUNTRIES CREDITWORTHINESS PROJECTS COLLECTIVE INTEREST BORROWERS MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS MULTILATERAL AGENCIES BILATERAL” AID GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS DUMMY VARIABLE CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL BANK CREDITOR BUDGET INTERNATIONAL FINANCE ARMED CONFLICT PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION STATES MULTILATERAL AID TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PARTNERSHIPS DISBURSEMENT FOREIGN AID UNION PROXY ECONOMIC COOPERATION TRADING MONETARY FUND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING NATURAL DISASTERS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CRITERIA MARKETS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AID FINANCING WORLD DEVELOPMENT TRUST ORGANIZATIONS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POST‐CONFLICT” COUNTRIES NEGOTIATIONS INCOME LEVELS ECONOMIC POLICIES LOANS HEALTH AID GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT TRUST FUNDS COLLECTIVE INTEREST ARMED CONFLICT FINANCE BANK POLICY DIRECTORS ALLOCATION DECISIONS INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE BANKS FOREIGN AID EQUITY GRANT DONOR COUNTRIES MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS IMF ACCOUNTABILITY MEMBER STATES TRANCHE ACCESS TO CAPITAL FUTURE VALUE MEMBER STATES INTERNATIONAL STUDIES DEVELOPMENT BANKS INVESTIGATION BANK BUDGETS AID INSTITUTIONS ASSOCIATION COLLECTIVE DISBURSEMENTS ECONOMY REFUGEE DEVELOPING‐COUNTRY FISCAL YEAR DEVELOPMENT AID INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY SHARES MARKET UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL BILATERAL” AID INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IFC GOVERNANCE SHAREHOLDERS RECIPIENT COUNTRIES INTERESTS PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION STATE GOODS SECURITY TRUSTEE DEVELOPMENT AID WAR HEALTH AID IBRD SHARE ORGANIZATION EQUALITY TRUST‐FUNDS POVERTY CRISES BILATERAL AID MULTILATERAL AGENCIES BOARD MEMBERS DEVELOPMENT FINANCE UNIVERSITY FINANCIAL SUPPORT RECIPIENT COUNTRY LENDING TRUST FUND INTERNATIONAL BANK AID FLOWS DONOR COUNTRIES FINANCIAL SERVICES STATISTICAL ANALYSIS POST‐CONFLICT COUNTRIES FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING PRIVATE COMPANIES EXCHANGE RATE INSTRUMENT RATES OF INTEREST GOVERNMENTS ARREARS AID FLOWS RECIPIENT COUNTRY WORLD DEVELOPMENT RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIES HUMAN DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES Eichenauer, Vera Knack, Stephen Poverty and Policy Selectivity of World Bank Trust Funds |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7731 |
| description |
Over the past decade, donors of foreign
aid quadrupled their annual contributions to trust funds at
the World Bank. This earmarking of contributions to
donors' preferred recipient countries and issues has
raised concerns about the alignment of trust funds with the
performance-based allocations of aid by the International
Development Association, the World Bank's concessional
lending arm, and raises the question of the role of this new
"multi-bi" aid channel. This study finds that the
cross-country allocations of aggregate trust fund aid are
poverty- and policy-selective. In this respect, they are
much more similar to allocations from the International
Development Association than from bilateral donors. The
allocations of trust fund types that are more closely
controlled by donor countries—recipient-executed and
single-donor trust funds—are more strongly related to the
strategic interests of donor countries than trust fund aid
in general. Trust funds for health and education aid are
poverty selective and positively correlated with the World
Bank's assessment of the quality of countries'
sector policies, while environmental trust funds are neither
poverty selective nor correlated with the assessed quality
of countries' environmental policies. Overall, the
evidence indicates that multi-bi funds administered by the
World Bank do not undermine the International Development
Association’s allocation criteria. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Eichenauer, Vera Knack, Stephen |
| author_facet |
Eichenauer, Vera Knack, Stephen |
| author_sort |
Eichenauer, Vera |
| title |
Poverty and Policy Selectivity of World Bank Trust Funds |
| title_short |
Poverty and Policy Selectivity of World Bank Trust Funds |
| title_full |
Poverty and Policy Selectivity of World Bank Trust Funds |
| title_fullStr |
Poverty and Policy Selectivity of World Bank Trust Funds |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Poverty and Policy Selectivity of World Bank Trust Funds |
| title_sort |
poverty and policy selectivity of world bank trust funds |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2016 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/06/26532670/poverty-policy-selectivity-world-bank-trust-funds http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24648 |
| _version_ |
