Electoral Rules and Political Selection : Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan

Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This paper explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representat...

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Main Authors:	Beath, Andrew, Christia, Fotini, Egorov, Georgy, Enikolopov, Ruben
Format:	Working Paper
Language:	English en_US
Published:	World Bank, Washington, DC 2015
Subjects:	POLICY ISSUE COMMUNITIES FOCUS GROUP NATIONAL PARLIAMENT VILLAGES DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS POLITICS CONSULTATION BRIBES VILLAGE BY ELECTION GOVERNMENT LEGISLATOR POLITICAL CAREERS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS POLITICAL THEORY DATA COLLECTION DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE GAMES INFORMATION SERVICES PARTY COMPETITION REPRESENTATIVE BODIES INCENTIVES ECONOMIC POLICY LOCAL ELECTIONS PROJECTS PROJECT PARLIAMENT ELECTORAL SYSTEM POLICY POSITION CITIES CORRUPTION OVERSIGHT ELECTORAL SYSTEMS CREDIBILITY DETAILED INFORMATION PUBLIC POLICY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT TRAINING EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT INTERVENTION RENT CIVIL SOCIETY VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY POLITICAL POWER CANDIDATES RESIDENCES INHABITANTS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS FIGURES ACCESS REPRESENTATIVES PARLIAMENTS GRANTS PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY POLITICAL SYSTEM DESIGN GRANT ELECTIONS CONSTITUENTS INTERVIEWS ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS FAIRS DESCRIPTION PARTICIPATION MOBILE PHONE SURVEY GENDER HOMES CASTING VOTES POLICY STUDIES REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS WORKSHOP OCCUPATION HOUSEHOLD CONSTITUENCY DECISION MAKING LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES OPENNESS GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT HOUSE OF COMMONS ELIGIBLE VOTERS SOCIAL WELFARE POLITICAL PARTIES DEMOCRACIES POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION CONSENSUS VILLAGE LEVEL HOUSEHOLDS PARTNERS ELECTORATE LOCAL PARTICIPATION DWELLINGS FACILITIES LOCAL LEADERS HOUSES INTERVENTIONS LEGISLATORS REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PUBLIC SERVICE GOVERNMENTS INTERMEDIARIES POLLING STATION ELECTION PUBLIC GOOD FEMALE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES DIRECT DEMOCRACY SERVICE DISTRICTS DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES RECONSTRUCTION PUBLIC GOODS
Online Access:	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/07/24775055/electoral-rules-political-selection-theory-evidence-field-experiment-afghanistan http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22446

