Public Good Provision in Indian Rural Areas : The Returns to Collective Action by Microfinance Groups
Self-help groups (SHGs) are the most common form of microfinance in India. The authors provide evidence that SHGs, composed of women only, undertake collective actions for the provision of public goods within village communities. Using a theoretica...
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| Format: | Working Paper |
| Language: | English en_US |
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World Bank, Washington, DC
2015
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| Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/08/24925624/public-good-provision-indian-rural-areas-returns-collective-action-microfinance-groups http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22654 |
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okr-10986-226542021-04-23T14:04:10Z Public Good Provision in Indian Rural Areas : The Returns to Collective Action by Microfinance Groups Casini, Paolo Vandewalle, Lore Wahhaj, Zaki EMPOWERMENT LIMITED NGO HOLDING SOCIAL NORMS INCENTIVE FOCUS GROUP LOCAL AUTHORITIES PRODUCTION INTEREST SAVINGS ACCOUNTS EXCHANGE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES POLITICAL ECONOMY WELFARE COMPANIES FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS INCENTIVES EQUILIBRIUM POLICY DISCUSSIONS VARIABLES NEGATIVE EXTERNALITY BORROWERS INPUTS WEALTH INTERNATIONAL BANK ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM PENSION BUDGET DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY MEMBERS CHOICE SOCIAL IMPACT STATES INFLUENCE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT SAVINGS GROUP LENDING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS RISK FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AGENDA EXTERNALITIES TRUST ORGANIZATIONS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ANTI-POVERTY LAND OWNERSHIP LOANS UTILITY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORS BANK POLICY TAXES BANKS SMALL LOANS RESOURCES EXTERNALITY CONSUMPTION DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OPPORTUNITY COST GOOD ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE CAPITAL SOCIAL JUSTICE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS DERIVATIVE FUTURE PUBLIC POLICIES VALUE BANK RETURNS CONTRIBUTIONS UTILITY FUNCTION ASSOCIATION CONTRACT POLICY FORUM COLLECTIVE AGRICULTURE SOCIAL SCIENCE PROPERTY COST MARKET ECONOMICS PRODUCTION FUNCTION CITIZENS MICROCREDIT COMMUNITY LEVEL MICROFINANCE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INTERESTS COLLECTIVE ACTIONS STATE GOODS LAND MUNICIPALITY THEORY INVESTMENT NATIONAL BANK EXPECTED UTILITY COMMERCIAL BANKS POVERTY ALLOCATION SUPPLY INDIVIDUALS DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH NASH EQUILIBRIUM UNIVERSITY INVESTMENTS LENDING CHECK UNDERESTIMATES COMMUNITY INSTRUMENT PRIVATE CITIZENS COLLECTIVE ACTION OUTCOMES CETERIS PARIBUS MARGINAL UTILITY PUBLIC GOOD GUARANTEE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA DEVELOPMENT POLICY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PUBLIC GOODS Self-help groups (SHGs) are the most common form of microfinance in India. The authors provide evidence that SHGs, composed of women only, undertake collective actions for the provision of public goods within village communities. Using a theoretical model, this paper shows that an elected official, whose aim is to maximize re-election chances, exerts higher effort in providing public goods when private citizens undertake collective action and coordinate their voluntary contributions towards the same goods. This effect occurs although government and private contributions are assumed to be substitutes in the technology of providing public goods. Using first-hand data on SHGs in India, the paper tests the prediction of the model and shows that, in response to collective action by SHGs, local authorities tackle a larger variety of public issues, and are more likely to tackle issues of interest to SHGs. The findings highlight how the social behavior of SHGs can influence the governance of rural Indian communities. 2015-09-23T15:32:49Z 2015-09-23T15:32:49Z 2015-08 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/08/24925624/public-good-provision-indian-rural-areas-returns-collective-action-microfinance-groups http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22654 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7397 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper South Asia India |
| repository_type |
Digital Repository |
| institution_category |
Foreign Institution |
| institution |
Digital Repositories |
| building |
World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| collection |
World Bank |
| language |
English en_US |
| topic |
EMPOWERMENT LIMITED NGO HOLDING SOCIAL NORMS INCENTIVE FOCUS GROUP LOCAL AUTHORITIES PRODUCTION INTEREST SAVINGS ACCOUNTS EXCHANGE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES POLITICAL ECONOMY WELFARE COMPANIES FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS INCENTIVES EQUILIBRIUM POLICY DISCUSSIONS VARIABLES NEGATIVE EXTERNALITY BORROWERS INPUTS WEALTH INTERNATIONAL BANK ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM PENSION BUDGET DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY MEMBERS CHOICE SOCIAL IMPACT STATES INFLUENCE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT SAVINGS GROUP LENDING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS RISK FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AGENDA EXTERNALITIES TRUST ORGANIZATIONS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ANTI-POVERTY LAND OWNERSHIP LOANS UTILITY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORS BANK POLICY TAXES BANKS SMALL LOANS RESOURCES EXTERNALITY CONSUMPTION DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OPPORTUNITY COST GOOD ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE CAPITAL SOCIAL JUSTICE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS DERIVATIVE FUTURE PUBLIC POLICIES VALUE BANK RETURNS CONTRIBUTIONS UTILITY FUNCTION ASSOCIATION CONTRACT POLICY FORUM COLLECTIVE AGRICULTURE SOCIAL SCIENCE PROPERTY COST MARKET ECONOMICS PRODUCTION FUNCTION CITIZENS MICROCREDIT COMMUNITY LEVEL MICROFINANCE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INTERESTS COLLECTIVE ACTIONS STATE GOODS LAND MUNICIPALITY THEORY INVESTMENT NATIONAL BANK EXPECTED UTILITY COMMERCIAL BANKS POVERTY ALLOCATION SUPPLY INDIVIDUALS DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH NASH EQUILIBRIUM UNIVERSITY INVESTMENTS LENDING CHECK UNDERESTIMATES COMMUNITY INSTRUMENT PRIVATE CITIZENS COLLECTIVE ACTION OUTCOMES CETERIS PARIBUS MARGINAL UTILITY PUBLIC GOOD GUARANTEE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA DEVELOPMENT POLICY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PUBLIC GOODS |
| spellingShingle |
EMPOWERMENT LIMITED NGO HOLDING SOCIAL NORMS INCENTIVE FOCUS GROUP LOCAL AUTHORITIES PRODUCTION INTEREST SAVINGS ACCOUNTS EXCHANGE LOCAL GOVERNMENTS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES POLITICAL ECONOMY WELFARE COMPANIES FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS INCENTIVES EQUILIBRIUM POLICY DISCUSSIONS VARIABLES NEGATIVE EXTERNALITY BORROWERS INPUTS WEALTH INTERNATIONAL BANK ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM PENSION BUDGET DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY MEMBERS CHOICE SOCIAL IMPACT STATES INFLUENCE COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT SAVINGS GROUP LENDING DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS RISK FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AGENDA EXTERNALITIES TRUST ORGANIZATIONS INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ANTI-POVERTY LAND OWNERSHIP LOANS UTILITY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT DIRECTORS BANK POLICY TAXES BANKS SMALL LOANS RESOURCES EXTERNALITY CONSUMPTION DOMESTIC VIOLENCE OPPORTUNITY COST GOOD ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE CAPITAL SOCIAL JUSTICE ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS DERIVATIVE FUTURE PUBLIC POLICIES VALUE BANK RETURNS CONTRIBUTIONS UTILITY FUNCTION ASSOCIATION CONTRACT POLICY FORUM COLLECTIVE AGRICULTURE SOCIAL SCIENCE PROPERTY COST MARKET ECONOMICS PRODUCTION FUNCTION CITIZENS MICROCREDIT COMMUNITY LEVEL MICROFINANCE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INTERESTS COLLECTIVE ACTIONS STATE GOODS LAND MUNICIPALITY THEORY INVESTMENT NATIONAL BANK EXPECTED UTILITY COMMERCIAL BANKS POVERTY ALLOCATION SUPPLY INDIVIDUALS DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH NASH EQUILIBRIUM UNIVERSITY INVESTMENTS LENDING CHECK UNDERESTIMATES COMMUNITY INSTRUMENT PRIVATE CITIZENS COLLECTIVE ACTION OUTCOMES CETERIS PARIBUS MARGINAL UTILITY PUBLIC GOOD GUARANTEE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA DEVELOPMENT POLICY HUMAN DEVELOPMENT PUBLIC GOODS Casini, Paolo Vandewalle, Lore Wahhaj, Zaki Public Good Provision in Indian Rural Areas : The Returns to Collective Action by Microfinance Groups |
| geographic_facet |
South Asia India |
| relation |
Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7397 |
| description |
Self-help groups (SHGs) are the most
common form of microfinance in India. The authors provide
evidence that SHGs, composed of women only, undertake
collective actions for the provision of public goods within
village communities. Using a theoretical model, this paper
shows that an elected official, whose aim is to maximize
re-election chances, exerts higher effort in providing
public goods when private citizens undertake collective
action and coordinate their voluntary contributions towards
the same goods. This effect occurs although government and
private contributions are assumed to be substitutes in the
technology of providing public goods. Using first-hand data
on SHGs in India, the paper tests the prediction of the
model and shows that, in response to collective action by
SHGs, local authorities tackle a larger variety of public
issues, and are more likely to tackle issues of interest to
SHGs. The findings highlight how the social behavior of SHGs
can influence the governance of rural Indian communities. |
| format |
Working Paper |
| author |
Casini, Paolo Vandewalle, Lore Wahhaj, Zaki |
| author_facet |
Casini, Paolo Vandewalle, Lore Wahhaj, Zaki |
| author_sort |
Casini, Paolo |
| title |
Public Good Provision in Indian Rural Areas : The Returns to Collective Action by Microfinance Groups |
| title_short |
Public Good Provision in Indian Rural Areas : The Returns to Collective Action by Microfinance Groups |
| title_full |
Public Good Provision in Indian Rural Areas : The Returns to Collective Action by Microfinance Groups |
| title_fullStr |
Public Good Provision in Indian Rural Areas : The Returns to Collective Action by Microfinance Groups |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Public Good Provision in Indian Rural Areas : The Returns to Collective Action by Microfinance Groups |
| title_sort |
public good provision in indian rural areas : the returns to collective action by microfinance groups |
| publisher |
World Bank, Washington, DC |
| publishDate |
2015 |
| url |
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/08/24925624/public-good-provision-indian-rural-areas-returns-collective-action-microfinance-groups http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22654 |
| _version_ |
1764451681688354816 |