On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia

On the Effects of Enforcement on Illegal Markets : Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment in Colombia

This paper studies the effects of enforcement on illegal behavior in the context of a large aerial spraying program designed to curb coca cultivation in Colombia. In 2006, the Colombian government pledged not to spray a 10 km band around the fronti...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Mejía, Daniel, Restrepo, Pascual, Rozo, Sandra V.
Format: Working Paper
Language:English
en_US
Published: World Bank, Washington, DC 2015
Subjects:
CHEMICALS
POLICIES
CROP
COCA
MILITARY
PLANTATIONS
SPRAYING
TIME
MOLASSES
POLICE
RESEARCH WORKING PAPERS
VALIDITY
CRIMES
INTERDICTION
TERRORIST
CULTIVATION
BANK
GOVERNMENT
ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES
STRATEGIES
FINANCIAL RESOURCES
INFORMATION
SERVICES
FUMIGATION
ILLEGAL CROPS
CELL
PLANTING
EFFECTS
CRIME
SURVEYS
POLICY
WEEDS
MEASURES
ESTIMATORS
ATTACKS
CELLS
JUSTICE
TERRORIST ATTACK
WEIGHT
TERRORIST ATTACKS
CRIMINALS
EVIDENCE
PLANTS
THEORY
THEFTS
TECHNIQUES
SCIENTISTS
ESTIMATING
SECURITY
SPACE
PENALTIES
ILLEGAL ACTIVITY
GRASSES
METHODOLOGIES
TESTS
SEEDS
LABORATORIES
YIELDS
AERIAL SPRAYING
ESTIMATES
DOCUMENTS
ORGANIZATIONS
HERBICIDES
AGREEMENT
STRATEGY
CONFIDENCE
RESEARCH
METHODOLOGY
ARMED FORCES
ROBBERIES
FARMERS
GOVERNMENTS
CROPS
TESTING
ATTACK
GRANTS
POLICE OFFICERS
Online Access:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/09/24990286/effects-enforcement-illegal-markets-evidence-quasi-experiment-colombia
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22665

Internet

http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/09/24990286/effects-enforcement-illegal-markets-evidence-quasi-experiment-colombia
http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22665

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