id	okr-10986-22446
recordtype	oai_dc
spelling	okr-10986-224462021-04-23T14:04:08Z Electoral Rules and Political Selection : Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan Beath, Andrew Christia, Fotini Egorov, Georgy Enikolopov, Ruben POLICY ISSUE COMMUNITIES FOCUS GROUP NATIONAL PARLIAMENT VILLAGES DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS POLITICS CONSULTATION BRIBES VILLAGE BY ELECTION GOVERNMENT LEGISLATOR POLITICAL CAREERS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS POLITICAL THEORY DATA COLLECTION DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE GAMES INFORMATION SERVICES PARTY COMPETITION REPRESENTATIVE BODIES INCENTIVES ECONOMIC POLICY LOCAL ELECTIONS PROJECTS PROJECT PARLIAMENT ELECTORAL SYSTEM POLICY POSITION CITIES CORRUPTION OVERSIGHT ELECTORAL SYSTEMS CREDIBILITY DETAILED INFORMATION PUBLIC POLICY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT TRAINING EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT INTERVENTION RENT CIVIL SOCIETY VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY POLITICAL POWER CANDIDATES RESIDENCES INHABITANTS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS FIGURES ACCESS REPRESENTATIVES PARLIAMENTS GRANTS PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY POLITICAL SYSTEM DESIGN GRANT ELECTIONS CONSTITUENTS INTERVIEWS ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS FAIRS DESCRIPTION PARTICIPATION MOBILE PHONE SURVEY GENDER HOMES CASTING VOTES POLICY STUDIES REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS WORKSHOP OCCUPATION HOUSEHOLD CONSTITUENCY DECISION MAKING LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES OPENNESS GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT HOUSE OF COMMONS ELIGIBLE VOTERS SOCIAL WELFARE POLITICAL PARTIES DEMOCRACIES POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION CONSENSUS VILLAGE LEVEL HOUSEHOLDS PARTNERS ELECTORATE LOCAL PARTICIPATION DWELLINGS FACILITIES LOCAL LEADERS HOUSES INTERVENTIONS LEGISLATORS REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PUBLIC SERVICE GOVERNMENTS INTERMEDIARIES POLLING STATION ELECTION PUBLIC GOOD FEMALE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES DIRECT DEMOCRACY SERVICE DISTRICTS DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES RECONSTRUCTION PUBLIC GOODS Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This paper explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and policy outcomes. The paper shows formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single-member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates. Results from a unique field experiment in Afghanistan are consistent with these predictions. Specifically, representatives elected in elections with a single multi-member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences. 2015-08-17T18:50:45Z 2015-08-17T18:50:45Z 2015-07 Working Paper http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/07/24775055/electoral-rules-political-selection-theory-evidence-field-experiment-afghanistan http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22446 English en_US Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7361 CC BY 3.0 IGO http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/igo/ World Bank World Bank, Washington, DC Publications & Research Publications & Research :: Policy Research Working Paper South Asia Afghanistan
repository_type	Digital Repository
institution_category	Foreign Institution
institution	Digital Repositories
building	World Bank Open Knowledge Repository
collection	World Bank
language	English en_US
topic	POLICY ISSUE COMMUNITIES FOCUS GROUP NATIONAL PARLIAMENT VILLAGES DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS POLITICS CONSULTATION BRIBES VILLAGE BY ELECTION GOVERNMENT LEGISLATOR POLITICAL CAREERS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS POLITICAL THEORY DATA COLLECTION DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE GAMES INFORMATION SERVICES PARTY COMPETITION REPRESENTATIVE BODIES INCENTIVES ECONOMIC POLICY LOCAL ELECTIONS PROJECTS PROJECT PARLIAMENT ELECTORAL SYSTEM POLICY POSITION CITIES CORRUPTION OVERSIGHT ELECTORAL SYSTEMS CREDIBILITY DETAILED INFORMATION PUBLIC POLICY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT TRAINING EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT INTERVENTION RENT CIVIL SOCIETY VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY POLITICAL POWER CANDIDATES RESIDENCES INHABITANTS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS FIGURES ACCESS REPRESENTATIVES PARLIAMENTS GRANTS PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY POLITICAL SYSTEM DESIGN GRANT ELECTIONS CONSTITUENTS INTERVIEWS ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS FAIRS DESCRIPTION PARTICIPATION MOBILE PHONE SURVEY GENDER HOMES CASTING VOTES POLICY STUDIES REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS WORKSHOP OCCUPATION HOUSEHOLD CONSTITUENCY DECISION MAKING LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES OPENNESS GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT HOUSE OF COMMONS ELIGIBLE VOTERS SOCIAL WELFARE POLITICAL PARTIES DEMOCRACIES POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION CONSENSUS VILLAGE LEVEL HOUSEHOLDS PARTNERS ELECTORATE LOCAL PARTICIPATION DWELLINGS FACILITIES LOCAL LEADERS HOUSES INTERVENTIONS LEGISLATORS REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PUBLIC SERVICE GOVERNMENTS INTERMEDIARIES POLLING STATION ELECTION PUBLIC GOOD FEMALE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES DIRECT DEMOCRACY SERVICE DISTRICTS DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES RECONSTRUCTION PUBLIC GOODS
