Charter School Entry and School Choice : The Case of Washington, D.C.
This paper develops and estimates an equilibrium model of charter school entry and school choice. In the model, households choose among public, private, and charter schools, and a regulator authorizes charter entry and mandates charter exit. The mo...
Main Authors: | , |
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Format: | Working Paper |
Language: | English en_US |
Published: |
World Bank, Washington, DC
2015
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/07/24839593/charter-school-entry-school-choice-case-washington-dc http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22465 |
Summary: | This paper develops and estimates an
equilibrium model of charter school entry and school choice.
In the model, households choose among public, private, and
charter schools, and a regulator authorizes charter entry
and mandates charter exit. The model is estimated for
Washington, D.C. According to the estimates, charters
generate net social gains by providing additional school
options, and they benefit non-white, low-income, and
middle-school students the most. Further, policies that
raise the supply of prospective charter entrants in
combination with high authorization standards enhance social welfare. |
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