1764457272352702464 |
| spelling |
okr-10986-246482021-04-23T14:04:23Z Poverty and Policy Selectivity of World Bank Trust Funds Eichenauer, Vera Knack, Stephen ALLIANCE LIMITED MODALITIES CAPITAL MARKETS FINANCIAL SERVICES BILATERAL AID MULTILATERAL AID BOARD MEMBERS FISCAL YEAR DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE CHECKS ACCOUNTING CORPORATION INTERNATIONAL POLITICS PRINCIPAL POST‐CONFLICT” COUNTRIES INTEREST TRUST FUNDS DUMMY VARIABLES AID INSTITUTIONS NATIONS ALLOCATION DECISIONS AID FINANCING INTERNATIONAL POLITICS EXCHANGE POLITICAL ECONOMIES FINANCIAL SUPPORT SERVICES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES PUBLIC SERVICES POLITICAL ECONOMY POSITIVE COEFFICIENT PORTFOLIO COMPANIES RECIPIENT COUNTRIES CREDITWORTHINESS PROJECTS COLLECTIVE INTEREST BORROWERS MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS MULTILATERAL AGENCIES BILATERAL” AID GOVERNMENT SUPPORTS VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS DUMMY VARIABLE CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL BANK CREDITOR BUDGET INTERNATIONAL FINANCE ARMED CONFLICT PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION STATES MULTILATERAL AID TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PARTNERSHIPS DISBURSEMENT FOREIGN AID UNION PROXY ECONOMIC COOPERATION TRADING MONETARY FUND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING NATURAL DISASTERS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CRITERIA MARKETS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AID FINANCING WORLD DEVELOPMENT TRUST ORGANIZATIONS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POST‐CONFLICT” COUNTRIES NEGOTIATIONS INCOME LEVELS ECONOMIC POLICIES LOANS HEALTH AID GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT TRUST FUNDS COLLECTIVE INTEREST ARMED CONFLICT FINANCE BANK POLICY DIRECTORS ALLOCATION DECISIONS INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE BANKS FOREIGN AID EQUITY GRANT DONOR COUNTRIES MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS IMF ACCOUNTABILITY MEMBER STATES TRANCHE ACCESS TO CAPITAL FUTURE VALUE MEMBER STATES INTERNATIONAL STUDIES DEVELOPMENT BANKS INVESTIGATION BANK BUDGETS AID INSTITUTIONS ASSOCIATION COLLECTIVE DISBURSEMENTS ECONOMY REFUGEE DEVELOPING‐COUNTRY FISCAL YEAR DEVELOPMENT AID INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY SHARES MARKET UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL BILATERAL” AID INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IFC GOVERNANCE SHAREHOLDERS RECIPIENT COUNTRIES INTERESTS PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION STATE GOODS SECURITY TRUSTEE DEVELOPMENT AID WAR HEALTH AID IBRD SHARE ORGANIZATION EQUALITY TRUST‐FUNDS POVERTY CRISES BILATERAL AID MULTILATERAL AGENCIES BOARD MEMBERS DEVELOPMENT FINANCE UNIVERSITY FINANCIAL SUPPORT RECIPIENT COUNTRY LENDING TRUST FUND INTERNATIONAL BANK AID FLOWS DONOR COUNTRIES FINANCIAL SERVICES STATISTICAL ANALYSIS POST‐CONFLICT COUNTRIES FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING PRIVATE COMPANIES EXCHANGE RATE INSTRUMENT RATES OF INTEREST GOVERNMENTS ARREARS AID FLOWS RECIPIENT COUNTRY WORLD DEVELOPMENT RECONSTRUCTION ECONOMIES HUMAN DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES Over the past decade, donors of foreign aid quadrupled their annual contributions to trust funds at the World Bank. This earmarking of contributions to donors' preferred recipient countries and issues has raised concerns about the alignment of trust funds with the performance-based allocations of aid by the International Development Association, the World Bank's concessional lending arm, and raises the question of the role of this new "multi-bi" aid channel. This study finds that the cross-country allocations of aggregate trust fund aid are poverty- and policy-selective. In this respect, they are much more similar to allocations from the International Development Association than from bilateral donors. The allocations of trust fund types that are more closely controlled by donor countries—recipient-executed and single-donor trust funds—are more strongly related to the strategic interests of donor countries than trust fund aid in general. Trust funds for health and education aid are poverty selective and positively correlated with the World Bank's assessment of the quality of countries' sector policies, while environmental trust funds are neither poverty selective nor correlated with the assessed quality of countries' environmental policies. Overall, the evidence indicates that multi-bi funds administered by the World Bank do not undermine the International Development Association’s allocation criteria. 2016-07-07T22:17:34Z 2016-07-07T22:17:34Z 2016-06 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/06/26532670/poverty-policy-selectivity-world-bank-trust-funds http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24648 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7731 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper |