Nash on a Rotary : Two Theorems with Implications for Electoral Politics

The paper provides a complete characterization of Nash equilibria for games in which n candidates choose a strategy in the form of a platform, each from a circle of feasible platforms, with the aim of maximizing the stretch of the circle from where...

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Main Authors:	Basu, Kaushik, Mitra, Tapan
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2016
Subjects:	OPEN ACCESS COMMON CHOICE GOODS THEORY EXERCISE LEAD VOTERS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ARC VALUE GAME THEORY NASH EQUILIBRIUM PLATFORM MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION EQUILIBRIA POLITICAL ECONOMY COURNOT COMPETITION PROPERTY PROPERTIES DECISION MAKING DISTRIBUTION EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES BENCHMARK ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/06/26449085/nash-rotary-two-theorems-implications-electoral-politics http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24538

id	okr-10986-24538
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-245382021-04-23T14:04:22Z Nash on a Rotary : Two Theorems with Implications for Electoral Politics Basu, Kaushik Mitra, Tapan OPEN ACCESS COMMON CHOICE GOODS THEORY EXERCISE LEAD VOTERS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ARC VALUE GAME THEORY NASH EQUILIBRIUM PLATFORM MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION EQUILIBRIA POLITICAL ECONOMY COURNOT COMPETITION PROPERTY PROPERTIES DECISION MAKING DISTRIBUTION EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES BENCHMARK ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY The paper provides a complete characterization of Nash equilibria for games in which n candidates choose a strategy in the form of a platform, each from a circle of feasible platforms, with the aim of maximizing the stretch of the circle from where the candidate’s platform will receive support from the voters. Using this characterization, it is shown that if the sum of all players’ payoffs is 1, the Nash equilibrium payoff of each player in an arbitrary Nash equilibrium must be restricted to the interval [1/2(n − 1), 2/(n + 1)]. This implies that in an election with four candidates, a candidate who is attracting less than one-sixth of the voters can do better by changing his or her strategy. 2016-06-14T22:11:22Z 2016-06-14T22:11:22Z 2016-06 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/06/26449085/nash-rotary-two-theorems-implications-electoral-politics http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24538 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7701 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	OPEN ACCESS COMMON CHOICE GOODS THEORY EXERCISE LEAD VOTERS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ARC VALUE GAME THEORY NASH EQUILIBRIUM PLATFORM MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION EQUILIBRIA POLITICAL ECONOMY COURNOT COMPETITION PROPERTY PROPERTIES DECISION MAKING DISTRIBUTION EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES BENCHMARK ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY
spellingShingle	OPEN ACCESS COMMON CHOICE GOODS THEORY EXERCISE LEAD VOTERS DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS ARC VALUE GAME THEORY NASH EQUILIBRIUM PLATFORM MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION EQUILIBRIA POLITICAL ECONOMY COURNOT COMPETITION PROPERTY PROPERTIES DECISION MAKING DISTRIBUTION EQUILIBRIUM OUTCOMES BENCHMARK ECONOMIC THEORY ECONOMICS DEVELOPMENT POLICY Basu, Kaushik Mitra, Tapan Nash on a Rotary : Two Theorems with Implications for Electoral Politics
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7701
description	The paper provides a complete characterization of Nash equilibria for games in which n candidates choose a strategy in the form of a platform, each from a circle of feasible platforms, with the aim of maximizing the stretch of the circle from where the candidate’s platform will receive support from the voters. Using this characterization, it is shown that if the sum of all players’ payoffs is 1, the Nash equilibrium payoff of each player in an arbitrary Nash equilibrium must be restricted to the interval [1/2(n − 1), 2/(n + 1)]. This implies that in an election with four candidates, a candidate who is attracting less than one-sixth of the voters can do better by changing his or her strategy.
format	Working Paper
author	Basu, Kaushik Mitra, Tapan
author_facet	Basu, Kaushik Mitra, Tapan
author_sort	Basu, Kaushik
title	Nash on a Rotary : Two Theorems with Implications for Electoral Politics
title_short	Nash on a Rotary : Two Theorems with Implications for Electoral Politics
title_full	Nash on a Rotary : Two Theorems with Implications for Electoral Politics
title_fullStr	Nash on a Rotary : Two Theorems with Implications for Electoral Politics
title_full_unstemmed	Nash on a Rotary : Two Theorems with Implications for Electoral Politics
title_sort	nash on a rotary : two theorems with implications for electoral politics
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2016
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2016/06/26449085/nash-rotary-two-theorems-implications-electoral-politics http://hdl.handle.net/10986/24538
_version_	1764456983602135040

Nash on a Rotary : Two Theorems with Implications for Electoral Politics

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