spellingShingle	POLICY ISSUE COMMUNITIES FOCUS GROUP NATIONAL PARLIAMENT VILLAGES DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS POLITICS CONSULTATION BRIBES VILLAGE BY ELECTION GOVERNMENT LEGISLATOR POLITICAL CAREERS LOCAL GOVERNMENTS POLITICAL THEORY DATA COLLECTION DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE GAMES INFORMATION SERVICES PARTY COMPETITION REPRESENTATIVE BODIES INCENTIVES ECONOMIC POLICY LOCAL ELECTIONS PROJECTS PROJECT PARLIAMENT ELECTORAL SYSTEM POLICY POSITION CITIES CORRUPTION OVERSIGHT ELECTORAL SYSTEMS CREDIBILITY DETAILED INFORMATION PUBLIC POLICY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT TRAINING EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT INTERVENTION RENT CIVIL SOCIETY VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT ELECTED REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY POLITICAL POWER CANDIDATES RESIDENCES INHABITANTS DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS FIGURES ACCESS REPRESENTATIVES PARLIAMENTS GRANTS PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY POLITICAL SYSTEM DESIGN GRANT ELECTIONS CONSTITUENTS INTERVIEWS ACCOUNTABILITY POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS FAIRS DESCRIPTION PARTICIPATION MOBILE PHONE SURVEY GENDER HOMES CASTING VOTES POLICY STUDIES REPRESENTATIVE INSTITUTIONS WORKSHOP OCCUPATION HOUSEHOLD CONSTITUENCY DECISION MAKING LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES OPENNESS GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION HUMAN CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT HOUSE OF COMMONS ELIGIBLE VOTERS SOCIAL WELFARE POLITICAL PARTIES DEMOCRACIES POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION CONSENSUS VILLAGE LEVEL HOUSEHOLDS PARTNERS ELECTORATE LOCAL PARTICIPATION DWELLINGS FACILITIES LOCAL LEADERS HOUSES INTERVENTIONS LEGISLATORS REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PUBLIC SERVICE GOVERNMENTS INTERMEDIARIES POLLING STATION ELECTION PUBLIC GOOD FEMALE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES DIRECT DEMOCRACY SERVICE DISTRICTS DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES RECONSTRUCTION PUBLIC GOODS Beath, Andrew Christia, Fotini Egorov, Georgy Enikolopov, Ruben Electoral Rules and Political Selection : Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan
geographic_facet	South Asia Afghanistan
relation	Policy Research Working Paper;No. 7361
description	Voters commonly face a choice between competent candidates and those with policy preferences similar to their own. This paper explores how electoral rules, such as district magnitude, mediate this trade-off and affect the composition of representative bodies and policy outcomes. The paper shows formally that anticipation of bargaining over policy causes voters in elections with multiple single-member districts to prefer candidates with polarized policy positions over more competent candidates. Results from a unique field experiment in Afghanistan are consistent with these predictions. Specifically, representatives elected in elections with a single multi-member district are better educated and exhibit less extreme policy preferences.
format	Working Paper
author	Beath, Andrew Christia, Fotini Egorov, Georgy Enikolopov, Ruben
author_facet	Beath, Andrew Christia, Fotini Egorov, Georgy Enikolopov, Ruben
author_sort	Beath, Andrew
title	Electoral Rules and Political Selection : Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan
title_short	Electoral Rules and Political Selection : Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan
title_full	Electoral Rules and Political Selection : Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan
title_fullStr	Electoral Rules and Political Selection : Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan
title_full_unstemmed	Electoral Rules and Political Selection : Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan
title_sort	electoral rules and political selection : theory and evidence from a field experiment in afghanistan
publisher	World Bank, Washington, DC
publishDate	2015
url	http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2015/07/24775055/electoral-rules-political-selection-theory-evidence-field-experiment-afghanistan http://hdl.handle.net/10986/22446
_version_	1764451063616765952

Electoral Rules and Political Selection : Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Afghanistan

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