Analysis of Potential Work Disincentive Effects of the Monthly Benefit for Poor Families in the Kyrgyz Republic
The objective of this report was to address the concerns with respect to potential disincentive effects to labor participation of the only poverty-targeted social protection program in the Kyrgyz Republic, the Monthly Benefit for Poor Families with...
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Format: | Report |
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2015
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Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/10/25132486/analysis-potential-work-disincentive-effects-monthly-benefit-poor-families-kyrgyz-republic http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22966 |
Summary: | The objective of this report was to
address the concerns with respect to potential disincentive
effects to labor participation of the only poverty-targeted
social protection program in the Kyrgyz Republic, the
Monthly Benefit for Poor Families with Children (MBPF). The
benefit provided by the program is the only social
assistance transfer in the Kyrgyz Republic specifically
targeted at extremely poor households with children. It is a
means-tested transfer that provides monthly cash benefits to
lift per capita income of each child in eligible households
to the Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI). The report examines
the MBPF from different angles. First, the report reviews
the design features of the MBPF, focusing on the targeting
method and the size of the benefit, with respect to
household incomes, consumption and formal and informal wages
by economic sector. Secondly, it compares the demographic
profile, including labor force participation outcomes, of
MBPF beneficiaries to that of non-beneficiaries. The
comparison of the labor force participation status of
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries focus on the group of
people which could be expected to be economically active and
have children. The reference group is comprised of the
able-bodied working age population (aged 18-62 years old),
excluding full time students, living in households with
children under 18 years old. Thirdly, it empirically
analyzes the potential disincentives for labor force
participation of the MBPF, using a quasi-experimental method
to analyze the difference in labor market outcomes between
MBPF beneficiaries and individuals with similar
characteristics, but which are not receiving a transfer. |
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