Nash on a Rotary : Two Theorems with Implications for Electoral Politics

Nash on a Rotary : Two Theorems with Implications for Electoral Politics

The paper provides a complete characterization of Nash equilibria for games in which n candidates choose a strategy in the form of a platform, each from a circle of feasible platforms, with the aim of maximizing the stretch of the circle from where...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Basu, Kaushik, Mitra, Tapan
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2016
Subjects:
OPEN ACCESS
COMMON
CHOICE
GOODS
THEORY
EXERCISE
LEAD
VOTERS
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS
ARC
VALUE
GAME THEORY
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
PLATFORM
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION
EQUILIBRIA
POLITICAL ECONOMY
COURNOT COMPETITION
PROPERTY
PROPERTIES
DECISION MAKING
DISTRIBUTION
EQUILIBRIUM
OUTCOMES
BENCHMARK
ECONOMIC THEORY
ECONOMICS
DEVELOPMENT POLICY
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/06/26449085/nash-rotary-two-theorems-implications-electoral-politics
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24538

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/06/26449085/nash-rotary-two-theorems-implications-electoral-politics
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24538

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